Detect Component Object Model Hijacking in Sumo Logic CSE
Adversaries may establish persistence by executing malicious content triggered by hijacked references to Component Object Model (COM) objects. COM is a system within Windows to enable interaction between software components through the operating system. References to various COM objects are stored in the Registry. Adversaries can use the COM system to insert malicious code that can be executed in place of legitimate software through hijacking the COM references and relationships as a means for persistence. Hijacking a COM object requires a change in the Windows Registry to replace a reference to a legitimate system component which may cause the execution of the adversary's code instead of the intended COM component.
MITRE ATT&CK
- Tactic
- Privilege Escalation Persistence
- Technique
- T1546 Event Triggered Execution
- Sub-technique
- T1546.015 Component Object Model Hijacking
- Canonical reference
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/015/
Sumo Detection Query
_sourceCategory="windows/sysmon" OR _sourceCategory="windows/security"
| where EventID in ("12", "13")
| where TargetObject matches /Classes\\CLSID\\/ and TargetObject matches /(InprocServer32|LocalServer32|InprocServer|LocalServer|TreatAs|ProgID)/
| eval is_hkcu = if(TargetObject matches /HKU\\|HKCU\\|Software\\Classes\\CLSID/, 1, 0)
| eval is_suspicious_path = if(
toLower(Details) matches /(appdata|\\temp\\|programdata|users\\public|powershell|cmd\.exe|wscript|cscript|mshta|rundll32|regsvr32)/,
1, 0
)
| eval is_system_path = if(
toLower(Details) matches /(windows\\system32|syswow64|program files)/,
1, 0
)
| where is_suspicious_path = 1 or (is_hkcu = 1 and is_system_path = 0)
| parse regex field=TargetObject "CLSID\\\\(?P<clsid_guid>\{[0-9A-Fa-f\-]+\})" nodrop
| eval detection_type = if(is_suspicious_path = 1, "COM_SUSPICIOUS_PAYLOAD",
if(is_hkcu = 1 and is_system_path = 0, "COM_HKCU_NON_SYSTEM",
if(is_hkcu = 1, "COM_HKCU_OVERRIDE", "COM_HKLM_MODIFICATION")))
| fields _messageTime, Computer, User, EventID, detection_type, clsid_guid, TargetObject, Details, Image
| sort by _messageTime descSumo Logic detection for COM object hijacking targeting CLSID server registration keys via Sysmon registry events (EventID 12/13). Identifies suspicious payload paths and HKCU overrides to non-system paths, classifying each match by detection type for analyst triage.
Data Sources
Required Tables
False Positives & Tuning
- Software installers that use per-user COM registration (HKCU) to avoid requiring administrator privileges, such as Google Chrome or Firefox update mechanisms
- Python or .NET developer environments registering COM interop assemblies in user-accessible paths during SDK setup
- Legitimate administrative scripts using regsvr32 or rundll32 to register or re-register COM components after repair operations
Other platforms for T1546.015
Testing Methodology
Validate this detection against 3 adversary techniques from Atomic Red Team. Each test below lists the behaviour to exercise and the telemetry you should expect to see. Executable commands and cleanup steps are available with Pro.
- Test 1COM Hijack via HKCU InprocServer32
Expected signal: Sysmon Event ID 13: TargetObject=HKCU\SOFTWARE\Classes\CLSID\{BCDE0395-E52F-467C-8E3D-C4579291692E}\InprocServer32, Details=AppData path. IsHkcuOverride=true, IsNotSystemPath=true. Process creation for reg.exe.
- Test 2COM Hijack Targeting Explorer Shell Extension CLSID
Expected signal: Sysmon Event ID 13 for HKCU CLSID registration with Temp directory DLL path. The Temp path is the high-risk indicator.
- Test 3Enumerate COM Hijacking Opportunities
Expected signal: Process creation for powershell.exe with registry enumeration command. Read-only registry access to HKLM and HKCU CLSID trees. Output reveals count of potential hijacking candidates.
References (5)
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/015/
- https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1546.015/T1546.015.md
- https://www.cyberbit.com/blog/endpoint-security/com-hijacking-windows-overlooked-security-vulnerability/
- https://bohops.com/2018/08/18/abusing-the-com-registry-structure-part-2-loading-techniques-for-evasion-and-persistence/
- https://threatexpress.com/blogs/2021/02/living-off-the-com-land/
Unlock Pro Content
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