T1555.001 CrowdStrike LogScale · LogScale

Detect Keychain in CrowdStrike LogScale

Adversaries may acquire credentials from Keychain. Keychain (or Keychain Services) is the macOS credential management system that stores account names, passwords, private keys, certificates, sensitive application data, payment data, and secure notes. There are three types of Keychains: Login Keychain, System Keychain, and Local Items (iCloud) Keychain. Adversaries may gather user credentials from Keychain storage/memory using the security command-line utility (e.g., security dump-keychain -d), by directly reading Keychain database files from ~/Library/Keychains/, or programmatically via Keychain Services API functions like SecKeychainFindInternetPassword and SecItemCopyMatching.

MITRE ATT&CK

Tactic
Credential Access
Technique
T1555 Credentials from Password Stores
Sub-technique
T1555.001 Keychain
Canonical reference
https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1555/001/

LogScale Detection Query

CrowdStrike LogScale (LogScale)
cql
#event_simpleName = "ProcessRollup2"
| FileName = /^(security|keychaindump)$/i OR CommandLine = /(dump-keychain|find-generic-password|find-internet-password|find-certificate|keychaindump|SecKeychainFindInternetPassword|SecItemCopyMatching|SecKeychainItemCopyAttributesAndData)/i OR CommandLine = /Library.Keychains/i
| KeychainDump := if(CommandLine=~/dump-keychain/i, 1, 0)
| PasswordQuery := if(CommandLine=~/(find-generic-password|find-internet-password)/i, 1, 0)
| CertExport := if(CommandLine=~/find-certificate/i, 1, 0)
| SuspicionScore := KeychainDump*3 + PasswordQuery + CertExport
| SuspicionScore > 0
| table([timestamp, ComputerName, UserName, FileName, CommandLine, KeychainDump, PasswordQuery, CertExport, SuspicionScore])
| sort(timestamp, order=desc)
high severity high confidence

CrowdStrike LogScale detection for macOS Keychain credential access via ProcessRollup2 events, matching the security utility with credential-dumping subcommands, the keychaindump tool, or Keychain API function references, scored by technique specificity.

Data Sources

CrowdStrike Falcon Sensor (macOS agent)Falcon Data Replicator (FDR) — ProcessRollup2 event stream

Required Tables

ProcessRollup2 Falcon event stream

False Positives & Tuning

  • Authorized red team or penetration testing exercises using keychaindump as part of an agreed-scope engagement on managed macOS endpoints
  • macOS system administrator automation scripts using security find-internet-password for managed service credential retrieval in approved operational runbooks
  • Software development CI/CD pipelines running Keychain Services API integration tests on enrolled developer macOS endpoints registered in Falcon
Download portable Sigma rule (.yml)

Other platforms for T1555.001


Testing Methodology

Validate this detection against 3 adversary techniques from Atomic Red Team. Each test below lists the behaviour to exercise and the telemetry you should expect to see. Executable commands and cleanup steps are available with Pro.

  1. Test 1Dump Login Keychain with security command

    Expected signal: macOS Unified Log entry for /usr/bin/security process with 'dump-keychain -d' arguments. ESF process execution event. EDR process creation event with full command line.

  2. Test 2Extract specific password from Keychain

    Expected signal: macOS Unified Log entry for /usr/bin/security with 'find-generic-password' and '-w' arguments. ESF Keychain item access event.

  3. Test 3Copy Keychain database file for offline extraction

    Expected signal: ESF file copy event for login.keychain-db. Sysmon for macOS or EDR file creation event at destination path. macOS Unified Log may not capture this if only CLI cp is used.

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