T1562.003 Sumo Logic CSE · Sumo

Detect Impair Command History Logging in Sumo Logic CSE

Adversaries may impair command history logging to hide commands they run on a compromised system. On Linux and macOS, this involves manipulating HISTFILE, HISTFILESIZE, HISTSIZE, and HISTCONTROL environment variables, or redirecting history to /dev/null. On Windows, adversaries may modify PSReadLine settings to disable PowerShell command history. On network devices, adversaries may disable command logging entirely.

MITRE ATT&CK

Tactic
Defense Evasion
Technique
T1562 Impair Defenses
Sub-technique
T1562.003 Impair Command History Logging
Canonical reference
https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562/003/

Sumo Detection Query

Sumo Logic CSE (Sumo)
sql
(_sourceCategory=*linux* OR _sourceCategory=*syslog* OR _sourceCategory=*audit* OR _sourceCategory=*windows* OR _sourceCategory=*sysmon*)
| where (
    (%"CommandLine" matches "*unset HISTFILE*"
    OR %"CommandLine" matches "*HISTFILE=/dev/null*"
    OR %"CommandLine" matches "*HISTFILESIZE=0*"
    OR %"CommandLine" matches "*HISTSIZE=0*"
    OR %"CommandLine" matches "*HISTCONTROL=ignoreboth*"
    OR %"CommandLine" matches "*HISTCONTROL=ignorespace*"
    OR %"CommandLine" matches "*set +o history*"
    OR %"CommandLine" matches "*history -c*"
    OR %"CommandLine" matches "*history -w /dev/null*"
    OR %"CommandLine" matches "*Set-PSReadlineOption*SaveNothing*"
    OR %"CommandLine" matches "*Set-PSReadLineOption*HistorySavePath*"
    OR %"CommandLine" matches "*Remove-Item*ConsoleHost_history*"
    OR %"CommandLine" matches "*del*ConsoleHost_history*")
  OR (
    (%"CommandLine" matches "*rm *" OR %"CommandLine" matches "*truncate*" OR %"CommandLine" matches "*ln -sf*")
    AND (%"CommandLine" matches "*bash_history*" OR %"CommandLine" matches "*zsh_history*" OR %"CommandLine" matches "*fish_history*")
  )
)
| if (_sourceCategory matches "*linux*" OR _sourceCategory matches "*syslog*" OR _sourceCategory matches "*audit*", "Linux/macOS",
     if (_sourceCategory matches "*windows*" OR _sourceCategory matches "*sysmon*", "Windows", "Unknown")) as platform
| if (%"CommandLine" matches "*unset HISTFILE*" OR %"CommandLine" matches "*HISTFILE=/dev/null*", "HISTFILE Disabled",
     if (%"CommandLine" matches "*HISTFILESIZE=0*" OR %"CommandLine" matches "*HISTSIZE=0*", "History Size Zeroed",
     if (%"CommandLine" matches "*HISTCONTROL*", "HISTCONTROL Modified",
     if (%"CommandLine" matches "*history -c*", "History Cleared",
     if (%"CommandLine" matches "*set +o history*", "History Disabled",
     if (%"CommandLine" matches "*SaveNothing*" OR %"CommandLine" matches "*HistorySavePath*", "PSReadLine Tampered",
     if (%"CommandLine" matches "*ConsoleHost_history*", "PS History File Deleted",
     if (%"CommandLine" matches "*bash_history*", "History File Manipulated", "Other")))))))) as tamper_method
| fields _messageTime, %host, %user, platform, tamper_method, %"CommandLine"
| sort by _messageTime desc
medium severity medium confidence

Detects shell history tampering and PSReadLine configuration abuse across Linux/macOS and Windows hosts. Searches for process command lines containing known history-suppression patterns, including HISTFILE manipulation, history file deletion, redirection to /dev/null, and PowerShell ConsoleHost history file removal or PSReadLine reconfiguration.

Data Sources

Linux syslog/auditd forwarded to Sumo LogicWindows Sysmon via Sumo Logic collectorSumo Logic CSE normalized process events

Required Tables

Syslog source categorySysmon source categoryCSE Normalized Events

False Positives & Tuning

  • DevOps pipeline agents (Jenkins, GitLab runners, GitHub Actions self-hosted) that disable history recording in their shell wrapper scripts to prevent leaking tokens or credentials into persistent log files
  • System administrators using set +o history interactively when manually entering passwords or API keys during maintenance windows, then re-enabling with set -o history
  • Containerized workloads with entrypoint scripts that explicitly unset HISTFILE to reduce artifact footprint in ephemeral environments where persistence is undesirable
Download portable Sigma rule (.yml)

Other platforms for T1562.003


Testing Methodology

Validate this detection against 3 adversary techniques from Atomic Red Team. Each test below lists the behaviour to exercise and the telemetry you should expect to see. Executable commands and cleanup steps are available with Pro.

  1. Test 1Disable Bash History via HISTFILE

    Expected signal: Auditd execve record for the shell session showing 'unset HISTFILE'. Process creation event in MDE. No bash_history entries will be written for subsequent commands.

  2. Test 2Redirect History to /dev/null (BPFDoor Pattern)

    Expected signal: Auditd execve record. The process /proc/<PID>/environ will show HISTFILE=/dev/null.

  3. Test 3Disable PSReadLine History on Windows

    Expected signal: Sysmon Event ID 1: powershell.exe with CommandLine containing 'Set-PSReadlineOption'. PowerShell ScriptBlock Log Event ID 4104.

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