Detect Credentials in Registry in CrowdStrike LogScale
Adversaries may search the Windows Registry on compromised systems for insecurely stored credentials. The Registry stores configuration data used by programs for automatic logons, saved passwords, and service credentials. Common registry credential locations include: Windows AutoLogon (HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon\DefaultPassword), PuTTY saved sessions (SOFTWARE\SimonTatham\Putty\Sessions), Outlook profiles (HKCU\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Office\16.0\Outlook\Profiles), VNC passwords (SOFTWARE\{TightVNC,RealVNC,UltraVNC}), and SNMP community strings. TrickBot, APT32, IceApple, Valak, and StrelaStealer have all abused registry credential storage.
MITRE ATT&CK
- Tactic
- Credential Access
- Technique
- T1552 Unsecured Credentials
- Sub-technique
- T1552.002 Credentials in Registry
- Canonical reference
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1552/002/
LogScale Detection Query
// Detect direct registry reads of credential paths
#repo=base_sensor
| #event_simpleName=RegOpenKey OR #event_simpleName=RegQueryValue
| RegObjectName = /(?i)(Winlogon\\DefaultPassword|Winlogon.*AutoAdminLogon|SimonTatham|Pu[Tt]{2}Y\\Sessions|Outlook.*Profiles|(?:Real|Tight|Ultra|Win)VNC.*Password)/
| not ImageFileName = /(?i)(putty|OUTLOOK|tvnserver|vncviewer)\.exe$/
| AlertType := case {
RegObjectName = /(?i)Winlogon/ => "AutoLogon_Credential",
RegObjectName = /(?i)(SimonTatham|PuTTY)/ => "PuTTY_Credential",
RegObjectName = /(?i)Outlook/ => "Outlook_Credential",
RegObjectName = /(?i)VNC/ => "VNC_Credential",
default => "Registry_CredentialAccess"
}
| table([_time, ComputerName, UserName, ImageFileName, RegObjectName, AlertType])
// Detect reg.exe and PowerShell bulk credential hunting
| union {
#repo=base_sensor
| #event_simpleName=ProcessRollup2
| ImageFileName = /(?i)\\(reg|powershell|pwsh)\.exe$/
| CommandLine = /(?i)(query.*\/f.*(password|passwd|pwd)|Get-RegistryAutoLogon|Find-GPOPassword|Get-SiteListPassword|Get-CachedGPPPassword|Get-ItemProperty.*password)/
| AlertType := case {
ImageFileName = /(?i)reg\.exe/ => "RegQuery_PasswordSearch",
default => "PowerSploit_CredRegistry"
}
| table([_time, ComputerName, UserName, ImageFileName, CommandLine, AlertType])
}
| sort(field=_time, order=desc)CrowdStrike LogScale (CQL) detection for T1552.002. Queries base_sensor repository for Falcon RegOpenKey and RegQueryValue events matching credential-bearing registry paths (AutoLogon, PuTTY, Outlook, VNC), unioned with ProcessRollup2 events for reg.exe bulk searches and PowerSploit credential harvesting commands. Results are enriched with an AlertType classification.
Data Sources
Required Tables
False Positives & Tuning
- CrowdStrike Falcon sensor itself or other EDR agents performing registry telemetry collection that incidentally touches credential-adjacent registry paths
- Enterprise single sign-on or credential synchronisation services (Okta, OneLogin agents) reading AutoLogon or Outlook profile keys to provision managed credentials
- Helpdesk or remote support tools (TeamViewer, ConnectWise) accessing VNC registry configuration during legitimate remote session setup
Other platforms for T1552.002
Testing Methodology
Validate this detection against 4 adversary techniques from Atomic Red Team. Each test below lists the behaviour to exercise and the telemetry you should expect to see. Executable commands and cleanup steps are available with Pro.
- Test 1Query Registry for AutoLogon Credentials
Expected signal: Sysmon Event ID 1: reg.exe with 'query' and 'DefaultPassword'. Security Event ID 4663 (Object Access) if registry auditing enabled for this key. The returned value (if present) is the plaintext password.
- Test 2Bulk Registry Password Search with reg.exe
Expected signal: Sysmon Event ID 1: reg.exe with 'query HKLM /f password /t REG_SZ /s'. The command will iterate through the entire HKLM hive, generating multiple registry access events. Output shows all registry paths containing 'password'.
- Test 3Query PuTTY Saved Session Credentials
Expected signal: Sysmon Event ID 1: reg.exe with 'query' and 'SimonTatham'. Registry access events for each PuTTY session key. Output includes HostName, UserName, and connection parameters for each saved session.
- Test 4PowerSploit Get-RegistryAutoLogon
Expected signal: Sysmon Event ID 1: powershell.exe with 'Get-RegistryAutoLogon'. Sysmon Event ID 7: PowerSploit module DLL loaded. Registry access to Winlogon key. PowerShell ScriptBlock Log Event ID 4104 with function content.
References (6)
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1552/002/
- https://pentestlab.blog/2017/04/19/stored-credentials/
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/network-access-do-not-allow-storage-of-passwords-and-credentials-for-network-authentication
- https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1552.002/T1552.002.md
- https://github.com/PowerShellMafia/PowerSploit/blob/master/Exfiltration/Get-GPPPassword.ps1
- https://www.trendmicro.com/en_us/research/19/b/trickbot-adds-new-features-targets-energy-enterprises.html
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