Detect Steal Web Session Cookie in CrowdStrike LogScale
An adversary may steal web application or service session cookies and use them to gain access to web applications or Internet services as an authenticated user without needing credentials. Web applications and services often use session cookies as an authentication token after a user has authenticated to a website. Cookies are often valid for an extended period of time, even if the web application is not actively used. Session cookies can be found on disk in browser profile directories (SQLite databases), in the process memory of the browser, and in network traffic to remote systems. Tools such as Evilginx2 and Muraena act as adversary-in-the-middle proxies to capture session cookies from victims directed to phishing domains without the victim's endpoint ever being directly compromised. Malware families including Raccoon Stealer, QakBot, Spica, CookieMiner, Grandoreiro, and EVILNUM specifically target browser cookie stores for theft. Stolen session cookies can bypass multi-factor authentication by reusing authenticated sessions, enabling account takeover without requiring credentials.
MITRE ATT&CK
- Tactic
- Credential Access
- Technique
- T1539 Steal Web Session Cookie
- Canonical reference
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1539/
LogScale Detection Query
#event_simpleName=FileOpenInfo
| TargetFileName = /(?i)(Chrome.User.Data|Edge.User.Data|Firefox.Profiles|BraveSoftware.Brave-Browser|Opera.Software.Opera.Stable|Vivaldi.User.Data)/
| TargetFileName = /(?i)([\/\\]Cookies$|cookies\.sqlite(-wal)?$|[\/\\]Local.State$|[\/\\]Login.Data$)/
| ImageFileName != /(?i)(\\chrome\.exe|\\msedge\.exe|\\firefox\.exe|\\brave\.exe|\\opera\.exe|\\vivaldi\.exe|\\chromium\.exe|\\msedgewebview2\.exe|\\MsMpEng\.exe|\\SearchIndexer\.exe|\\SgrmBroker\.exe|\\backgroundTaskHost\.exe|\\WerFault\.exe|\\svchost\.exe|\\TiWorker\.exe|\\TrustedInstaller\.exe)/
| IsScriptHost := ImageFileName matches /(?i)(powershell\.exe|pwsh\.exe|cmd\.exe|wscript\.exe|cscript\.exe|mshta\.exe|python[23]?\.exe|node\.exe|ruby\.exe|perl\.exe|sqlite3\.exe)/
| IsInterpreter := ImageFileName matches /(?i)(python[23]?\.exe|node\.exe|ruby\.exe|perl\.exe|sqlite3\.exe)/
| SuspicionScore := if(IsScriptHost == true, 2, 1) + if(IsInterpreter == true, 1, 0)
| table([_timstamp, ComputerName, UserName, ImageFileName, CommandLine, TargetFileName, IsScriptHost, IsInterpreter, SuspicionScore])
| sort(field=SuspicionScore, order=desc)CrowdStrike LogScale (Falcon) query detecting non-browser processes accessing browser session cookie stores and saved credential databases using Falcon's FileOpenInfo telemetry. Filters on browser profile path patterns and cookie/credential file names, excludes legitimate browser and system processes, and scores detections higher when the initiating process is a script interpreter or common stealer runtime.
Data Sources
Required Tables
False Positives & Tuning
- Automated browser testing frameworks (Selenium, Playwright, Puppeteer) running in CI/CD pipelines where a node.exe or python.exe process manages a browser session — these will match IsInterpreter and should be scoped by hostname or user account to known build agents
- SQLite database inspection tools used by developers to examine browser databases locally (e.g., DB Browser for SQLite, sqlite3.exe) for debugging web application cookie behavior
- Enterprise endpoint management agents performing user profile size auditing or data governance scans that traverse browser profile directories as part of broader filesystem enumeration
Other platforms for T1539
Testing Methodology
Validate this detection against 4 adversary techniques from Atomic Red Team. Each test below lists the behaviour to exercise and the telemetry you should expect to see. Executable commands and cleanup steps are available with Pro.
- Test 1Copy Chrome Cookie Database via CMD
Expected signal: Sysmon Event ID 11 (FileCreate): TargetFilename=%TEMP%\df00tech_test_cookies.db, Image=cmd.exe. DeviceFileEvents: ActionType=FileCreated, FileName=df00tech_test_cookies.db, FolderPath containing Chrome\User Data, InitiatingProcessFileName=cmd.exe. The source Cookies file read will appear as a separate FileAccess event for the Cookies file initiated by cmd.exe.
- Test 2Extract Chrome Cookies and Local State via PowerShell
Expected signal: Sysmon Event ID 1: powershell.exe Process Create with CommandLine containing Chrome\User Data and Copy-Item. Sysmon Event ID 11: Two FileCreate events — TargetFilename containing df00tech_chrome\LocalState and df00tech_chrome\Cookies, Image=powershell.exe. DeviceFileEvents: Two file access events for Local State and Cookies files, InitiatingProcessFileName=powershell.exe.
- Test 3Read Firefox Cookie Database via sqlite3
Expected signal: Sysmon Event ID 1: sqlite3.exe Process Create with CommandLine containing Firefox\Profiles, cookies.sqlite, and SELECT. Sysmon Event ID 11: TargetFilename=%TEMP%\df00tech_ff_cookies.txt, Image=sqlite3.exe. DeviceProcessEvents: FileName=sqlite3.exe, ProcessCommandLine contains moz_cookies. DeviceFileEvents: sqlite3.exe accessing cookies.sqlite within Firefox Profiles path.
- Test 4Linux Firefox Cookie Theft via File Copy
Expected signal: Linux auditd: syscall=openat with path containing .mozilla/firefox and cookies.sqlite, and syscall=open/write for /tmp/df00tech_ff_linux_cookies.sqlite. Syslog/auditd: process cp accessing Firefox profile path. Linux EDR agents: file access event for cookies.sqlite initiated by cp process.
References (10)
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1539/
- https://wunderwuzzi23.github.io/blog/passthecookie.html
- https://github.com/kgretzky/evilginx2
- https://github.com/muraenateam/muraena
- https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/mac-malware-steals-cryptocurrency-exchanges-cookies/
- https://securelist.com/project-tajmahal/90240/
- https://krebsonsecurity.com/2023/05/discord-admins-hacked-by-malicious-bookmarks/
- https://blog.talosintelligence.com/roblox-scam-overview/
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/microsoft-365/security/defender-endpoint/advanced-hunting-devicefileevents-table
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/azure-monitor/reference/tables/signinlogs
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