Detect Hide Artifacts in Splunk
Adversaries may attempt to hide artifacts associated with their behaviors to evade detection. Operating systems may have features to hide various artifacts, such as important system files and administrative task execution, to avoid disrupting user work environments and prevent users from changing files or features on the system. Adversaries may abuse these features to hide artifacts such as files, directories, user accounts, or other system activity to evade detection. Sub-techniques cover hidden files and directories, hidden users, hidden windows, NTFS alternate data streams, hidden file systems, virtual instance abuse, VBA stomping, email hiding rules, resource forking, process argument spoofing, and scheduled task SD registry deletion.
MITRE ATT&CK
- Tactic
- Defense Evasion
- Technique
- T1564 Hide Artifacts
- Canonical reference
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1564/
SPL Detection Query
| union
[ search index=wineventlog sourcetype="XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational" EventCode=1
(Image="*\\attrib.exe")
| eval CommandLine=lower(CommandLine)
| where match(CommandLine, "\+h|\+s")
| eval Signal="HiddenFileAttribute"
| table _time, host, User, Image, CommandLine, ParentImage, ParentCommandLine, Signal ],
[ search index=wineventlog sourcetype="XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational" EventCode=1
(Image="*\\cmd.exe" OR Image="*\\powershell.exe" OR Image="*\\pwsh.exe")
| eval CommandLine=lower(CommandLine)
| where match(CommandLine, ">[^:]+:[^\\\\/:*?\"<>|\s]+") OR
(match(CommandLine, "set-content|out-file") AND match(CommandLine, ":[^\\\\]+"))
| eval Signal="NTFSAlternateDataStream"
| table _time, host, User, Image, CommandLine, ParentImage, ParentCommandLine, Signal ],
[ search index=wineventlog sourcetype="XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational" EventCode=13
TargetObject="*\\Schedule\\TaskCache\\Tree\\*"
| where match(TargetObject, "\\SD$") AND EventType="DeleteValue"
| eval Signal="HiddenScheduledTaskSD"
| eval CommandLine=ProcessCommandLine
| table _time, host, User=UtcTime, Image, CommandLine, TargetObject, Signal ],
[ search index=wineventlog sourcetype="XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational" EventCode=1
NOT (Image="*\\explorer.exe" OR Image="*\\msiexec.exe" OR Image="*\\svchost.exe")
| eval CommandLine=lower(CommandLine)
| where match(CommandLine, "-windowstyle\s+h|-w\s+hidden|sw_hide|//b\s|//b$")
| eval Signal="HiddenWindowExecution"
| table _time, host, User, Image, CommandLine, ParentImage, ParentCommandLine, Signal ],
[ search index=wineventlog sourcetype="XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational" EventCode=1
(Image="*\\icacls.exe" OR Image="*\\cacls.exe")
| eval CommandLine=lower(CommandLine)
| where match(CommandLine, "/deny\s+(everyone|\*s-1-1-0|users|\*s-1-5-32-545)")
| eval Signal="FileAccessDeniedToHide"
| table _time, host, User, Image, CommandLine, ParentImage, ParentCommandLine, Signal ],
[ search index=wineventlog sourcetype="WinEventLog:Security" EventCode=4698 OR EventCode=4702
| eval TaskContent=lower(TaskContent)
| where match(TaskContent, "hidden|runonlyidle|0x04")
| eval Signal="SuspiciousScheduledTaskHidden"
| eval CommandLine=TaskName
| table _time, host, SubjectUserName, TaskName, Signal ]
| eval SuspicionScore=1
| stats sum(SuspicionScore) as TotalSignals, values(Signal) as Signals, values(CommandLine) as Commands,
earliest(_time) as FirstSeen, latest(_time) as LastSeen by host, User
| where TotalSignals >= 1
| sort - TotalSignalsMulti-signal detection for T1564 Hide Artifacts using Sysmon Event ID 1 (Process Creation), Sysmon Event ID 13 (Registry Value Set/Delete), and Security Event ID 4698/4702 (Scheduled Task Create/Modify). Detects attrib +h/+s for hidden file attributes, NTFS ADS creation via redirection syntax, scheduled task SD registry value deletion (Tarrask), hidden window flags, and icacls access denial. Results are aggregated per host/user with a total signal count for prioritization.
