Detect Ignore Process Interrupts in IBM QRadar
Adversaries evade defensive mechanisms by launching processes immune to interrupt signals, preventing analyst-driven or system-triggered termination. The primary technique is nohup on Linux and macOS, which detaches a process from the controlling terminal and causes it to ignore SIGHUP—the hangup signal sent when a session ends or a terminal closes. Malware authors also call signal() or sigaction() directly to mask SIGINT, SIGTERM, SIGPIPE, SIGCHLD, and other control signals, as documented in BPFDoor (masks 7 signals) and BOLDMOVE (masks SIGCHLD, SIGHUP, SIGPIPE). On Windows, PowerShell's -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue or $ErrorActionPreference = 'SilentlyContinue' prevents script termination on errors, allowing malicious payloads to continue past failures that would otherwise halt execution. Real-world usage includes GoldMax Linux variant (nohup invocation for C2 persistence through SSH disconnection), UNC3886 (nohup /bin/support in /etc/init.d/localnet for semi-persistence across reboots), Sea Turtle running SnappyTCP via nohup, and OSX/Shlayer applying nohup to payload execution on macOS. Unlike Trap (T1546.005), this technique does not re-invoke the process after termination—it only prolongs the existing execution session through events that would otherwise end it.
MITRE ATT&CK
- Tactic
- Defense Evasion
- Technique
- T1564 Hide Artifacts
- Sub-technique
- T1564.011 Ignore Process Interrupts
- Canonical reference
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1564/011/
QRadar Detection Query
SELECT
DATEFORMAT(starttime, 'YYYY-MM-dd HH:mm:ss') AS event_time,
logsourcename(logsourceid) AS log_source,
hostname AS device_name,
username,
"process" AS process_name,
"cmdline" AS command_line,
CASE
WHEN LOWER("cmdline") MATCHES '.*nohup\s+.*(\x2ftmp\x2f|\x2fvar\x2ftmp\x2f|\x2fdev\x2fshm\x2f).*' THEN 1 ELSE 0
END +
CASE
WHEN LOWER("cmdline") MATCHES '.*(netcat|ncat|socat|\x2fbin\x2fnc\s).*' THEN 1 ELSE 0
END +
CASE
WHEN LOWER("cmdline") MATCHES '.*(-i\s|bash\s-i|sh\s-i).*' THEN 1 ELSE 0
END +
CASE
WHEN LOWER("cmdline") MATCHES '.*\x2fetc\x2finit\.d\x2f.*|.*\x2fetc\x2frc\..*|.*\x2fetc\x2fcron.*' THEN 1 ELSE 0
END +
CASE
WHEN "cmdline" MATCHES '.*&\s*$' THEN 1 ELSE 0
END AS nohup_suspicion_score,
CASE
WHEN LOWER("cmdline") MATCHES '.*(invoke-webrequest|net\.webclient|downloadstring|downloadfile|invoke-expression|iex\(|-encodedcommand|-enc\s).*' THEN 1 ELSE 0
END +
CASE
WHEN LOWER("cmdline") MATCHES '.*(schtasks|sc\screate|reg\sadd|new-service|set-mppreference|add-mppreference).*' THEN 1 ELSE 0
END +
CASE
WHEN LOWER("cmdline") MATCHES '.*(certutil|start-bitstransfer|bitsadmin).*' THEN 1 ELSE 0
END AS ps_suspicion_score,
CASE
WHEN "process" LIKE 'nohup' OR "cmdline" LIKE '%nohup %' THEN 'nohup_interrupt_ignore'
WHEN LOWER("process") IN ('powershell.exe', 'pwsh.exe') AND
LOWER("cmdline") MATCHES '.*(silentlycontinue|erroractionpreference|-erroraction ignore|-ea ignore).*' THEN 'ps_error_suppression'
ELSE 'unknown'
END AS detection_type,
CATEGORYNAME(category) AS event_category,
sourceip AS source_ip
FROM events
WHERE
LOGSOURCETYPENAME(devicetype) IN ('Linux OS', 'Apple Mac OS X', 'Microsoft Windows', 'Sysmon')
AND starttime > DATEADD('hour', -24, NOW())
AND (
-- nohup detection (Linux/macOS)
"process" = 'nohup'
OR (
"cmdline" LIKE '%nohup %' AND
"process" IN ('bash', 'sh', 'dash', 'zsh', 'ksh', 'python3', 'python', 'perl', 'ruby')
)
-- PowerShell error suppression with malicious indicators (Windows)
OR (
LOWER("process") IN ('powershell.exe', 'pwsh.exe') AND
LOWER("cmdline") MATCHES '.*(silentlycontinue|erroractionpreference|-erroraction ignore|-ea ignore|-ea silentlycontinue).*' AND
LOWER("cmdline") MATCHES '.*(invoke-webrequest|net\.webclient|downloadstring|invoke-expression|iex\(|-encodedcommand|schtasks|sc\screate|reg\sadd|new-service|set-mppreference|certutil).*'
)
)
ORDER BY event_time DESC Detects T1564.011 Ignore Process Interrupts by querying process execution events for nohup invocations (Linux/macOS) with associated suspicion scoring based on payload path, network tools, interactive shells, and persistence targets, as well as PowerShell processes (Windows) combining error suppression parameters with malicious behavioral indicators such as download cradles, encoded commands, and persistence mechanisms.
