T1547.010 Elastic Security · Elastic

Detect Port Monitors in Elastic Security

Adversaries may use port monitors to run an adversary-supplied DLL during system boot for persistence or privilege escalation. A port monitor can be set through the AddMonitor API call to set a DLL to be loaded at startup. This DLL can be located in C:\Windows\System32 and will be loaded and run by the print spooler service, spoolsv.exe, under SYSTEM level permissions on boot. Alternatively, an arbitrary DLL can be loaded if permissions allow writing a fully-qualified pathname for that DLL to the Driver value of an existing or new arbitrarily named subkey of HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Print\Monitors.

MITRE ATT&CK

Tactic
Persistence Privilege Escalation
Technique
T1547 Boot or Logon Autostart Execution
Sub-technique
T1547.010 Port Monitors
Canonical reference
https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1547/010/

Elastic Detection Query

Elastic Security (Elastic)
eql
sequence by host.name with maxspan=5m
  [registry where registry.path : "HKLM\\SYSTEM\\CurrentControlSet\\Control\\Print\\Monitors\\*" and event.action in ("registry_value_set", "registry_key_created")]
  [file where file.path : "C:\\Windows\\System32\\*.dll" and event.action == "creation" and not process.name : ("TiWorker.exe", "TrustedInstaller.exe", "msiexec.exe", "svchost.exe")]

sequence
  [registry where registry.path : "HKLM\\SYSTEM\\CurrentControlSet\\Control\\Print\\Monitors\\*" and registry.data.strings : "*.dll"]
  [process where process.parent.name : "spoolsv.exe" and not process.name : ("splwow64.exe", "PrintIsolationHost.exe", "printfilterpipelinesvc.exe")]
high severity high confidence

Detects T1547.010 Port Monitor persistence via Print Monitors registry key modification, suspicious DLL drops in System32, and unusual child processes spawned by spoolsv.exe. Uses EQL sequences to correlate registry modifications with subsequent file creation or spooler child processes.

Data Sources

Windows Registry EventsWindows File EventsWindows Process EventsSysmon

Required Tables

registryfileprocess

False Positives & Tuning

  • Legitimate printer driver installations that register custom port monitors (e.g., HP, Canon, Xerox printer software)
  • Print management software updates that modify the Print Monitors registry key during upgrades
  • Windows Update or system components like TrustedInstaller deploying spooler-related DLLs to System32
Download portable Sigma rule (.yml)

Other platforms for T1547.010


Testing Methodology

Validate this detection against 3 adversary techniques from Atomic Red Team. Each test below lists the behaviour to exercise and the telemetry you should expect to see. Executable commands and cleanup steps are available with Pro.

  1. Test 1Port Monitor Registry Key Creation

    Expected signal: Sysmon Event ID 13: Registry Value Set with TargetObject=HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Print\Monitors\TestMonitor_df00tech\Driver, Details=localspl.dll, Image=reg.exe. Security Event ID 4688 with CommandLine containing reg add.

  2. Test 2DLL Drop in System32 Simulating Port Monitor Payload

    Expected signal: Sysmon Event ID 11: File Create with TargetFilename=C:\Windows\System32\df00tech_test_monitor.dll, Image=cmd.exe. DeviceFileEvents with ActionType=FileCreated, FolderPath starting with C:\Windows\System32.

  3. Test 3PowerShell AddMonitor API Simulation via Registry

    Expected signal: Sysmon Event ID 12: Registry Key Created for PSTestMonitor subkey. Sysmon Event ID 13: Registry Value Set for Driver value. Sysmon Event ID 1: Process Create for powershell.exe with the full command line. PowerShell ScriptBlock Log Event ID 4104 with the registry manipulation commands.

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