T1562.004 Google Chronicle · YARA-L

Detect Disable or Modify System Firewall in Google Chronicle

Adversaries may disable or modify system firewalls in order to bypass controls limiting network usage. Changes could be disabling the entire mechanism as well as adding, deleting, or modifying particular rules. This can be done via command-line tools (netsh, iptables, ufw, pfctl), editing Windows Registry keys, or through the Windows Control Panel. On ESXi, firewall rules may be modified via esxcli. Adversaries may add new firewall rules for RDP on non-standard ports or open all traffic to enable C2, lateral movement, and data exfiltration.

MITRE ATT&CK

Tactic
Defense Evasion
Technique
T1562 Impair Defenses
Sub-technique
T1562.004 Disable or Modify System Firewall
Canonical reference
https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562/004/

YARA-L Detection Query

Google Chronicle (YARA-L)
yaral
rule disable_or_modify_system_firewall {
  meta:
    author = "Argus Detection Engineering"
    description = "Detects attempts to disable or modify system firewalls via netsh, iptables, ufw, pfctl, PowerShell cmdlets, or esxcli on Windows, Linux, or ESXi hosts."
    mitre_attack_tactic = "Defense Evasion"
    mitre_attack_technique = "T1562.004"
    severity = "HIGH"
    confidence = "HIGH"
    version = "1.0"
    created = "2026-04-20"

  events:
    $e.metadata.event_type = "PROCESS_LAUNCH"
    (
      re.regex($e.target.process.command_line, `(?i)netsh\s+advfirewall\s+set`) or
      re.regex($e.target.process.command_line, `(?i)netsh\s+advfirewall\s+firewall\s+(add|delete)`) or
      re.regex($e.target.process.command_line, `(?i)netsh\s+firewall\s+set\s+opmode\s+disable`) or
      re.regex($e.target.process.command_line, `(?i)Set-NetFirewallProfile.{0,50}-Enabled\s+False`) or
      re.regex($e.target.process.command_line, `(?i)(New|Remove)-NetFirewallRule`) or
      re.regex($e.target.process.command_line, `(?i)iptables\s+(-F|-X|-P\s+INPUT\s+ACCEPT|-P\s+FORWARD\s+ACCEPT)`) or
      re.regex($e.target.process.command_line, `(?i)ufw\s+disable`) or
      re.regex($e.target.process.command_line, `(?i)pfctl\s+-d`) or
      re.regex($e.target.process.command_line, `(?i)esxcli\s+network\s+firewall\s+set`)
    )

  match:
    $e.principal.hostname over 5m

  outcome:
    $firewall_action = if(
      re.regex($e.target.process.command_line, `(?i)(state off|opmode disable|Enabled.*False|ufw disable|pfctl -d)`), "Firewall Disabled",
      re.regex($e.target.process.command_line, `(?i)(firewall add|New-NetFirewallRule)`), "Rule Added",
      re.regex($e.target.process.command_line, `(?i)(firewall delete|Remove-NetFirewallRule)`), "Rule Deleted",
      re.regex($e.target.process.command_line, `(?i)iptables -[FX]`), "IPTables Flushed",
      re.regex($e.target.process.command_line, `(?i)iptables -P.*ACCEPT`), "IPTables Policy ACCEPT",
      "Other Modification"
    )
    $hostname = $e.principal.hostname
    $username = $e.principal.user.userid
    $process_name = $e.target.process.file.full_path
    $command_line = $e.target.process.command_line

  condition:
    $e
}
high severity high confidence

Chronicle YARA-L 2.0 rule detecting firewall disablement or modification via process launches containing firewall management command patterns across Windows (netsh, PowerShell) and Linux/BSD (iptables, ufw, pfctl) and VMware ESXi (esxcli). Outputs categorized firewall action type for triage.

Data Sources

Google Chronicle UDMWindows Sysmon via Chronicle forwarderLinux Auditd via Chronicle forwarderCrowdStrike Falcon via Chronicle integration

Required Tables

UDM Events (PROCESS_LAUNCH)

False Positives & Tuning

  • Legitimate use of configuration management automation (Ansible, Terraform) deploying firewall rule changes during infrastructure provisioning recorded in change management systems.
  • System administrators executing documented firewall policy updates during approved maintenance windows, particularly on hardened build pipelines.
  • Security operations center analysts intentionally disabling firewall rules on isolated sandbox machines for malware analysis or threat emulation exercises.
Download portable Sigma rule (.yml)

Other platforms for T1562.004


Testing Methodology

Validate this detection against 3 adversary techniques from Atomic Red Team. Each test below lists the behaviour to exercise and the telemetry you should expect to see. Executable commands and cleanup steps are available with Pro.

  1. Test 1Disable Windows Firewall All Profiles

    Expected signal: Sysmon Event ID 1: netsh.exe process creation. Windows Firewall Event ID 2003: Firewall profile changed. Each profile state change generates a separate event.

  2. Test 2Add Firewall Rule for RDP on Non-Standard Port

    Expected signal: Sysmon Event ID 1: netsh.exe with 'firewall add rule'. Windows Firewall Event ID 2004: A rule has been added.

  3. Test 3Flush IPTables Rules on Linux

    Expected signal: Auditd execve syscall records for iptables. Syslog entries for iptables commands. MDE DeviceProcessEvents if MDE for Linux is deployed.

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