Detect Disk Structure Wipe in CrowdStrike LogScale
Adversaries may corrupt or wipe disk data structures such as the Master Boot Record (MBR), GUID Partition Table (GPT), or partition entries to render systems permanently unbootable. Wiper malware (Shamoon, HermeticWiper, WhisperGate, CaddyWiper, KillDisk) achieves this by opening a handle to raw physical disk devices (e.g., \\.\PhysicalDrive0) and overwriting the first 512 bytes (MBR boot sector) or subsequent partition structures. Some malware uses kernel-mode drivers such as ElRawDisk.sys (Shamoon) or the HermeticWiper EaseUS driver to bypass user-mode restrictions and gain direct disk sector access. On Linux systems, adversaries use utilities like dd with /dev/zero or /dev/urandom targeting /dev/sda or /dev/nvme0n1. This technique is frequently combined with worm-like propagation via SMB/Windows Admin Shares, Valid Accounts, and OS Credential Dumping to maximize organizational impact.
MITRE ATT&CK
- Tactic
- Impact
- Technique
- T1561 Disk Wipe
- Sub-technique
- T1561.002 Disk Structure Wipe
- Canonical reference
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1561/002/
LogScale Detection Query
#event_simpleName = /^(ProcessRollup2|PeFileWritten|DriverLoad|ServiceInstall)$/
/* Vector 1: Raw PhysicalDrive handle in command line */
| IsMBRWipe := if(CommandLine = /(?i)physicaldrive/, 1, 0)
/* Vector 2 & 3: dd.exe or diskpart wiper tool commands */
| IsWiperTool := if(
#event_simpleName = "ProcessRollup2"
and (
(
ImageFileName = /(?i)\\dd\.exe$/
and CommandLine = /(?i)(physicaldrive|if=\/dev\/zero|if=\/dev\/urandom)/
)
or (
ImageFileName = /(?i)\\diskpart\.exe$/
and not ParentBaseFileName = /(?i)(mmc\.exe|diskmgmt\.msc)/
)
),
1, 0)
/* Vector 4: Known wiper driver PE written to user-writable path */
| IsDriverDrop := if(
#event_simpleName = "PeFileWritten"
and TargetFileName = /(?i)\.sys$/
and (
TargetFileName = /(?i)(elrawdsk|elrawdisk|epmntdrv|hermeticwiper|killdisk|caddywiper)/
or TargetFileName = /(?i)\\(temp|appdata|programdata|downloads)\\/
),
1, 0)
/* Vector 5: Known wiper kernel driver load */
| IsKnownWiperDriver := if(
#event_simpleName = "DriverLoad"
and ImageFileName = /(?i)(elrawdsk|elrawdisk|epmntdrv|hermeticwiper|killdisk)/,
1, 0)
/* Vector 6: Service installed with kernel driver binary from non-system path */
| IsServiceInstall := if(
#event_simpleName = "ServiceInstall"
and ServiceImagePath = /(?i)\\(temp|appdata|programdata|users|downloads)\\/,
1, 0)
| SuspicionScore := IsMBRWipe + IsWiperTool + IsDriverDrop + IsKnownWiperDriver + IsServiceInstall
| SuspicionScore > 0
| DetectionVector := case {
IsKnownWiperDriver = 1 => "WiperDriverLoad";
IsServiceInstall = 1 => "KernelDriverService";
IsMBRWipe = 1 => "PhysicalDriveHandle";
IsWiperTool = 1 => "WiperToolCommand";
IsDriverDrop = 1 => "WiperDriverDrop";
* => "Unknown"
}
| select(
[
@timestamp, ComputerName, UserName,
ImageFileName, CommandLine, ParentBaseFileName,
TargetFileName, ServiceImagePath, ServiceName,
DetectionVector, SuspicionScore
]
)
| sort(SuspicionScore, order=desc)CrowdStrike LogScale (Humio CQL) detection query for T1561.002 Disk Structure Wipe. Filters Falcon telemetry across ProcessRollup2 (process creation), PeFileWritten (PE file write), DriverLoad (kernel driver load), and ServiceInstall (service registration) event types. Scores each event against five detection vectors: raw PhysicalDrive command-line access, dd.exe/diskpart wiper tool invocations, known wiper driver PE writes to user-writable paths, known wiper kernel driver loads, and suspicious kernel driver service installs from non-system directories. Results are sorted descending by suspicion score for analyst triage.
