Which SIEM platforms have a T1557 detection rule?

df00tech provides T1557 (Adversary-in-the-Middle) detection queries for 7 SIEM platforms: Microsoft Sentinel / Defender, Splunk, Elastic Security (EQL), IBM QRadar (AQL), Sumo Logic CSE, Google Chronicle / SecOps, CrowdStrike LogScale (CQL).

What data sources are required to detect Adversary-in-the-Middle (T1557)?

Detecting Adversary-in-the-Middle requires the following data sources: Process: Process Creation, Command: Command Execution, Windows Registry: Registry Key Modification, Microsoft Defender for Endpoint.

What severity and confidence is the T1557 detection?

The T1557 detection is rated high severity with medium confidence.

What are common false positives for T1557?

Common false positives for T1557 include: Network engineers using arp -s for legitimate static ARP entry management on servers or network appliances; Security teams running authorized penetration tests or red team exercises using Responder, Bettercap, or Ettercap in approved lab segments; IT administrators reconfiguring DNS server settings via netsh or Set-DnsClientServerAddress during planned network migrations or failover procedures.

T1557 IBM QRadar · QRadar

Detect Adversary-in-the-Middle in IBM QRadar

Adversaries may attempt to position themselves between two or more networked devices using an adversary-in-the-middle (AiTM) technique to support follow-on behaviors such as Network Sniffing (T1040), Transmitted Data Manipulation (T1565.002), or replay attacks. By abusing features of common networking protocols (ARP, DNS, LLMNR, DHCP), adversaries force devices to communicate through an adversary-controlled system to harvest credentials, session tokens, and sensitive data. Sub-techniques include LLMNR/NBT-NS Poisoning and SMB Relay (T1557.001), ARP Cache Poisoning (T1557.002), DHCP Spoofing (T1557.003), and Evil Twin wireless attacks (T1557.004). Common attack frameworks include Responder, Bettercap, Ettercap, ntlmrelayx, mitmproxy, dnschef, and EvilGinx2. Threat groups including Kimsuky, Sea Turtle, and Mustang Panda have leveraged AiTM positioning for large-scale credential theft, session hijacking, and DNS record manipulation at service providers.

MITRE ATT&CK

Tactic: Credential Access Collection
Technique: T1557 Adversary-in-the-Middle
Canonical reference: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1557/

QRadar Detection Query

IBM QRadar (QRadar)

sql

SELECT
  DATEFORMAT(starttime, 'YYYY-MM-dd HH:mm:ss') AS event_time,
  sourceip,
  username,
  "Image" AS process_image,
  "CommandLine" AS command_line,
  "ParentImage" AS parent_image,
  QIDNAME(qid) AS event_name,
  LOGSOURCETYPEID(devicetype) AS log_source_type,
  CASE
    WHEN LOWER("CommandLine") MATCHES '(responder|ntlmrelayx|smbrelayx|multirelay|impacket-ntlmrelayx)' THEN 'LLMNR_NBT_NS_Relay'
    WHEN LOWER("CommandLine") MATCHES '(bettercap|ettercap|arpspoof|arp\s+-s)' THEN 'ARP_Poisoning'
    WHEN LOWER("CommandLine") MATCHES '(mitmproxy|mitmdump|mitmweb|sslstrip)' THEN 'SSL_Interception'
    WHEN LOWER("CommandLine") MATCHES '(dnschef|mitm6|evilginx)' THEN 'DNS_Spoofing'
    WHEN LOWER("CommandLine") MATCHES '(set-dnsclientserveraddress|netsh interface ip set dns|netsh int ip set dns)' THEN 'DNS_Config_Modification'
    ELSE 'AiTM_Tool_Other'
  END AS detection_category
FROM events
WHERE
  LOGSOURCETYPEID(devicetype) IN (
    SELECT id FROM logsourcetypes WHERE name ILIKE '%windows%' OR name ILIKE '%sysmon%' OR name ILIKE '%microsoft%'
  )
  AND starttime > NOW() - 86400000
  AND (
    LOWER("CommandLine") MATCHES '(responder|ntlmrelayx|smbrelayx|multirelay|impacket-ntlmrelayx|bettercap|ettercap|arpspoof|mitmproxy|mitmdump|mitmweb|sslstrip|dnschef|mitm6|evilginx|arp-spoof|set-dnsclientserveraddress)'
    OR LOWER("Image") MATCHES '(responder\.exe|bettercap\.exe|ettercap\.exe|mitmproxy|mitmdump|mitmweb|dnschef|evilginx|mitm6)'
    OR (
      LOWER("Image") MATCHES '(python\.exe|python3\.exe|python3)'
      AND LOWER("CommandLine") MATCHES '(ntlmrelayx|smbrelayx|responder|mitm6|dnschef|evilginx|bettercap)'
    )
    OR (
      LOWER("Image") ILIKE '%\\arp.exe'
      AND LOWER("CommandLine") MATCHES '\s-s\s'
    )
    OR (
      LOWER("Image") ILIKE '%\\netsh.exe'
      AND LOWER("CommandLine") MATCHES '(interface.*dns.*set|int.*ip.*set.*dns)'
    )
    OR (
      LOWER("Image") ILIKE '%\\powershell.exe'
      AND LOWER("CommandLine") ILIKE '%Set-DnsClientServerAddress%'
    )
  )
ORDER BY starttime DESC
LIMIT 1000

high severity medium confidence

AQL query for QRadar detecting known AiTM tooling execution via process command line and image name matching. Covers Responder, Bettercap, Ettercap, mitmproxy, ntlmrelayx, dnschef, mitm6, and EvilGinx2 via Windows/Sysmon process creation events. Categorizes detections by AiTM sub-technique.

