Detect Active Setup in CrowdStrike LogScale
Adversaries may achieve persistence by adding a Registry key to the Active Setup of the local machine. Active Setup is a Windows mechanism that is used to execute programs when a user logs in. The value stored in the Registry key will be executed after a user logs into the computer. These programs will be executed under the context of the user and will have the account's associated permissions level. Adversaries may abuse Active Setup by creating a key under HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Active Setup\Installed Components\ and setting a malicious value for StubPath. This value will serve as the program that will be executed when a user logs into the computer. Adversaries can abuse these components to execute malware, such as remote access tools, to maintain persistence through system reboots.
MITRE ATT&CK
- Tactic
- Persistence Privilege Escalation
- Technique
- T1547 Boot or Logon Autostart Execution
- Sub-technique
- T1547.014 Active Setup
- Canonical reference
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1547/014/
LogScale Detection Query
#event_simpleName in (AsepValueUpdate, RegGenericValueUpdate)
| RegObjectName = /SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Active Setup\\Installed Components/i
| (RegValueName = /^StubPath$/i OR RegObjectName = /\\StubPath$/i)
| isSuspiciousStub := RegStringValue = /(?i)(cmd\.exe|powershell|mshta\.exe|rundll32|regsvr32|wscript|cscript|certutil|\.bat|\.vbs|\.js|\.hta|https?:\/\/)/
| isKnownGUID := RegObjectName = /(?i)(89820200-ECBD|22d6f312-b0f6|2C7339CF-2B09|44BBA840-CC51|6BF52A52-394A|89B4C1CD-B018)/
| guidExtract := replace(RegObjectName, /.*Installed Components\\(\{[^}]+\}).*/i, "$1")
| where isSuspiciousStub = true OR isKnownGUID = false
| table([@timestamp, ComputerName, UserName, RegObjectName, RegValueName, RegStringValue, FileName, CommandLine, guidExtract, isSuspiciousStub, isKnownGUID])
| sort(field=@timestamp, order=desc)Detects Active Setup persistence (T1547.014) in CrowdStrike Falcon LogScale by monitoring AsepValueUpdate and RegGenericValueUpdate events targeting the Active Setup Installed Components registry path. Extracts the GUID from the registry key, flags StubPath values containing known attacker-favored executables and interpreters, and identifies novel unknown GUIDs not matching Microsoft's built-in component set.
Data Sources
Required Tables
False Positives & Tuning
- CrowdStrike Falcon sensor may generate AsepValueUpdate events during legitimate Windows Update or software patch cycles that touch Active Setup keys for OS components
- Enterprise MDM or GPO-driven configuration changes that set or update Active Setup StubPath entries across endpoints as part of application lifecycle management
- Vendor-supplied installation scripts for enterprise software (e.g., Microsoft 365, Citrix Workspace) that create new GUID entries with PowerShell or cmd.exe StubPath initialization commands
Other platforms for T1547.014
Testing Methodology
Validate this detection against 3 adversary techniques from Atomic Red Team. Each test below lists the behaviour to exercise and the telemetry you should expect to see. Executable commands and cleanup steps are available with Pro.
- Test 1Active Setup StubPath Persistence with Custom GUID
Expected signal: Sysmon Event ID 12: Registry Key Created for the GUID subkey. Sysmon Event ID 13: Registry Value Set for StubPath, ComponentID, and Version values. Security Event ID 4688: Process creation for reg.exe with the full command line.
- Test 2Active Setup with Suspicious LOLBin StubPath
Expected signal: Sysmon Event ID 13: Registry Value Set with Details containing 'cmd.exe /c'. On next user logon: Sysmon Event ID 1 for cmd.exe spawned by userinit.exe/explorer.exe. Sysmon Event ID 11 for file creation in %TEMP%.
- Test 3Active Setup via PowerShell Registry Manipulation
Expected signal: Sysmon Event ID 1: Process Create for powershell.exe with the registry manipulation command. Sysmon Event ID 12: Registry Key Created. Sysmon Event ID 13: Registry Value Set for StubPath and Version. PowerShell ScriptBlock Log Event ID 4104 with the full script.
References (8)
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1547/014/
- https://helgeklein.com/blog/2010/04/active-setup-explained/
- https://digital-forensics.sans.org/summit-archives/2010/35-glyer-apt-persistence-mechanisms.pdf
- https://citizenlab.ca/2015/12/packrat-report/
- https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/unit42-tropic-trooper-targets-taiwanese-government-and-fossil-fuel-provider-with-poison-ivy/
- https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/bb963902
- https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1547.014/T1547.014.md
- https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/registry/registry_set
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