Data Sources
Required Sourcetypes
False Positives & Tuning
- System administrators running attrib.exe to set hidden attributes on configuration or system-managed files
- Legitimate backup and archival software manipulating file attributes and ACLs as part of normal operation
- Enterprise deployment tools (SCCM, Intune) that use wscript //b or hidden PowerShell windows for silent software installation
- Security software and AV solutions that set hidden/system attributes on quarantine directories
- DevOps pipelines and CI/CD agents that create build artifacts with ADS zone identifiers or create scheduled tasks with non-default descriptors
Other platforms for T1564
Testing Methodology
Validate this detection against 5 adversary techniques from Atomic Red Team. Each test below lists the behaviour to exercise and the telemetry you should expect to see. Executable commands and cleanup steps are available with Pro.
- Test 1Hide File Using Attrib Command
Expected signal: Sysmon Event ID 1: Process Create for attrib.exe with CommandLine '+h +s %TEMP%\t1564-test.txt'. Security Event ID 4688 (if command line auditing enabled). DeviceProcessEvents in MDE: FileName=attrib.exe, ProcessCommandLine contains '+h' and '+s'. The 'dir' command at the end will show no file — confirming hiding worked.
- Test 2Write Payload to NTFS Alternate Data Stream
Expected signal: Sysmon Event ID 15 (FileCreateStreamHash): TargetFilename='%TEMP%\t1564-ads-test.txt:hidden_payload.ps1', Hash of stream content. Sysmon Event ID 1: cmd.exe process create with redirect operator and colon-delimited stream path in CommandLine. DeviceFileEvents in MDE: ActionType=FileCreated with stream notation in FileName. The 'dir /r' output will show both the main file and ':hidden_payload.ps1:$DATA' confirming ADS creation.
- Test 3Delete Scheduled Task Security Descriptor to Hide Task (Tarrask Technique)
Expected signal: Sysmon Event ID 13 (RegistryEvent - Value Delete): TargetObject='HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Schedule\TaskCache\Tree\Microsoft\Windows\T1564-HiddenTask\SD', EventType='DeleteValue', Image='reg.exe'. Security Event ID 4698 (scheduled task created) for the initial schtasks /create. Security Event ID 4699 will NOT fire for the SD deletion — only the Sysmon registry event captures this. DeviceRegistryEvents in MDE: ActionType=RegistryValueDeleted, RegistryKey contains 'TaskCache\Tree', RegistryValueName='SD'.
- Test 4Hide Script Execution Using Wscript Batch Mode (Hidden Window)
Expected signal: Sysmon Event ID 1: Process Create for wscript.exe with CommandLine '//b //nologo %TEMP%\t1564-hidden.vbs'. ParentImage will be cmd.exe (from the atomic test) but in real attacks is often outlook.exe, explorer.exe, or mshta.exe. Security Event ID 4688 (if command line auditing enabled). DeviceProcessEvents in MDE: FileName=wscript.exe, ProcessCommandLine contains '//b'. No console window or UI appears on the desktop.
- Test 5Linux Hidden File and Directory Creation
Expected signal: Auditd syscall events: execve for mkdir, echo/tee, chmod with dotfile paths. Syslog/auditd: SYSCALL records with comm='mkdir' and a0 pointing to path starting with dot. Linux process creation events in Sysmon for Linux (if deployed): Image=/bin/mkdir, CommandLine contains '.t1564-hidden-dir'. The first ls command returns no output (directory is hidden), the second ls -la shows it — confirming the hiding behavior.
References (13)
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1564/
- https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2022/04/12/tarrask-malware-uses-scheduled-tasks-for-defense-evasion/
- https://blog.malwarebytes.com/101/2015/07/introduction-to-alternate-data-streams/
- https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2016/09/unit42-sofacys-komplex-os-x-trojan/
- https://news.sophos.com/en-us/2020/05/21/ragnar-locker-ransomware-deploys-virtual-machine-to-dodge-security/
- https://cdn2.hubspot.net/hubfs/3354902/Content%20PDFs/Cybereason-Lab-Analysis-OSX-Pirrit-4-6-16.pdf
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/downloads/streams
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/administration/windows-commands/attrib
- https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1564.001/T1564.001.md
- https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation
- https://www.secureworks.com/research/darktortilla-malware-analysis
- https://www.checkpoint.com/downloads/products/warzone-whitepaper.pdf
- https://www.sentinelone.com/labs/shlayer-to-zshlayer-macos-malware-evolution/
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Related Detections
Sub-techniques (14)
- T1564.001Hidden Files and Directories
- T1564.002Hidden Users
- T1564.003Hidden Window
- T1564.004NTFS File Attributes
- T1564.005Hidden File System
- T1564.006Run Virtual Instance
- T1564.007VBA Stomping
- T1564.008Email Hiding Rules
- T1564.009Resource Forking
- T1564.010Process Argument Spoofing
- T1564.011Ignore Process Interrupts
- T1564.012File/Path Exclusions
- T1564.013Bind Mounts
- T1564.014Extended Attributes