Data Sources
Required Tables
False Positives & Tuning
- CrowdStrike sensor exclusion-listed or allow-listed security products (Carbon Black, Symantec EP, Malwarebytes) whose kernel drivers are staged in non-standard directories by managed deployment tooling (SCCM, Intune, Ansible) before installation — validate against software deployment schedules
- Developer or IT test lab environments where dd.exe is used for legitimate disk benchmarking, wipe verification of decommissioned hardware, or forensic imaging — cross-reference ComputerName against asset inventory for end-of-life or lab classification
- Automated OS provisioning pipelines (Ansible, Puppet, PowerShell DSC, PXE boot sequences) that invoke diskpart.exe as a child of cmd.exe or powershell.exe rather than the expected mmc.exe parent, especially during server build or cloud VM initialization workflows
Other platforms for T1561.002
Testing Methodology
Validate this detection against 4 adversary techniques from Atomic Red Team. Each test below lists the behaviour to exercise and the telemetry you should expect to see. Executable commands and cleanup steps are available with Pro.
- Test 1MBR Overwrite Simulation on VHD (Windows, Safe)
Expected signal: Sysmon Event ID 1: Process Create for powershell.exe with CommandLine containing 'PhysicalDrive'. Sysmon Event ID 11: File Creation for mbr-test.vhd in %TEMP%. DeviceProcessEvents will show the PowerShell process with the raw disk handle pattern. Windows Event ID 4688 (if command-line auditing enabled) captures the full PowerShell command. DeviceFileEvents captures the VHD file creation.
- Test 2Kernel Driver Drop to Temp Directory (Windows)
Expected signal: Sysmon Event ID 11: File Created — TargetFilename matches '*\Temp\elrawdsk.sys'. Sysmon Event ID 1: Process Create for powershell.exe invoking New-Service. Windows System Event ID 7045: New Service Installed with ServiceName=RawDiskDrv, ServiceFileName pointing to %TEMP%\elrawdsk.sys, ServiceType=kernel mode driver. Security Event ID 4697: A service was installed in the system.
- Test 3Linux MBR Overwrite on Loop Device (Linux, Safe)
Expected signal: Sysmon for Linux (if deployed): ProcessCreate event showing dd with arguments 'if=/dev/zero of=/dev/loop* bs=512 count=1'. auditd (if configured with execve rules): EXECVE record capturing the full dd command with the loop device path. /var/log/auth.log or journald: sudo/su records if the test required privilege elevation. bash_history: dd command with /dev/zero source.
- Test 4WhisperGate-Style Malicious Bootloader Drop Pattern (Windows)
Expected signal: Sysmon Event ID 11: File Created — TargetFilename '$env:TEMP\stage1.bin'. Sysmon Event ID 1: Process Create for powershell.exe with CommandLine containing '[Convert]::FromBase64String' and 'WriteAllBytes'. PowerShell ScriptBlock Log Event ID 4104: full script with staging path and base64 operations. DeviceFileEvents: file creation event for stage1.bin in TEMP.
References (10)
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1561/002/
- https://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/shamoon-attacks
- https://www.sentinelone.com/labs/hermetic-wiper-ukraine-under-attack/
- https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2022/01/15/destructive-malware-targeting-ukrainian-organizations/
- https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/shamoon-3-targets-oil-gas-organization/
- https://media.kasperskycontenthub.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/2018/03/07180722/Report_Shamoon_StoneDrill_final.pdf
- https://www.welivesecurity.com/2022/03/15/caddywiper-new-wiper-malware-discovered-ukraine/
- https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1561.002/T1561.002.md
- https://docs.microsoft.com/sysinternals/downloads/sysmon
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/defender-endpoint/advanced-hunting-devicefileevents-table
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