T1560.001 CrowdStrike LogScale · LogScale

Detect Archive via Utility in CrowdStrike LogScale

Adversaries may use utilities to compress and/or encrypt collected data prior to exfiltration. Many utilities include functionalities to compress, encrypt, or otherwise package data into a format that is easier or more secure to transport. Adversaries may abuse utilities such as 7-Zip, WinRAR, WinZip, tar, zip, and Windows built-ins like makecab/diantz and certutil to stage data for exfiltration. Password-protected archives are a common indicator as they prevent inspection by security tools. Threat actors including HAFNIUM, APT1, APT33, Volt Typhoon, Mustang Panda, menuPass, and Wizard Spider are documented using this technique.

MITRE ATT&CK

Tactic
Collection
Technique
T1560 Archive Collected Data
Sub-technique
T1560.001 Archive via Utility
Canonical reference
https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1560/001/

LogScale Detection Query

CrowdStrike LogScale (LogScale)
cql
#event_simpleName=ProcessRollup2
| ImageFileName = /(?i)(7z\.exe|7za\.exe|7zr\.exe|rar\.exe|winrar\.exe|winzip32\.exe|winzip64\.exe|makecab\.exe|diantz\.exe|zip\.exe|certutil\.exe)$/
| CommandLine != ""
| eval IsArchiveTool = if(ImageFileName =~ /(?i)(7z\.exe|7za\.exe|7zr\.exe|rar\.exe|winrar\.exe|winzip32\.exe|winzip64\.exe|zip\.exe)$/, true, false)
| eval IsCertutil = if(ImageFileName =~ /(?i)certutil\.exe$/, true, false)
| eval IsCabinetTool = if(ImageFileName =~ /(?i)(makecab|diantz)\.exe$/, true, false)
| eval PasswordProtected = if(CommandLine =~ /(?i)(-p\s|-hp\s|password)/, 1, 0)
| eval TargetsSensitivePath = if(CommandLine =~ /(?i)(\\ntds|\\lsass|\\sam|\\users\\|\\documents|\\desktop|\\appdata|\\inetpub)/, 1, 0)
| eval MultiVolume = if(CommandLine =~ /(?i)-v\d/, 1, 0)
| eval OutputToTemp = if(CommandLine =~ /(?i)(\\temp\\|\\tmp\\|\\programdata\\|\\appdata\\)/, 1, 0)
| eval CertutilEncode = if(IsCertutil and CommandLine =~ /(?i)(-encode|-encodehex|\/encode|\/encodehex)/, 1, 0)
| eval ArchiveWithFlags = if(IsArchiveTool and (CommandLine =~ /(?i)(\sa\s|-r\s|-v\d|-ep[23]?|-p\s|-hp\s|password)/ or TargetsSensitivePath = 1), 1, 0)
| eval CabinetSuspicious = if(IsCabinetTool and CommandLine !~ /(?i)(windows\\|system32\\)/, 1, 0)
| where ArchiveWithFlags = 1 OR CertutilEncode = 1 OR CabinetSuspicious = 1
| eval SuspicionScore = PasswordProtected + TargetsSensitivePath + MultiVolume + OutputToTemp
| eval DetectionSource = if(CertutilEncode = 1, "CertutilEncode", if(CabinetSuspicious = 1, "CabinetTool", "ArchiveTool"))
| table [@timestamp, ComputerName, UserName, ImageFileName, CommandLine, ParentBaseFileName, PasswordProtected, TargetsSensitivePath, MultiVolume, OutputToTemp, SuspicionScore, DetectionSource]
| sort @timestamp desc
high severity high confidence

CrowdStrike LogScale (CQL) query detecting T1560.001 archive utility abuse using Falcon ProcessRollup2 events. Identifies 7-Zip, WinRAR, zip, makecab, diantz, and certutil invocations with flags and path patterns indicative of data staging for exfiltration. Computes boolean enrichment fields and a suspicion score for analyst triage.

Data Sources

CrowdStrike Falcon Endpoint Detection (ProcessRollup2 events)CrowdStrike Falcon LogScale / Humio

Required Tables

ProcessRollup2

False Positives & Tuning

  • Authorized backup agents using 7-Zip or WinRAR with password protection to encrypt and compress endpoint data to local staging directories before cloud upload
  • Windows system maintenance routines invoking makecab or diantz to compress log or diagnostic files outside of System32 paths, such as in ProgramData subdirectories
  • IT provisioning scripts using certutil -encode to prepare binary payloads or certificates for deployment via GPO or endpoint management tools
Download portable Sigma rule (.yml)

Other platforms for T1560.001


Testing Methodology

Validate this detection against 4 adversary techniques from Atomic Red Team. Each test below lists the behaviour to exercise and the telemetry you should expect to see. Executable commands and cleanup steps are available with Pro.

  1. Test 17-Zip Password-Protected Archive of User Documents

    Expected signal: Sysmon Event ID 1: Process Create with Image=C:\Program Files\7-Zip\7z.exe, CommandLine containing '-p' (password flag), input path in user Documents, output path in C:\Windows\Temp. Sysmon Event ID 11: FileCreate for C:\Windows\Temp\staged_data.zip. Security Event ID 4688 if command line auditing is enabled.

  2. Test 2WinRAR Multi-Volume Password-Protected Archive

    Expected signal: Sysmon Event ID 1: Process Create with Image containing rar.exe, CommandLine containing '-hp' (header password), '-v50m' (multi-volume 50MB), and output path in C:\ProgramData. Sysmon Event ID 11: FileCreate events for each archive volume (svc_backup.part1.rar, svc_backup.part2.rar, etc.).

  3. Test 3certutil Base64 Encoding of Collected File

    Expected signal: Sysmon Event ID 1 (first): Process Create for cmd.exe writing collected_data.txt. Sysmon Event ID 11: FileCreate for collected_data.txt. Sysmon Event ID 1 (second): Process Create with Image=certutil.exe, CommandLine containing '-encode', input file path, and output file path. Sysmon Event ID 11: FileCreate for encoded_output.b64.

  4. Test 4makecab Cabinet File Creation for Data Staging

    Expected signal: Sysmon Event ID 1: Process Create with Image=makecab.exe, CommandLine containing source file path and output .cab path in C:\Windows\Temp. Sysmon Event ID 11: FileCreate events for archive_output.cab, setup.inf, and setup.rpt (makecab side-effect files). Security Event ID 4688 if command line auditing enabled.

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