Detect Password Managers in Google Chronicle
Adversaries may acquire user credentials from third-party password managers. Password managers are applications designed to store user credentials in an encrypted database, typically accessible after providing a master password. Once the database is unlocked, credentials may be copied to memory. Adversaries may extract the master password or plain-text credentials from memory, brute-force the master password, exploit vulnerabilities (e.g., CVE-2019-3610, CVE-2023-32784 KeePass), or directly exfiltrate password manager database files (.kdbx, .psafe3, .agilekeychain, .1pif) for offline cracking.
MITRE ATT&CK
- Tactic
- Credential Access
- Technique
- T1555 Credentials from Password Stores
- Sub-technique
- T1555.005 Password Managers
- Canonical reference
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1555/005/
YARA-L Detection Query
rule T1555_005_Password_Manager_Credential_Theft {
meta:
author = "Argus Detection Engineering"
description = "Detects password manager credential theft via known attack tools, unauthorized database file access, or memory dumping of password manager processes"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1555/005/"
mitre_attack_tactic = "Credential Access"
mitre_attack_technique = "T1555.005"
severity = "HIGH"
confidence = "HIGH"
created = "2026-04-13"
events:
(
(
$e.metadata.event_type = "PROCESS_LAUNCH" and
(
re.regex($e.target.process.command_line, `(?i)(keethief|keepass2john|kpcli|Find-KeePassConfig|Get-KeePassDatabaseKey|KeePassHax)`) or
re.regex($e.target.process.file.full_path, `(?i)(\\keethief|\\keepass2john)`) or
re.regex($e.target.process.command_line, `(?i)(procdump.{0,40}keepass|minidump.{0,40}keepass|comsvcs.{0,40}keepass)`)
)
) or
(
$e.metadata.event_type = "FILE_READ" and
re.regex($e.target.file.full_path, `(?i)(\.(kdbx|kdb|psafe3|agilekeychain|1pif)$|1Password\.sqlite|KeePass\.config\.xml|LastPass\.sqlite)`) and
not re.regex($e.principal.process.file.full_path, `(?i)(KeePass\.exe|1Password\.exe|LastPass\.exe|Bitwarden\.exe|Dashlane\.exe|RoboForm\.exe)`)
)
)
condition:
$e
} Chronicle YARA-L 2.0 rule that detects password manager credential theft using UDM normalized fields. Matches PROCESS_LAUNCH events where the command line or binary path contains known credential theft tool names (keethief, keepass2john, kpcli) or memory dumping commands targeting KeePass, and FILE_READ events targeting password database file extensions (.kdbx, .kdb, .psafe3, .agilekeychain, .1pif) or known database filenames initiated by processes not in the legitimate password manager whitelist.
Data Sources
Required Tables
False Positives & Tuning
- Password manager auto-sync or cloud backup agents running under service account identities whose executable paths differ from the standard installation paths used in the exclusion regex (e.g., enterprise-deployed Bitwarden with a custom path)
- Forensic or eDiscovery tools that open .kdbx or .psafe3 files for evidence collection during authorized investigations where the forensic tool binary is not in the exclusion list
- Development or QA environments where password manager databases are used as test fixtures and accessed by test runner processes (pytest, Jest, etc.) that do not match the legitimate application whitelist
Other platforms for T1555.005
Testing Methodology
Validate this detection against 3 adversary techniques from Atomic Red Team. Each test below lists the behaviour to exercise and the telemetry you should expect to see. Executable commands and cleanup steps are available with Pro.
- Test 1Copy KeePass database file for offline cracking
Expected signal: Sysmon Event ID 1: cmd.exe with dir searching for .kdbx files. Sysmon Event ID 11: FileCreate for the copied .kdbx file in %TEMP%. DeviceFileEvents showing file copy from original location.
- Test 2Extract KeePass master key with KeeThief
Expected signal: Sysmon Event ID 1: powershell.exe with CommandLine containing 'KeeThief' and 'Get-KeePassDatabaseKey'. PowerShell ScriptBlock Log Event ID 4104 with KeeThief module contents. Sysmon Event ID 10: Process Access targeting KeePass.exe.
- Test 3Memory dump of KeePass process with procdump
Expected signal: Sysmon Event ID 1: procdump.exe targeting KeePass.exe. Sysmon Event ID 10: Process Access with GrantedAccess indicating memory read on KeePass.exe. Sysmon Event ID 11: FileCreate for the .dmp file.
References (6)
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1555/005/
- https://github.com/GhostPack/KeeThief
- https://www.ise.io/casestudies/password-manager-hacking/
- https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-32784
- https://www.fox-it.com/media/kadlze5c/201912_report_operation_wocao.pdf
- https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1555.005/T1555.005.md
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