Which SIEM platforms have a T1556 detection rule?

df00tech provides T1556 (Modify Authentication Process) detection queries for 7 SIEM platforms: Microsoft Sentinel / Defender, Splunk, Elastic Security (EQL), IBM QRadar (AQL), Sumo Logic CSE, Google Chronicle / SecOps, CrowdStrike LogScale (CQL).

What data sources are required to detect Modify Authentication Process (T1556)?

Detecting Modify Authentication Process requires the following data sources: Registry: Registry Key Modification, Module: Module Load, Process: Process Creation, Microsoft Defender for Endpoint.

What severity and confidence is the T1556 detection?

The T1556 detection is rated critical severity with high confidence.

What are common false positives for T1556?

Common false positives for T1556 include: Legitimate MFA solutions (Duo Security, Okta Verify, RSA SecurID) that install custom credential provider DLLs during initial setup — filter by InitiatingProcessFileName = msiexec.exe and correlate with change management tickets; Enterprise privileged access management tools (CyberArk, BeyondTrust, Centrify) that register authentication packages — build an allowlist of their specific DLL names; Windows Defender Credential Guard enabling LSA protection, which modifies LSA configuration keys — these changes come from svchost.exe or TrustedInstaller.

T1556 Elastic Security · Elastic

Detect Modify Authentication Process in Elastic Security

Adversaries may modify authentication mechanisms and processes to access user credentials or enable otherwise unwarranted access to accounts. The authentication process is handled by mechanisms such as the Local Security Authentication Server (LSASS) process and the Security Accounts Manager (SAM) on Windows, pluggable authentication modules (PAM) on Unix-based systems, and authorization plugins on macOS systems. By modifying an authentication process, an adversary may authenticate to a service or system without using valid accounts, or may passively harvest credentials as users authenticate. Techniques include registering malicious password filter DLLs that receive plaintext passwords during every password change, injecting security support providers (SSPs) into LSASS to intercept credentials, installing skeleton keys to accept any password for domain accounts, modifying PAM stack configuration files to permit unauthorized access, and replacing legitimate authentication binaries with trojanized versions that exfiltrate credentials.

MITRE ATT&CK

Tactic: Credential Access Defense Evasion Persistence
Technique: T1556 Modify Authentication Process
Canonical reference: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1556/

Elastic Detection Query

Elastic Security (Elastic)

eql

any where
(
  (
    event.category == "registry" and
    event.type in ("change", "creation") and
    registry.path : (
      "*\\Control\\Lsa\\Notification Packages*",
      "*\\Control\\Lsa\\Security Packages*",
      "*\\Control\\Lsa\\Authentication Packages*",
      "*\\Control\\Lsa\\OSConfig\\Security Packages*",
      "*\\Control\\NetworkProvider\\Order*",
      "*\\CurrentVersion\\Winlogon\\GinaDLL*",
      "*\\CurrentVersion\\Authentication\\Credential Providers*"
    ) and
    not process.name : (
      "TrustedInstaller.exe", "MsMpEng.exe", "msiexec.exe",
      "wuauclt.exe", "WindowsUpdateAgent.exe", "svchost.exe"
    )
  )
  or
  (
    event.category == "library" and
    process.name : "lsass.exe" and
    not dll.name : (
      "ntdll.dll", "kernel32.dll", "kernelbase.dll", "msvcrt.dll",
      "kerberos.dll", "msv1_0.dll", "wdigest.dll", "tspkg.dll",
      "pku2u.dll", "cloudap.dll", "schannel.dll", "cryptdll.dll",
      "samsrv.dll", "lsasrv.dll", "netlogon.dll", "ntlmshared.dll"
    )
  )
  or
  (
    event.category == "authentication" and
    event.code in ("4610", "4614")
  )
)

critical severity high confidence

Detects T1556 modifications to Windows LSA authentication mechanisms across three detection branches: (1) registry modifications to LSA key paths covering Notification Packages (password filter DLLs), Security Packages (SSPs), Authentication Packages, Network Provider Order, GinaDLL, and Credential Providers — excluding known legitimate modifiers; (2) unexpected DLLs loaded by lsass.exe not present in the known-good baseline, covering in-memory SSP and password filter injection; (3) Windows Security audit events 4610 and 4614 for authentication and notification package loading by SAM/LSA. Covers skeleton key, Ebury, SILENTTRINITY, and Mimikatz SSP injection patterns.

