T1565.003 Google Chronicle · YARA-L

Detect Runtime Data Manipulation in Google Chronicle

Adversaries may modify systems in order to manipulate the data as it is accessed and displayed to an end user, threatening the integrity of information presented at runtime. Unlike stored data manipulation which alters data at rest, runtime manipulation intercepts and alters data in memory or during processing before it reaches the display layer — allowing adversaries to show fraudulent information while persisting clean data on disk. APT38 demonstrated this with DYEPACK.FOX, which hooked PDF rendering to redact fraudulent SWIFT transaction records from operator views. Runtime manipulation typically requires process injection (CreateRemoteThread, WriteProcessMemory), DLL hijacking into display application processes, or API hooking of rendering or formatting functions. The technique is particularly dangerous in financial, SCADA, and operational technology environments where displayed data directly informs decisions.

MITRE ATT&CK

Tactic
Impact
Technique
T1565 Data Manipulation
Sub-technique
T1565.003 Runtime Data Manipulation
Canonical reference
https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1565/003/

YARA-L Detection Query

Google Chronicle (YARA-L)
yaral
rule t1565_003_runtime_data_manipulation {
  meta:
    author = "df00tech"
    description = "Detects T1565.003 Runtime Data Manipulation via process injection, suspicious DLL loads, or binary tampering targeting display/document applications"
    mitre_attack_tactic = "Impact"
    mitre_attack_technique = "T1565.003"
    severity = "HIGH"
    priority = "HIGH"

  events:
    (
      // CreateRemoteThread or Process Access into display applications
      (
        $e.metadata.event_type = "PROCESS_INJECTION"
        and (
          $e.target.process.file.full_path = /(?i)(acrord32|acrobat|foxitreader|sumatrapdf|excel|winword|powerpnt|outlook|explorer|mmc|wmplayer)\.exe$/
        )
      )
      or
      // Suspicious process opening display application with write permissions
      (
        $e.metadata.event_type = "PROCESS_OPEN"
        and (
          $e.target.process.file.full_path = /(?i)(acrord32|acrobat|foxitreader|excel|winword|outlook)\.exe$/
        )
        and (
          $e.principal.process.file.full_path = /(?i)(powershell|pwsh|cmd|wscript|cscript|mshta|rundll32|regsvr32)\.exe$/
        )
      )
      or
      // Unexpected DLL load into document viewer (unsigned, non-standard path)
      (
        $e.metadata.event_type = "PROCESS_MODULE_LOAD"
        and (
          $e.principal.process.file.full_path = /(?i)(acrord32|acrobat|foxitreader|excel|winword)\.exe$/
        )
        and not (
          $e.target.file.full_path = /(?i)(C:\\Windows\\|C:\\Program Files\\Adobe\\|C:\\Program Files\\Foxit\\|C:\\Program Files\\Microsoft Office\\|C:\\Program Files \(x86\)\\Microsoft Office\\)/
        )
        and $e.target.file.pe_file.signature_info.signature_algorithm = ""
      )
      or
      // Binary tampering of display application executables
      (
        $e.metadata.event_type = "FILE_MODIFICATION"
        and (
          $e.target.file.full_path = /(?i)(Program Files\\Adobe|Program Files\\Foxit|Program Files\\Microsoft Office|Program Files \(x86\)\\Microsoft Office)/
        )
        and (
          $e.target.file.full_path = /(?i)\.(exe|dll)$/
        )
        and not (
          $e.principal.process.file.full_path = /(?i)(msiexec|setup|install|trustedinstaller|tiworker|svchost)\.exe$/
        )
      )
    )

  condition:
    $e
}
high severity medium confidence

Chronicle YARA-L 2.0 rule detecting T1565.003 Runtime Data Manipulation across four behavioral patterns: process injection into display/document applications, suspicious process handle opening with write access by script interpreters, unsigned DLL loads into document viewer processes from non-standard paths, and unauthorized modification of PDF reader or Office application binaries.

Data Sources

Google Chronicle UDM — Windows endpoint telemetryChronicle Ingestion: Microsoft Defender for Endpoint, CrowdStrike Falcon, or Sysmon via forwarder

Required Tables

UDM events (Chronicle)

False Positives & Tuning

  • Legitimate enterprise PDF workflow tools that perform in-process rendering transformations using COM automation or OLE, which may trigger process open events
  • Third-party Office add-ins deployed via Group Policy that are stored in non-standard locations and loaded as unsigned DLLs into winword.exe or excel.exe
  • Software deployment solutions running as svchost or service-hosted processes that update Adobe or Office binaries and are not included in the allowlist
Download portable Sigma rule (.yml)

Other platforms for T1565.003


Testing Methodology

Validate this detection against 4 adversary techniques from Atomic Red Team. Each test below lists the behaviour to exercise and the telemetry you should expect to see. Executable commands and cleanup steps are available with Pro.

  1. Test 1CreateRemoteThread Injection into Notepad (Windows Shellcode Proxy)

    Expected signal: Sysmon Event ID 8 (CreateRemoteThread): SourceImage=powershell.exe, TargetImage=notepad.exe, StartAddress=<allocated_address>, StartModule='' (empty — shellcode, not DLL). Sysmon Event ID 10 (ProcessAccess): SourceImage=powershell.exe, TargetImage=notepad.exe, GrantedAccess=0x1F0FFF. Security Event ID 4688: powershell.exe process creation with the injection command line.

  2. Test 2DLL Injection via LoadLibrary into Explorer (Reflective Load Simulation)

    Expected signal: Sysmon Event ID 8 (CreateRemoteThread): SourceImage=powershell.exe, TargetImage=explorer.exe, StartAddress=<LoadLibraryW_address>, StartModule=C:\Windows\System32\kernel32.dll, StartFunction=LoadLibraryW. Sysmon Event ID 7 (ImageLoad) in explorer.exe process showing version.dll load if not already present. Sysmon Event ID 10: GrantedAccess=0x1F0FFF from powershell.exe into explorer.exe.

  3. Test 3Linux LD_PRELOAD Injection to Intercept Display Library Functions

    Expected signal: Linux audit log (auditd): execve syscall for gcc compilation of the shared library. execve syscall for the LD_PRELOAD bash invocation with the environment variable set. syslog/auth.log: LD_PRELOAD environment variable may appear in process accounting. Sysmon for Linux (if deployed): EventCode 1 (Process Create) with CommandLine containing 'LD_PRELOAD' and the .so path. File creation events for /tmp/intercept_display.c and /tmp/intercept_display.so.

  4. Test 4Inline Function Hook (IAT Patch) in Running Process via PowerShell

    Expected signal: Sysmon Event ID 10 (ProcessAccess): SourceImage=powershell.exe, TargetImage=notepad.exe, GrantedAccess=0x0410 (PROCESS_QUERY_INFORMATION | PROCESS_VM_READ). Security Event ID 4688: powershell.exe execution with the command line. If AV is monitoring OpenProcess calls on non-EDR processes, an additional alert may fire from the security product.

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