Which SIEM platforms have a T1553 detection rule?

df00tech provides T1553 (Subvert Trust Controls) detection queries for 7 SIEM platforms: Microsoft Sentinel / Defender, Splunk, Elastic Security (EQL), IBM QRadar (AQL), Sumo Logic CSE, Google Chronicle / SecOps, CrowdStrike LogScale (CQL).

What data sources are required to detect Subvert Trust Controls (T1553)?

Detecting Subvert Trust Controls requires the following data sources: Process: Process Creation, Command: Command Execution, Windows Registry: Registry Key Modification, Microsoft Defender for Endpoint.

What severity and confidence is the T1553 detection?

The T1553 detection is rated high severity with medium confidence.

What are common false positives for T1553?

Common false positives for T1553 include: Enterprise PKI administrators legitimately adding internal CA certificates to ROOT or TRUSTEDPUBLISHER stores via certutil; Software developers using signtool.exe to sign their own applications during build processes; IT administrators using Unblock-File or removing Zone.Identifier from files downloaded from trusted internal shares.

T1553 Sumo Logic CSE · Sumo

Detect Subvert Trust Controls in Sumo Logic CSE

Adversaries may undermine security controls that warn users of untrusted activity or prevent execution of untrusted programs. Operating systems and security products contain mechanisms to identify programs or websites as possessing some level of trust, such as code signing certificates, Mark-of-the-Web (MOTW) attributes, Gatekeeper on macOS, or SIP and Trust Provider validation on Windows. Adversaries attempt to subvert these trust mechanisms through techniques including code signing certificate theft or forgery, MOTW removal, root certificate installation, SIP/Trust Provider hijacking, and Gatekeeper bypass. The method used depends on the specific mechanism being subverted.

MITRE ATT&CK

Tactic: Defense Evasion
Technique: T1553 Subvert Trust Controls
Canonical reference: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1553/

Sumo Detection Query

Sumo Logic CSE (Sumo)

sql

_index=sec_record*
| where metadata_deviceEventId in ("1", "4688")
| where (
    (toLowerCase(baseImage) matches ".*certutil\\.exe.*" AND
     toLowerCase(commandLine) matches ".*(-addstore|-delstore|-importpfx|-enterprise).*")
    OR (toLowerCase(baseImage) matches ".*(powershell|pwsh|cmd)\\.exe.*" AND
        toLowerCase(commandLine) matches ".*(zone\\.identifier|unblock-file|zoneid).*")
    OR (toLowerCase(baseImage) matches ".*signtool\\.exe.*" AND
        toLowerCase(commandLine) matches ".*sign.*")
    OR toLowerCase(baseImage) matches ".*(makecert|pvk2pfx)\\.exe.*"
  )
| eval ImageLower = toLowerCase(baseImage)
| eval CmdLower = toLowerCase(commandLine)
| eval CertStoreManip = if (ImageLower matches ".*certutil\\.exe.*" AND (CmdLower matches ".*-addstore.*" OR CmdLower matches ".*-delstore.*" OR CmdLower matches ".*-importpfx.*" OR CmdLower matches ".*-enterprise.*"), 1, 0)
| eval RootStoreAdd = if (CertStoreManip == 1 AND (CmdLower matches ".*(root|authroot|trustedpublisher|trustedpeople).*"), 1, 0)
| eval MotwRemoval = if (ImageLower matches ".*(powershell|pwsh|cmd)\\.exe.*" AND (CmdLower matches ".*zone\\.identifier.*" OR CmdLower matches ".*unblock-file.*"), 1, 0)
| eval SigntoolUsage = if (ImageLower matches ".*signtool\\.exe.*" AND CmdLower matches ".*sign.*", 1, 0)
| eval CertCreation = if (ImageLower matches ".*(makecert|pvk2pfx)\\.exe.*", 1, 0)
| eval SuspicionScore = CertStoreManip + RootStoreAdd + MotwRemoval + SigntoolUsage + CertCreation
| eval DetectionBranch = if (RootStoreAdd == 1, "ROOT_CERT_INSTALL", if (CertStoreManip == 1, "CERT_STORE_MANIP", if (MotwRemoval == 1, "MOTW_REMOVAL", if (SigntoolUsage == 1, "SIGNTOOL_SIGN", if (CertCreation == 1, "CERT_CREATION", "TRUST_SUBVERSION")))))
| fields metadata_deviceTimestamp, device_hostname, user_username, baseImage, commandLine, parentBaseImage, DetectionBranch, CertStoreManip, RootStoreAdd, MotwRemoval, SigntoolUsage, CertCreation, SuspicionScore
| sort by SuspicionScore desc, metadata_deviceTimestamp desc

high severity high confidence

Sumo Logic Cloud SIEM (CSE) query detecting T1553 Subvert Trust Controls using the normalized sec_record schema. Targets Sysmon EventID 1 and Windows Security EventID 4688 process creation records ingested through CSE normalization. Implements multi-branch scoring for certutil certificate manipulation, MOTW removal, signtool usage, and certificate creation tools. Requires CSE normalization with baseImage, commandLine, parentBaseImage, device_hostname, and user_username fields populated from Windows endpoint telemetry.