Data Sources

Elastic Security Endpoint (elastic-agent with endpoint integration)Winlogbeat with Sysmon (EventCode 7, 13)Windows Security Event Logs (EventID 4610, 4614) via Winlogbeat or Elastic Agent

Required Tables

logs-endpoint.events.registry-*logs-endpoint.events.library-*logs-windows.forwarded-*winlogbeat-*

False Positives & Tuning

Third-party MFA or smart card middleware (Duo Security, RSA Authentication Agent, Yubico, PIV/PKINIT providers) registering credential provider DLLs during initial installation or agent update
Enterprise VPN or network authentication clients (Cisco AnyConnect, Palo Alto GlobalProtect) adding entries to the NetworkProvider Order key as part of their split-tunneling or authentication components
Endpoint security products (CrowdStrike Falcon, Carbon Black, Symantec DLP) loading inspection DLLs into lsass.exe during sensor installation or major version upgrades — typically a one-time event at install time rather than recurring

Download portable Sigma rule (.yml)

Other platforms for T1556

Microsoft Sentinel (KQL) Splunk (SPL) IBM QRadar (QRadar) Sumo Logic CSE (Sumo) Google Chronicle (YARA-L) CrowdStrike LogScale (LogScale) All platforms (combined) →

Testing Methodology

Validate this detection against 4 adversary techniques from Atomic Red Team. Each test below lists the behaviour to exercise and the telemetry you should expect to see. Executable commands and cleanup steps are available with Pro.

Test 1Register Benign Password Filter DLL in LSA Notification Packages
Expected signal: Sysmon Event ID 13: TargetObject=HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa\Notification Packages, Details contains 'df00tech-test-filter', Image=powershell.exe. Windows Security Event ID 4657 if SACL is configured on the LSA key. DeviceRegistryEvents in MDE: RegistryKey contains 'Notification Packages', RegistryValueData contains new DLL name, InitiatingProcessFileName=powershell.exe.
Test 2Register Fake Security Support Provider (SSP) in LSA Security Packages
Expected signal: Sysmon Event ID 13: TargetObject=HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa\Security Packages, Details appended with 'df00tech-test-ssp'. DeviceRegistryEvents: RegistryKey contains 'Security Packages', ActionType=RegistryValueSet. If system reboots, Security Event ID 4610 will fire listing the (missing) SSP DLL name — LSASS will generate an error in System event log.
Test 3Modify PAM Configuration to Permit Authentication Bypass on Linux
Expected signal: Linux auditd: syscall=openat/write on path=/etc/pam.d/sshd with auid=<attacker_uid> if auditd watches are configured (-w /etc/pam.d/ -p wa -k pam_modification). Syslog: process writing to /etc/pam.d/sshd. File integrity monitoring (AIDE, Tripwire) will alert on hash change to /etc/pam.d/sshd. DeviceFileEvents (for Linux onboarded to MDE): FileModified on /etc/pam.d/sshd.
Test 4Register Malicious Network Provider DLL via Registry
Expected signal: Sysmon Event ID 13: TargetObject=HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\NetworkProvider\Order\ProviderOrder, Image=powershell.exe, Details contains appended provider name. DeviceRegistryEvents: RegistryKey contains 'NetworkProvider\Order', RegistryValueName='ProviderOrder', ActionType=RegistryValueSet.

Last updated: 2026-04-13 Research depth: deep

References (9)

Response Playbook

1. Examine the full command line and decode any Base64 content...
2. Identify the parent process chain and user context...
3. Check for concurrent network connections from the process...

Investigation Guide

Related techniques: T1027, T1105, T1562.001...
Forensic artifacts: PSReadLine history, Prefetch, ScriptBlock logs...

Atomic Red Team Tests

Test 1: Encoded command execution...
Test 2: Download cradle via Net.WebClient...

Unlock Pro Content

Get the full detection package for T1556 including response playbook, investigation guide, and atomic red team tests.

Response PlaybookInvestigation GuideHunting QueriesAtomic Red Team TestsTuning Guidance

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Sub-techniques (9)

Related Techniques

T1556.001Domain Controller Authentication T1556.002Password Filter DLL T1556.003Pluggable Authentication Modules T1556.004Network Device Authentication T1556.008Network Provider DLL T1003OS Credential Dumping T1547.005Security Support Provider T1574Hijack Execution Flow T1078Valid Accounts T1543Create or Modify System Process

Detect Modify Authentication Process in Elastic Security

MITRE ATT&CK

Elastic Detection Query

Data Sources

Required Tables

False Positives & Tuning

Other platforms for T1556

Testing Methodology

Response Playbook

Investigation Guide

Atomic Red Team Tests

Unlock Pro Content

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Sub-techniques (9)

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Same Tactic: Credential Access

Popular Detections

MITRE ATT&CK

Elastic Detection Query

Data Sources

Required Tables

False Positives & Tuning

Other platforms for T1556

Testing Methodology

Unlock Pro Content

Related Detections

Sub-techniques (9)

Related Techniques

Same Tactic: Credential Access

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