Data Sources

QRadar Windows Security DSMQRadar Sysmon DSMMicrosoft Windows Security Event Log

Required Tables

events

False Positives & Tuning

Authorized red team exercises using Responder or ntlmrelayx on isolated lab segments
Network administrators reconfiguring DNS via netsh or PowerShell as part of change management
Security researchers running mitmproxy for web application testing in approved environments
Python developers using packages whose names partially match AiTM tool keywords

Download portable Sigma rule (.yml)

Other platforms for T1557

Microsoft Sentinel (KQL) Splunk (SPL) Elastic Security (Elastic) Sumo Logic CSE (Sumo) Google Chronicle (YARA-L) CrowdStrike LogScale (LogScale) All platforms (combined) →

Testing Methodology

Validate this detection against 5 adversary techniques from Atomic Red Team. Each test below lists the behaviour to exercise and the telemetry you should expect to see. Executable commands and cleanup steps are available with Pro.

Test 1ARP Static Entry Manipulation (Windows)
Expected signal: Sysmon Event ID 1: Process Create with Image=C:\Windows\System32\arp.exe, CommandLine='arp -s 192.168.100.254 00-AA-BB-CC-DD-EE'. Security Event ID 4688 (if command-line auditing is enabled). No network events expected as this is a local table modification.
Test 2DNS Server Change via netsh (Windows)
Expected signal: Sysmon Event ID 1: Process Create with Image=C:\Windows\System32\netsh.exe, CommandLine containing 'interface ip set dns'. Sysmon Event ID 13: Registry value set under HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\Tcpip\Parameters\Interfaces\{GUID}\NameServer with new value '127.0.0.1'.
Test 3DNS Server Change via PowerShell (Windows)
Expected signal: Sysmon Event ID 1: Process Create with Image=powershell.exe, CommandLine containing 'Set-DnsClientServerAddress'. Sysmon Event ID 13: Registry modification at HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\Tcpip\Parameters\Interfaces\{GUID}\NameServer. PowerShell ScriptBlock Log Event ID 4104 showing the Set-DnsClientServerAddress call.
Test 4ARP Poisoning Tool Execution — arpspoof (Linux)
Expected signal: Syslog or auditd process creation event for arpspoof. On systems with Sysmon for Linux (sysmonforlinux): Event ID 1 Process Create with Image path to arpspoof binary and CommandLine '-i lo -t 127.0.0.1 127.0.0.2'. Auditd syscall records for execve with the arpspoof arguments.
Test 5mitmproxy SSL Interception Tool Invocation (Linux/macOS)
Expected signal: Process creation event for mitmproxy binary (path varies by pip install location, typically ~/.local/bin/mitmproxy or /usr/local/bin/mitmproxy). Sysmon Event ID 1 (if Sysmon for Linux deployed) with Image containing 'mitmproxy' and CommandLine '--version'. Auditd EXECVE syscall record.

Last updated: 2026-04-13 Research depth: deep

References (12)

Response Playbook

1. Examine the full command line and decode any Base64 content...
2. Identify the parent process chain and user context...
3. Check for concurrent network connections from the process...

Investigation Guide

Related techniques: T1027, T1105, T1562.001...
Forensic artifacts: PSReadLine history, Prefetch, ScriptBlock logs...

Atomic Red Team Tests

Test 1: Encoded command execution...
Test 2: Download cradle via Net.WebClient...

Unlock Pro Content

Get the full detection package for T1557 including response playbook, investigation guide, and atomic red team tests.

Response PlaybookInvestigation GuideHunting QueriesAtomic Red Team TestsTuning Guidance

Detect Adversary-in-the-Middle in IBM QRadar

MITRE ATT&CK

QRadar Detection Query

Data Sources

Required Tables

False Positives & Tuning

Other platforms for T1557

Testing Methodology

Response Playbook

Investigation Guide

Atomic Red Team Tests

Unlock Pro Content

Related Detections

Sub-techniques (4)

Related Techniques

Same Tactic: Credential Access

Popular Detections

MITRE ATT&CK

QRadar Detection Query

Data Sources

Required Tables

False Positives & Tuning

Other platforms for T1557

Testing Methodology

Unlock Pro Content

Related Detections

Sub-techniques (4)

Related Techniques

Same Tactic: Credential Access

Popular Detections

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