Detect Launchctl in Sumo Logic CSE
Adversaries may abuse launchctl to execute commands or programs on macOS. Launchctl interfaces with launchd, the macOS service management framework, and supports subcommands including load, unload, start, stop, and kickstart. Adversaries use launchctl to execute payloads as Launch Agents (per-user persistence in ~/Library/LaunchAgents/ or /Library/LaunchAgents/) or Launch Daemons (system-level persistence in /Library/LaunchDaemons/). Common attack patterns include loading malicious plist files from world-writable directories such as /tmp, using the -w flag to force-enable disabled services, and invoking launchctl from scripting engines after initial access. Real-world threat actors using this technique include LoudMiner (QEMU-based cryptominer), Cuckoo Stealer, AppleJeus (North Korean cryptocurrency theft), macOS.OSAMiner, XCSSET (Xcode project infection), and Calisto spyware.
MITRE ATT&CK
- Tactic
- Execution
- Technique
- T1569 System Services
- Sub-technique
- T1569.001 Launchctl
- Canonical reference
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1569/001/
Sumo Detection Query
_sourceCategory=*osquery* OR _sourceCategory=*endpoint* OR _sourceCategory=*macos*
| where (%"columns.path" = "/usr/bin/launchctl" OR %"columns.path" = "/bin/launchctl" OR %"columns.cmdline" matches "*launchctl*")
| if(isNull(%"columns.cmdline"), "", %"columns.cmdline") as cmdline
| if(isNull(%"columns.parent_path"), "", %"columns.parent_path") as parent_path
| if(isNull(%"columns.username"), "", %"columns.username") as username
| if(isNull(%"columns.host"), _sourceHost, %"columns.host") as endpoint_host
| if(cmdline matches "*(/tmp/|/private/tmp/|/var/tmp/|/var/folders/|/Users/Shared/)*", 1, 0) as LoadFromTempPath
| if(cmdline matches "*launchctl load -w*", 1, 0) as ForceLoad
| if(cmdline matches "*launchctl kickstart*", 1, 0) as KickstartCmd
| if(cmdline matches "*launchctl bootstrap*", 1, 0) as BootstrapCmd
| if(parent_path matches "*(bash|sh|zsh|ksh|python|ruby|perl|osascript|curl|wget|node|npm)", 1, 0) as ScriptingParent
| if(cmdline matches "*/Users/*/Library/LaunchAgents/*", 1, 0) as LoadUserAgent
| LoadFromTempPath + ForceLoad + ScriptingParent + KickstartCmd as SuspicionScore
| where SuspicionScore > 0 or (LoadUserAgent = 1 and ScriptingParent = 1)
| fields _messagetime, endpoint_host, username, cmdline, parent_path, LoadFromTempPath, ForceLoad, ScriptingParent, LoadUserAgent, KickstartCmd, SuspicionScore
| sort by SuspicionScore desc, _messagetime descSumo Logic detection for T1569.001 launchctl abuse targeting macOS systems. Parses osquery or endpoint telemetry log sources to identify launchctl process executions loading from temporary or world-writable directories, using force-load flags, executing kickstart or bootstrap subcommands, or invoked by scripting engines and download utilities. Composite suspicion scoring matches KQL/SPL reference logic.
Data Sources
Required Tables
False Positives & Tuning
- macOS system updates or Apple software patches that invoke launchctl via shell scripts to reload system services during the update process
- Third-party application installers using curl or wget to download components and then calling launchctl to register background update agents
- Legitimate developer tools such as Docker Desktop, VirtualBox, or VMware Fusion that register system extensions or helpers using launchctl from non-standard paths
Other platforms for T1569.001
Testing Methodology
Validate this detection against 4 adversary techniques from Atomic Red Team. Each test below lists the behaviour to exercise and the telemetry you should expect to see. Executable commands and cleanup steps are available with Pro.
- Test 1Load LaunchAgent from /tmp (Malware Staging Pattern)
Expected signal: Process creation: launchctl with ProcessCommandLine containing 'load /tmp/com.df00tech.atomictest.plist'; parent process is the executing shell. Secondary process creation: /bin/sh spawned by launchd executing the RunAtLoad ProgramArguments. File creation: /tmp/launchctl_test_output.txt written by the loaded agent. macOS Unified Log entry for com.df00tech.atomictest service start under the current user's launchd domain.
- Test 2Load LaunchDaemon with Force-Enable Flag (-w) — XCSSET and LoudMiner Technique
Expected signal: Process creation: sudo followed by launchctl with ProcessCommandLine containing 'load -w /Library/LaunchDaemons/com.df00tech.daemontest.plist'. File creation event in /Library/LaunchDaemons/ directory (anomalous outside MDM-managed deployments). launchd override database updated at /var/db/launchd.db/. macOS Unified Log records bootstrap of com.df00tech.daemontest in the system launchd domain.
- Test 3Enable Screen Sharing via Launchctl — Calisto Spyware Technique
Expected signal: Process creation: launchctl with ProcessCommandLine 'load -w /System/Library/LaunchDaemons/com.apple.screensharing.plist'. Parent process is sudo/shell. macOS Unified Log records screensharing daemon activation. System Preferences -> Sharing would show Screen Sharing enabled. VNC listener appears on TCP port 5900 (detectable via network telemetry). launchd override database records screensharing as enabled.
- Test 4Launchctl Invoked from Python Dropper (Staged Execution Chain)
Expected signal: Process creation chain: python3 spawning /bin/launchctl as a child process. ProcessCommandLine for launchctl: 'load /tmp/com.df00tech.pytest.plist'. InitiatingProcessFileName: python3. This specific parent-child relationship (python3 → launchctl) is the key detection signal. Secondary process creation: /bin/sh running the ProgramArguments payload, spawned by launchd.
References (11)
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1569/001/
- https://ss64.com/osx/launchctl.html
- https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2016/09/unit42-sofacys-komplex-os-x-trojan/
- https://labs.sentinelone.com/20-common-tools-techniques-used-by-macos-threat-actors-malware/
- https://blog.kandji.io/cuckoo-stealer
- https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/alerts/aa21-048a
- https://securelist.com/calisto-trojan-for-macos/86543/
- https://www.trendmicro.com/en_us/research/20/h/xcsset-mac-malware--infects-xcode-projects--uses-zero-day-exploit.html
- https://www.welivesecurity.com/2019/07/09/mac-cryptocurrency-trading-app-repackaged-deliver-sigspoof-backdoor/
- https://developer.apple.com/library/archive/documentation/MacOSX/Conceptual/BPSystemStartup/Chapters/CreatingLaunchdJobs.html
- https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1569.001/T1569.001.md
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