Detect System Services in Elastic Security
This detection identifies adversaries abusing Windows services, Linux systemd units, and macOS launchd daemons to execute malicious code. Attackers commonly leverage sc.exe, net start, PsExec, systemctl, and launchctl to create or start services that run attacker-controlled binaries. Indicators include services with suspicious binary paths (temp directories, user profile paths, UNC paths), service names mimicking legitimate system services, new service installations from unusual parent processes (cmd.exe, powershell.exe, wscript.exe), and service creations from non-standard accounts. This technique is frequently chained with lateral movement and persistence techniques to achieve remote code execution or maintain footholds across reboots.
MITRE ATT&CK
- Tactic
- Execution
- Technique
- T1569 System Services
- Canonical reference
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1569/
Elastic Detection Query
sequence by host.name with maxspan=5m
[
any where event.category == "process" and
process.name in~ ("sc.exe", "net.exe", "net1.exe") and
(
process.args : ("create", "start", "config", "binpath") and
(
process.parent.name in~ ("cmd.exe", "powershell.exe", "pwsh.exe", "wscript.exe", "cscript.exe", "mshta.exe", "rundll32.exe", "regsvr32.exe", "msiexec.exe") or
process.command_line : ("*binpath*\\Temp\\*", "*binpath*\\AppData\\*", "*binpath*\\Downloads\\*", "*binpath*\\Public\\*", "*binpath*\\Users\\*", "*cmd.exe /c*", "*powershell*")
)
)
] by process.pid
OR
sequence by host.name with maxspan=2m
[
any where event.category == "process" and
process.name in~ ("psexec.exe", "psexec64.exe", "paexec.exe", "remcom.exe", "csexec.exe")
] by process.pid
[
any where event.category == "process" and
process.name == "services.exe"
] by process.parent.pid
OR
any where event.category == "file" and event.action == "creation" and
(
file.path : ("*\\Temp\\*.exe", "*\\Temp\\*.dll", "*\\Users\\*\\AppData\\*.exe", "*\\Downloads\\*.exe", "*\\Public\\*.exe")
) and
process.name in~ ("services.exe", "sc.exe", "svchost.exe")Detects adversaries abusing Windows service creation and manipulation via suspicious binary paths, LOLBin service registrations, PsExec-style remote service creation, and service binaries dropped into temp or user-writable directories. Covers sc.exe/net.exe launched from scripting engines, PsExec chaining into services.exe, and new service executables written to suspicious filesystem locations.
Data Sources
Required Tables
False Positives & Tuning
- Legitimate software installers that use sc.exe from cmd.exe or PowerShell during installation pipelines (e.g., NSIS, Inno Setup, WiX toolchain installers).
- IT automation tools such as Ansible, Chef, or Puppet that invoke sc.exe or net.exe via cmd.exe wrappers to manage services during provisioning.
- Remote management agents (e.g., ConnectWise, Kaseya, Datto RMM) that create or modify services from AppData or ProgramData paths as part of their normal update mechanisms.
- Security software (EDR, AV) that installs kernel drivers or service components into non-standard paths during updates.
- PsExec used legitimately by sysadmins for remote task execution in environments where it is an approved tool.
Other platforms for T1569
Testing Methodology
Validate this detection against 4 adversary techniques from Atomic Red Team. Each test below lists the behaviour to exercise and the telemetry you should expect to see. Executable commands and cleanup steps are available with Pro.
- Test 1Create and Execute Malicious Service via sc.exe
Expected signal: SecurityEvent 7045 with ServiceName=AtomicTestSvc and ImagePath containing Temp directory; DeviceProcessEvents showing sc.exe with 'create' and 'binpath' in command line; parent process cmd.exe or PowerShell
- Test 2Remote Service Execution via PsExec Simulation
Expected signal: SecurityEvent 7045 on target host showing UNC path in ImagePath; Sysmon EventCode 3 (network) showing SMB connection to remote host; sc.exe process creation with remote hostname argument
- Test 3Linux Malicious Systemd Service Creation
Expected signal: Syslog or auditd entries showing systemctl execution; file creation event for /etc/systemd/system/atomic-test.service; bash process spawned by systemd with UID=0 executing id command
- Test 4Service Creation via PowerShell New-Service Cmdlet
Expected signal: SecurityEvent 7045 with ServiceName=PSAtomicTestSvc and ImagePath in %TEMP%; PowerShell ScriptBlock log EventID 4104 showing New-Service cmdlet; DeviceProcessEvents showing powershell.exe as initiating process for service creation API calls
References (9)
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1569/
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1569/001/
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1569/002/
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1569/003/
- https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-7045
- https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4697
- https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1569.002/T1569.002.md
- https://www.cybereason.com/blog/research/cybereason-vs-darkside-ransomware
- https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/wizard-spider-adversary-update/
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