Detect Use Alternate Authentication Material in IBM QRadar
Adversaries may use alternate authentication material, such as password hashes, Kerberos tickets, and application access tokens, in order to move laterally within an environment and bypass normal system access controls. Authentication processes generally require a valid identity (e.g., username) along with one or more authentication factors (e.g., password, pin, physical smart card, token generator, etc.). Alternate authentication material is legitimately generated by systems after a user or application successfully authenticates by providing a valid identity and the required authentication factor(s). By stealing alternate authentication material, adversaries are able to bypass system access controls and authenticate to systems without knowing the plaintext password or any additional authentication factors. Sub-techniques include Application Access Token abuse (T1550.001), Pass the Hash (T1550.002), Pass the Ticket (T1550.003), and Web Session Cookie reuse (T1550.004).
MITRE ATT&CK
- Tactic
- Defense Evasion Lateral Movement
- Canonical reference
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1550/
QRadar Detection Query
SELECT
DATEFORMAT(starttime, 'yyyy-MM-dd HH:mm:ss') AS event_time,
logsourcename(logsourceid) AS log_source,
username AS target_user,
QIDNAME(qid) AS event_name,
"Logon_Type" AS logon_type,
"Authentication_Package_Name" AS auth_package,
sourceip AS src_ip,
"Ticket_Encryption_Type" AS ticket_enc,
Status AS event_status,
CASE
WHEN eventid = '4624' AND "Logon_Type" = '9' THEN 'Pass-the-Hash: LogonType 9 NewCredentials (mimikatz sekurlsa::pth)'
WHEN eventid = '4624' AND "Logon_Type" = '3' AND (LOWER("Authentication_Package_Name") = 'ntlm' OR LOWER("Authentication_Package_Name") = 'ntlmssp') THEN 'Pass-the-Hash: NTLM Network Logon'
WHEN eventid = '4769' AND ("Ticket_Encryption_Type" = '0x17' OR "Ticket_Encryption_Type" = '23') THEN 'Pass-the-Ticket: RC4 Kerberos Downgrade'
WHEN eventid = '4776' AND Status IS NOT NULL AND Status != '0x0' AND Status != '0' THEN 'NTLM Hash Override Attempt'
ELSE 'Alternate Auth Abuse'
END AS attack_pattern,
CASE
WHEN eventid = '4624' AND "Logon_Type" = '9' THEN 3
WHEN eventid = '4769' AND ("Ticket_Encryption_Type" = '0x17' OR "Ticket_Encryption_Type" = '23') THEN 2
ELSE 1
END AS suspicion_score
FROM events
WHERE
LOGSOURCETYPEID(logsourceid) = 12 /* Microsoft Windows Security Event Log */
AND eventid IN ('4624', '4769', '4776')
AND (
(eventid = '4624' AND "Logon_Type" = '9')
OR (
eventid = '4624'
AND "Logon_Type" = '3'
AND (LOWER("Authentication_Package_Name") IN ('ntlm', 'ntlmssp'))
AND sourceip IS NOT NULL
AND sourceip NOT IN ('127.0.0.1', '::1', '-', '')
AND NOT (username LIKE '%$')
)
OR (
eventid = '4769'
AND ("Ticket_Encryption_Type" = '0x17' OR "Ticket_Encryption_Type" = '23')
AND (Status = '0x0' OR Status IS NULL)
)
OR (
eventid = '4776'
AND Status IS NOT NULL
AND Status NOT IN ('0x0', '0', '-', '')
)
)
AND LOGSOURCETIME(starttime) > NOW() - 1 DAYS
ORDER BY suspicion_score DESC, starttime DESCDetects Use of Alternate Authentication Material (T1550) against QRadar events ingested from Windows Security Event Log (LOGSOURCETYPEID 12). Identifies Pass-the-Hash via LogonType 9 and remote NTLM logons, Pass-the-Ticket via RC4-HMAC Kerberos ticket encryption downgrade (Event 4769), and NTLM hash override attempts via Event 4776 validation failures. Scores events by suspicion level.
Data Sources
Required Tables
False Positives & Tuning
- NTLM LogonType 3 events from legitimate IT admin tools such as PsExec, WMI, or remote management consoles that use NTLM authentication over the network
- Kerberos RC4 encryption (0x17) from legacy printers, embedded devices, or services configured only to support DES/RC4 Kerberos
- High volume of Event 4776 failures during account lockout scenarios or Active Directory synchronisation issues between domain controllers
Other platforms for T1550
Testing Methodology
Validate this detection against 4 adversary techniques from Atomic Red Team. Each test below lists the behaviour to exercise and the telemetry you should expect to see. Executable commands and cleanup steps are available with Pro.
- Test 1Pass-the-Hash via Mimikatz sekurlsa::pth (Windows)
Expected signal: Sysmon Event ID 1: Process Create for mimikatz.exe with parent process context. Security Event ID 4624 with LogonType=9, TargetUserName=testadmin, AuthenticationPackageName=NTLM on the local host — this fires immediately when the new process token is created. If the spawned cmd.exe then accesses a network resource, Security Event ID 4624 LogonType=3 with NTLM auth will appear on the target host. Sysmon Event ID 10 may appear if mimikatz accessed LSASS.
- Test 2Pass-the-Hash via Impacket wmiexec.py (Linux attacking Windows)
Expected signal: On the target Windows host: Security Event ID 4624 with LogonType=3, AuthenticationPackageName=NTLM, IpAddress=<Linux attacker IP>, TargetUserName=testadmin. Security Event ID 4688 (or Sysmon Event ID 1) showing WmiPrvSE.exe spawning cmd.exe for the WMI command execution. No LogonType 9 event — this is a pure NTLM Type 3 network logon, demonstrating the PTH_NTLM detection branch.
- Test 3Pass-the-Ticket — Export and Inject Kerberos Ticket via Mimikatz
Expected signal: Sysmon Event ID 1: Process Create for mimikatz.exe. After ticket injection, subsequent Kerberos service ticket requests from the session may appear in Security Event ID 4769 — if the injected ticket is RC4-encrypted (common with older tickets or those from tools using RC4), TicketEncryptionType=0x17 will appear. Security Event ID 4648 may appear when using the injected ticket to access network resources. klist output shows the injected service ticket.
- Test 4Overpass-the-Hash — Convert NTLM Hash to Kerberos TGT via Mimikatz /ptt
Expected signal: Security Event ID 4624 LogonType=9 on the local host when the new credential token is created. Security Event ID 4768 (Kerberos TGT request) on the domain controller showing the AS-REQ using RC4-HMAC encryption (TicketEncryptionType=0x17) if the domain does not enforce AES-only. Security Event ID 4769 when the TGT is used to request service tickets for SYSVOL/CIFS access. The combination of LogonType 9 followed by Kerberos tickets from that session ties the PTH origin to subsequent Kerberos activity.
References (13)
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1550/
- https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/dn487457.aspx
- https://csrc.nist.gov/glossary/term/authentication
- https://csrc.nist.gov/glossary/term/multi_factor_authentication
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/defender-endpoint/advanced-hunting-securityevent-table
- https://github.com/gentilkiwi/mimikatz/wiki/module-~-sekurlsa
- https://github.com/SecureAuthCorp/impacket
- https://www.sans.org/white-papers/36962/
- https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/identity/ad-ds/plan/security-best-practices/credential-protection-and-management
- https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1550.002/T1550.002.md
- https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1550.003/T1550.003.md
- https://adsecurity.org/?p=1515
- https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2021/09/27/foggyweb-targeted-nobelium-malware-leads-to-persistent-backdoor/
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