Data Sources
Required Tables
False Positives & Tuning
- Scheduled maintenance tasks run via nohup by operations teams to ensure job completion despite cron or SSH disconnects
- Developer toolchains invoking nohup to start background services, compilers, or long-running test suites in non-interactive shells
- PowerShell automation and monitoring scripts that defensively suppress errors when probing system state for optional features or registry paths
Other platforms for T1564.011
Testing Methodology
Validate this detection against 4 adversary techniques from Atomic Red Team. Each test below lists the behaviour to exercise and the telemetry you should expect to see. Executable commands and cleanup steps are available with Pro.
- Test 1nohup Background Execution with Network Listener
Expected signal: Linux auditd EXECVE record: a0='nohup', a1='nc', a2='-lvp', a3='14444', a4='-s', a5='127.0.0.1'. A second EXECVE record for the nc process itself with ppid matching the nohup process. MDE DeviceProcessEvents: FileName='nohup' with child process FileName='nc' where InitiatingProcessFileName='nohup'. DeviceNetworkEvents: nc process creating a listening socket on port 14444.
- Test 2nohup Protecting Interpreter from Temp Directory
Expected signal: Auditd EXECVE: a0='chmod', a1='+x', a2='/tmp/df00tech_test_payload.sh' followed by a0='nohup', a1='/tmp/df00tech_test_payload.sh'. MDE DeviceFileEvents: file creation at /tmp/df00tech_test_payload.sh. DeviceProcessEvents: FileName='nohup', ProcessCommandLine contains '/tmp/' (TempDirPayload indicator). A second DeviceProcessEvents record for bash/sh with InitiatingProcessFileName='nohup' and FolderPath='/tmp/'.
- Test 3Programmatic Signal Masking via Python
Expected signal: Auditd EXECVE: a0='python3', a1='-c', a2 contains 'signal.SIG_IGN'. MDE DeviceProcessEvents: FileName='python3', ProcessCommandLine contains 'SIG_IGN' and 'signal'. /proc/<pid>/status SigIgn field will be non-zero (e.g., 0x0000000000003c06 with SIGHUP=1, SIGINT=2, SIGTERM=15, SIGPIPE=13 masked). Attempting `kill -SIGTERM <pid>` will have no effect; only `kill -9 <pid>` terminates the process.
- Test 4PowerShell Error Suppression with Download Cradle
Expected signal: Sysmon Event ID 1: Process Create — Image=powershell.exe, CommandLine contains 'ErrorActionPreference' and 'SilentlyContinue' and 'Net.WebClient' and 'DownloadString' and 'Invoke-WebRequest'. Sysmon Event ID 3: Network Connection attempts to 127.0.0.1:19999 (will fail with connection refused). PowerShell ScriptBlock Log Event ID 4104 in Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational with full script content.
References (11)
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1564/011/
- https://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man7/signal.7.html
- https://linux.die.net/man/1/nohup
- https://learn.microsoft.com/powershell/module/microsoft.powershell.core/about/about_preference_variables?view=powershell-7.3#erroractionpreference
- https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/observations-from-the-stellarparticle-campaign/
- https://cloud.google.com/blog/topics/threat-intelligence/boldmove-north-korea-fortigate
- https://www.mandiant.com/resources/blog/fortinet-malware-ecosystem
- https://www.deepinstinct.com/blog/bpfdoor-an-active-chinese-global-surveillance-tool
- https://www.huntress.com/blog/a-brief-history-of-sea-turtle
- https://www.jamf.com/blog/shlayer-malware-abusing-gatekeeper-bypass-on-macos/
- https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1564.011/T1564.011.md
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