Detect DLL Side-Loading in IBM QRadar
Adversaries execute malicious payloads by placing a malicious DLL alongside a legitimate, often digitally-signed, application and then invoking that application. Unlike passive DLL search order hijacking (which waits for a victim to run an application), DLL side-loading is active: the adversary both plants the DLL and triggers the legitimate executable. This allows malicious code to run under the cover of a trusted process signature. Common victim executables include security tools, game clients, and enterprise software (e.g., VMware, Symantec, LogMeIn). Widely used by APT groups including MuddyWater, Mustang Panda/TONESHELL, Cobalt Strike operators, and numerous others.
MITRE ATT&CK
- Canonical reference
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574/002/
QRadar Detection Query
SELECT
DATEFORMAT(devicetime, 'yyyy-MM-dd HH:mm:ss') AS event_time,
logsourcename(logsourceid) AS log_source,
"sourceip",
"username",
"FileName" AS loaded_dll,
"ImageLoaded" AS dll_path,
"Image" AS loading_process,
"Signed",
"SignatureStatus",
"Hashes",
CASE
WHEN LOWER("Image") ILIKE ANY ('%symantec%','%norton%','%vmware%','%logmein%','%teamviewer%','%anydesk%','%cisco%','%adobe%','%microsoft%')
THEN 'HIGH'
ELSE 'MEDIUM'
END AS severity
FROM events
WHERE
LOGSOURCETYPEID = 12 -- Windows
AND QIDNAME(qid) ILIKE '%sysmon%'
AND "EventID" = '7'
AND ("Signed" = 'false' OR "Signed" IS NULL OR "SignatureStatus" != 'Valid')
AND (
LOWER("ImageLoaded") ILIKE '%\\appdata\\%'
OR LOWER("ImageLoaded") ILIKE '%\\temp\\%'
OR LOWER("ImageLoaded") ILIKE '%\\programdata\\%'
OR LOWER("ImageLoaded") ILIKE '%\\users\\public\\%'
OR LOWER("ImageLoaded") ILIKE '%\\downloads\\%'
)
AND LAST 24 HOURS
ORDER BY devicetime DESCDetects DLL side-loading activity using Sysmon Event ID 7 (ImageLoad) forwarded to QRadar. Identifies unsigned DLLs loaded from user-writable suspicious directories and elevates severity when the loading process matches known legitimate vendor executables that are commonly abused for side-loading.
Data Sources
Required Tables
False Positives & Tuning
- Enterprise software deployment tools (SCCM, Intune) that stage DLL updates in ProgramData or Temp before loading them with signed binaries during patch cycles.
- Legitimate productivity software like Zoom, Slack, or Teams that loads unsigned plugin DLLs from AppData during updates or feature loading.
- Antivirus or endpoint protection products conducting on-access scanning that load unsigned scanning engine components from ProgramData directories.
Other platforms for T1574.002
Testing Methodology
Validate this detection against 3 adversary techniques from Atomic Red Team. Each test below lists the behaviour to exercise and the telemetry you should expect to see. Executable commands and cleanup steps are available with Pro.
- Test 1DLL Side-Loading via Renamed Legitimate Binary
Expected signal: Sysmon Event ID 11 (FileCreate): Both csc.exe and clrjit.dll created in same TEMP subdirectory within short timeframe. Sysmon Event ID 7 (ImageLoad): if csc.exe is executed, clrjit.dll would be loaded from the local directory first. DeviceFileEvents shows EXE+DLL creation in same writable path.
- Test 2Abusing VMware Binary for Side-Loading (Simulation)
Expected signal: Sysmon Event ID 11 (FileCreate): DLL created in user-writable TEMP location. DeviceFileEvents captures file creation event with SHA256 hash of the dummy DLL.
- Test 3PowerShell Verification of DLL Search Order
Expected signal: Sysmon Event ID 1 (Process Create): powershell.exe spawned with command enumerating PATH environment variable. PowerShell ScriptBlock Logging Event ID 4104 records the full script. No DLL loading events generated.
References (5)
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574/002/
- https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/global/en/current-threats/pdfs/rpt-dll-sideloading.pdf
- https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/dll-hijacking-techniques/
- https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1574.002/T1574.002.md
- https://news.sophos.com/en-us/2023/05/03/doubled-dll-sideloading-dragon-breath/
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