Detect Archive via Library in Elastic Security
Adversaries may compress or encrypt collected data prior to exfiltration using third-party or built-in programming libraries rather than standalone archival utilities. Libraries such as Python's zlib, bzip2, gzip, zipfile, and rarfile modules; .NET's System.IO.Compression (GZipStream, DeflateStream, ZipArchive); C libraries libzip and zlib; and platform-native libraries enable adversaries to compress and encrypt data programmatically within a running process. Because no separate archival utility process (7-Zip, WinRAR, tar) is spawned, this technique evades detections focused on command-line archivers. Malware families including TajMahal, LunarWeb, SeaDuke, BBSRAT, InvisiMole, and Denis have all used library-based compression to stage and exfiltrate collected data.
MITRE ATT&CK
- Tactic
- Collection
- Technique
- T1560 Archive Collected Data
- Sub-technique
- T1560.002 Archive via Library
- Canonical reference
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1560/002/
Elastic Detection Query
any where
(
event.category == "library" and
dll.name in~ ("zlib.dll", "zlib1.dll", "zlibwapi.dll", "bzip2.dll", "libbzip2.dll", "libzip.dll", "minizip.dll") and
not dll.path like~ "*System32*" and not dll.path like~ "*SysWOW64*" and
not dll.path like~ "*7-Zip*" and not dll.path like~ "*WinRAR*" and
not process.name in~ ("7z.exe", "7zG.exe", "WinRAR.exe", "msiexec.exe")
) or
(
event.category == "process" and event.type == "start" and
process.name in~ ("powershell.exe", "pwsh.exe") and
(
process.command_line like~ "*IO.Compression*" or process.command_line like~ "*GZipStream*" or
process.command_line like~ "*DeflateStream*" or process.command_line like~ "*ZipFile*" or
process.command_line like~ "*ZipArchive*" or process.command_line like~ "*ICSharpCode*" or
process.command_line like~ "*DotNetZip*"
)
) or
(
event.category == "process" and event.type == "start" and
process.name in~ ("python.exe", "python3.exe") and
(
process.command_line like~ "*import zlib*" or process.command_line like~ "*import bz2*" or
process.command_line like~ "*import gzip*" or process.command_line like~ "*import zipfile*" or
process.command_line like~ "*import rarfile*" or process.command_line like~ "*zlib.compress*" or
process.command_line like~ "*import lzma*" or process.command_line like~ "*import tarfile*"
)
) or
(
event.category == "file" and event.type == "creation" and
(file.name like~ "*.gz" or file.name like~ "*.bz2" or file.name like~ "*.zlib" or
file.name like~ "*.lzma" or file.name like~ "*.xz" or file.name like~ "*.lz") and
(file.path like~ "*\\Temp\\*" or file.path like~ "*\\AppData\\*" or
file.path like~ "*\\ProgramData\\*" or file.path like~ "*\\Users\\Public\\*") and
process.name in~ ("python.exe", "python3.exe", "ruby.exe", "perl.exe", "node.exe",
"java.exe", "javaw.exe", "wscript.exe", "cscript.exe", "mshta.exe")
) Detects T1560.002 Archive via Library across four behavioral branches using Elastic ECS event categories: compression DLL loads outside trusted paths by non-archiver processes; PowerShell invoking .NET System.IO.Compression or SharpZipLib classes; Python importing compression modules visible in command-line arguments; scripting interpreter creation of compressed archives in staging paths. Compatible with Elastic Endpoint 7.16+ and Sysmon via Winlogbeat with ECS normalization.
Data Sources
Required Tables
False Positives & Tuning
- Python-based build tools (pip, setuptools, conda) that import zlib or gzip during dependency installation with imports visible in process command-line arguments passed to interpreter scripts
- PowerShell deployment automation used by IT administrators that invokes System.IO.Compression to package software bundles or configuration payloads before staging on endpoints
- Electron or Java desktop applications that ship bundled compression DLLs (zlib.dll, libbzip2.dll) in application-local directories outside System32 and load them during normal startup
Other platforms for T1560.002
Testing Methodology
Validate this detection against 4 adversary techniques from Atomic Red Team. Each test below lists the behaviour to exercise and the telemetry you should expect to see. Executable commands and cleanup steps are available with Pro.
- Test 1Python zlib Compression of Sensitive File Collection
Expected signal: Sysmon Event ID 1: Process Create with Image=python.exe, CommandLine containing 'import zlib' and 'zlib.compress'. Sysmon Event ID 11: File Create for %TEMP%\stage_df00.zlib. DeviceFileEvents: FileCreated action for the .zlib output file. DeviceFileEvents: FileRead action for the hosts file.
- Test 2PowerShell GZipStream Compression via System.IO.Compression
Expected signal: Sysmon Event ID 1: Process Create with Image=powershell.exe, CommandLine containing 'IO.Compression', 'GZipStream', 'MemoryStream', and 'CompressionMode'. Sysmon Event ID 11: File Create for %TEMP%\stage_df00.gz. PowerShell ScriptBlock Log Event ID 4104 with full .NET compression code.
- Test 3Python bzip2 Multi-File Collection and Compression
Expected signal: Syslog/auditd: python3 process execution with command line containing 'import bz2', 'tarfile', and output path in /tmp. File creation event for /tmp/stage_df00.tar.bz2. Auditd syscall events: openat for source files, write for output file. Linux process accounting: python3 with suspicious file access pattern.
- Test 4Python rarfile Library Compression (Third-Party Library)
Expected signal: Sysmon Event ID 1: python.exe with CommandLine containing 'import zipfile', 'ZIP_DEFLATED', and temp path. Sysmon Event ID 11: File Create for %TEMP%\stage_df00_lib.zip. Potential child process for pip install subprocess. DeviceFileEvents shows file read of hosts file and write of .zip artifact.
References (12)
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1560/002/
- https://github.com/madler/zlib
- https://libzip.org/
- https://pypi.org/project/rarfile/
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/dotnet/api/system.io.compression
- https://securelist.com/kaspersky-lab-discovers-the-tajmahal-apt-framework/90240/
- https://www.welivesecurity.com/2024/05/23/eset-research-unveils-lunar-toolset-diplomatic-espionage/
- https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/bbsrat-attacks-targeting-russian-organizations-linked-to-roaming-tiger/
- https://www.welivesecurity.com/2018/06/07/invisimole-equipped-spyware-undercover/
- https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1560.002/T1560.002.md
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/defender-endpoint/advanced-hunting-deviceimageloadevents-table
- https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/downloads/sysmon
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