Detect Run Virtual Instance in Splunk
Adversaries may carry out malicious operations using a virtual instance to avoid detection. By running malicious code inside a VM, adversaries hide artifacts from security tools that cannot monitor guest activity. Ransomware groups (Maze, Ragnar Locker) used VirtualBox with shared folders mapped to host drives to encrypt files while evading endpoint protection. LoudMiner ran XMRig inside QEMU/VirtualBox Linux VMs for cryptomining. On ESXi, adversaries create rogue VMs via /bin/vmx directly, bypassing vCenter visibility checks. Windows Sandbox .wsb configuration files support LogonCommand payloads and MappedFolder host filesystem access, abused by MirrorFace APT. The CronTrap campaign used QEMU to stage malware inside emulated Linux environments on Windows hosts.
MITRE ATT&CK
- Tactic
- Defense Evasion
- Technique
- T1564 Hide Artifacts
- Sub-technique
- T1564.006 Run Virtual Instance
- Canonical reference
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1564/006/
SPL Detection Query
index=wineventlog sourcetype="XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational" EventCode=1
(Image="*\\VBoxHeadless.exe" OR Image="*\\VBoxManage.exe" OR Image="*\\VBoxSVC.exe"
OR Image="*\\VirtualBox.exe" OR Image="*\\VBoxSDL.exe"
OR Image="*\\qemu-system-x86_64.exe" OR Image="*\\qemu-system-i386.exe"
OR Image="*\\qemu-system-aarch64.exe" OR Image="*\\qemu-img.exe"
OR Image="*\\vmrun.exe" OR Image="*\\WindowsSandbox.exe"
OR CommandLine="*.wsb*")
| eval HeadlessMode=if(match(CommandLine, "(--headless|--type\s+headless|--startvm|-headless|-nographic)"), 1, 0)
| eval SharedFolderConfig=if(match(CommandLine, "(sharedfolder\s+add|MappedFolder|sharedlocation|-virtfs|--shared)"), 1, 0)
| eval SuspiciousParent=if(match(ParentImage, "(\\\\powershell\.exe$|\\\\pwsh\.exe$|\\\\cmd\.exe$|\\\\wscript\.exe$|\\\\cscript\.exe$|\\\\mshta\.exe$|\\\\rundll32\.exe$|\\\\regsvr32\.exe$|\\\\winword\.exe$|\\\\excel\.exe$|\\\\outlook\.exe$|\\\\acrord32\.exe$)"), 1, 0)
| eval UnexpectedPath=if(NOT match(Image, "(?i)(\\\\Program Files\\\\(Oracle|VMware|QEMU|Windows Sandbox)|\\\\Windows\\\\System32|\\\\Windows\\\\SysWOW64)"), 1, 0)
| eval WsbInvocation=if(match(CommandLine, "(?i)\.wsb"), 1, 0)
| eval SuspicionScore=HeadlessMode + SharedFolderConfig + SuspiciousParent + UnexpectedPath + WsbInvocation
| where SuspicionScore > 0
| table _time, host, User, Image, CommandLine, ParentImage, ParentCommandLine, HeadlessMode, SharedFolderConfig, SuspiciousParent, UnexpectedPath, WsbInvocation, SuspicionScore
| sort - SuspicionScore, - _timeDetects virtual instance execution using Sysmon Event ID 1 (Process Creation). Covers VirtualBox, QEMU, VMware vmrun, and Windows Sandbox invocations. Assigns a cumulative suspicion score across five indicators: headless/nographic mode, shared folder configuration commands, suspicious parent processes (script hosts, Office apps), binary execution outside standard install paths, and .wsb file invocations. Score > 1 indicates high-confidence malicious activity; score = 1 may reflect legitimate developer tooling requiring analyst review.
Data Sources
Required Sourcetypes
False Positives & Tuning
- Developers and QA engineers running VirtualBox or VMware Workstation headlessly as part of automated build/test pipelines (e.g., Vagrant, Packer)
- IT administrators using VBoxManage to manage shared folders for legitimate remote work or file transfer workflows
- Security researchers or blue teams running malware analysis VMs headlessly in an isolated lab environment
- Enterprise sandbox solutions (Bromium, Sandboxie) that legitimately invoke virtualization components from management processes
- Windows Sandbox used for legitimate application compatibility testing or software evaluation by power users
Other platforms for T1564.006
Testing Methodology
Validate this detection against 4 adversary techniques from Atomic Red Team. Each test below lists the behaviour to exercise and the telemetry you should expect to see. Executable commands and cleanup steps are available with Pro.
- Test 1Windows Sandbox .wsb Execution with MappedFolder and LogonCommand
Expected signal: Sysmon Event ID 1: Process Create with Image=WindowsSandbox.exe, CommandLine containing 'argus_test_T1564006.wsb'. Sysmon Event ID 11: File Create for the .wsb file in %TEMP%. Security Event ID 4688 (if command-line auditing enabled) for the PowerShell process writing the .wsb file.
- Test 2VBoxManage Shared Folder Add Targeting Host Root Drive
Expected signal: Sysmon Event ID 1: Process Create with Image=C:\Program Files\Oracle\VirtualBox\VBoxManage.exe, CommandLine containing 'sharedfolder add' and '--hostpath C:\' and '--automount'. The command returns an error (VM not found) but the process creation event is generated.
- Test 3QEMU Headless Execution from Non-Standard Path
Expected signal: Sysmon Event ID 11: File Create for svchost32.exe in %TEMP% (copy of QEMU binary). Sysmon Event ID 1: Process Create with Image=%TEMP%\svchost32.exe, CommandLine containing '-nographic -m 64 -snapshot'. The QEMU binary copy will also generate a DeviceFileEvents entry in MDE.
- Test 4QEMU Virtual Machine Execution on Linux
Expected signal: Syslog/auditd: process creation for qemu-system-x86_64 with arguments '-m 64 -nographic -snapshot -hda /dev/null'. Linux auditd EXECVE syscall event showing full argument list. If using Defender for Endpoint Linux agent: DeviceProcessEvents entry with FileName=qemu-system-x86_64 and ProcessCommandLine containing '-nographic'.
References (10)
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1564/006/
- https://news.sophos.com/en-us/2020/05/21/ragnar-locker-ransomware-deploys-virtual-machine-to-dodge-security/
- https://cybercx.com.au/blog/akira-ransomware/
- https://www.securonix.com/blog/crontrap-emulated-linux-environments-as-the-latest-tactic-in-malware-staging/
- https://www.welivesecurity.com/en/eset-research/operation-akairyu-mirrorface-invites-europe-expo-2025-revives-anel-backdoor/
- https://medium.com/mitre-engenuity/infiltrating-defenses-abusing-vmware-in-mitres-cyber-intrusion-4ea647b83f5b
- https://vninja.net/2024/11/11/beware-of-the-rogue-vms/
- https://blog-en.itochuci.co.jp/entry/2025/03/12/140000
- https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1564.006/T1564.006.md
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/application-security/application-isolation/windows-sandbox/windows-sandbox-configure-using-wsb-file
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