Data Sources

Sumo Logic Cloud SIEM (CSE) normalized recordsWindows Sysmon via CSE normalizationWindows Security Event Log via CSE normalization

Required Tables

sec_record_endpoint_os_windowssec_record_*

False Positives & Tuning

Enterprise certificate lifecycle management processes run by IT security or PKI teams using certutil to install corporate CA certificates into ROOT and TRUSTEDPUBLISHER stores will trigger CERT_STORE_MANIP and ROOT_CERT_INSTALL branches on every managed endpoint during rollouts
Developers using Windows SDK tools (makecert, pvk2pfx, signtool) during local development and testing of code signing workflows will generate persistent CERT_CREATION and SIGNTOOL_SIGN detections on developer workstations
Security scanning and EDR tools that interact with Zone.Identifier ADS attributes during file quarantine, sandboxing, or safe-launch preprocessing workflows may trigger MOTW_REMOVAL detections as a routine operational side effect

Download portable Sigma rule (.yml)

Other platforms for T1553

Microsoft Sentinel (KQL) Splunk (SPL) Elastic Security (Elastic) IBM QRadar (QRadar) Google Chronicle (YARA-L) CrowdStrike LogScale (LogScale) All platforms (combined) →

Testing Methodology

Validate this detection against 4 adversary techniques from Atomic Red Team. Each test below lists the behaviour to exercise and the telemetry you should expect to see. Executable commands and cleanup steps are available with Pro.

Test 1Add Self-Signed Root Certificate to Windows ROOT Store
Expected signal: Sysmon Event ID 1: Process Create with Image=certutil.exe, CommandLine containing '-addstore ROOT'. Security Event ID 4688 (if command line auditing enabled). Windows CertificateServicesClient-Lifecycle-System/Operational Event ID 1001 (certificate installed). CAPI2 Operational log entries for certificate store modification.
Test 2Remove Mark-of-the-Web via PowerShell Unblock-File
Expected signal: Sysmon Event ID 1: powershell.exe with CommandLine containing 'Unblock-File' and the target file path. Sysmon Event ID 23 or 26 (File Delete) for the Zone.Identifier ADS removal. PowerShell ScriptBlock Log Event ID 4104 showing the Unblock-File command. Security Event ID 4663 (object access) if file system auditing is enabled for the temp directory.
Test 3Remove Zone.Identifier ADS via cmd.exe del command
Expected signal: Sysmon Event ID 1: cmd.exe with CommandLine containing 'Zone.Identifier' and 'del'. Sysmon Event ID 23 (File Delete) for the ADS. Security Event ID 4688 if command line auditing is enabled. Note: some EDR solutions specifically monitor for ADS deletion on .exe files.
Test 4Inspect and Enumerate SIP Trust Provider Registry Keys
Expected signal: Sysmon Event ID 1: reg.exe with CommandLine querying Cryptography\OID paths. Security Event ID 4663 (registry object access) if registry auditing is enabled. No modifications occur — this tests detection of enumeration prior to hijacking.

Last updated: 2026-04-13 Research depth: deep

References (9)

Response Playbook

1. Examine the full command line and decode any Base64 content...
2. Identify the parent process chain and user context...
3. Check for concurrent network connections from the process...

Investigation Guide

Related techniques: T1027, T1105, T1562.001...
Forensic artifacts: PSReadLine history, Prefetch, ScriptBlock logs...

Atomic Red Team Tests

Test 1: Encoded command execution...
Test 2: Download cradle via Net.WebClient...

Unlock Pro Content

Get the full detection package for T1553 including response playbook, investigation guide, and atomic red team tests.

Response PlaybookInvestigation GuideHunting QueriesAtomic Red Team TestsTuning Guidance

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Sub-techniques (6)

Related Techniques

T1553.001Gatekeeper Bypass T1553.002Code Signing T1553.003SIP and Trust Provider Hijacking T1553.004Install Root Certificate T1553.005Mark-of-the-Web Bypass T1553.006Code Signing Policy Modification T1112Modify Registry T1222File and Directory Permissions Modification T1036Masquerading T1027Obfuscated Files or Information T1105Ingress Tool Transfer

Detect Subvert Trust Controls in Sumo Logic CSE

MITRE ATT&CK

Sumo Detection Query

Data Sources

Required Tables

False Positives & Tuning

Other platforms for T1553

Testing Methodology

Response Playbook

Investigation Guide

Atomic Red Team Tests

Unlock Pro Content

Related Detections

Sub-techniques (6)

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Same Tactic: Defense Evasion

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MITRE ATT&CK

Sumo Detection Query

Data Sources

Required Tables

False Positives & Tuning

Other platforms for T1553

Testing Methodology

Unlock Pro Content

Related Detections

Sub-techniques (6)

Related Techniques

Same Tactic: Defense Evasion

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