Detect Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion in Microsoft Sentinel
Adversaries may employ various means to detect and avoid virtualization and analysis environments. This may include changing behaviors based on the results of checks for the presence of artifacts indicative of a virtual machine environment (VME) or sandbox. If the adversary detects a VME, they may alter their malware to disengage from the victim or conceal the core functions of the implant. They may also search for VME artifacts before dropping secondary or additional payloads. Methods include checking for security monitoring tools, system artifacts associated with virtualization, legitimate user activity patterns, and time-based anomalies.
MITRE ATT&CK
- Tactic
- Defense Evasion Discovery
- Technique
- T1497 Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion
- Canonical reference
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1497/
KQL Detection Query
let VMDetectCommands = dynamic(["MSAcpi_ThermalZoneTemperature", "Win32_Fan", "Win32_ComputerSystem", "VMwareHostOpen.exe", "VBoxService", "vmtoolsd", "vmwaretray", "vboxservice", "qemu-ga", "vmusrvc", "vmsrvc"]);
let VMDetectRegistry = dynamic(["HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\VMware", "HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Oracle\\VirtualBox", "SYSTEM\\CurrentControlSet\\Services\\VBoxGuest", "SYSTEM\\CurrentControlSet\\Enum\\PCI\\VEN_15AD", "SYSTEM\\CurrentControlSet\\Enum\\PCI\\VEN_80EE"]);
let SandboxDetectTools = dynamic(["wireshark", "procmon", "procexp", "fiddler", "x64dbg", "x32dbg", "ollydbg", "ida64", "idaq", "windbg", "regmon", "filemon", "autoruns"]);
DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(24h)
| where ProcessCommandLine has_any (VMDetectCommands)
or ProcessCommandLine has_any (VMDetectRegistry)
or (FileName =~ "wmic.exe" and ProcessCommandLine has_any ("MSAcpi_ThermalZoneTemperature", "Win32_Fan", "Win32_ComputerSystem", "Win32_BaseBoard", "Win32_BIOS"))
or (FileName =~ "reg.exe" and ProcessCommandLine has_any ("VMware", "VirtualBox", "VBoxGuest", "QEMU"))
or (ProcessCommandLine has "tasklist" and ProcessCommandLine has_any (SandboxDetectTools))
| extend WMICheck = ProcessCommandLine has_any ("MSAcpi_ThermalZoneTemperature", "Win32_Fan", "Win32_ComputerSystem", "Win32_BIOS")
| extend RegistryCheck = ProcessCommandLine has_any ("VMware", "VirtualBox", "VBoxGuest", "QEMU") and FileName =~ "reg.exe"
| extend ProcessScan = ProcessCommandLine has "tasklist" and ProcessCommandLine has_any (SandboxDetectTools)
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, FileName, ProcessCommandLine,
InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine,
WMICheck, RegistryCheck, ProcessScan
| sort by Timestamp descBroad detection for virtualization and sandbox evasion techniques. Monitors for WMI queries targeting thermal zone temperature (VM detection), fan/hardware checks, registry queries for VMware/VirtualBox/QEMU artifacts, and process enumeration looking for analysis tools (Wireshark, ProcMon, debuggers). Covers techniques used by Agent Tesla, Bumblebee, GravityRAT, QakBot, and Raspberry Robin.
Data Sources
Required Tables
False Positives & Tuning
- System administrators running WMI queries for hardware inventory and asset management
- IT automation tools (SCCM, Intune, ManageEngine) collecting system hardware information via WMI
- Security teams running sandbox detection tests as part of adversary emulation exercises
- System monitoring software that queries hardware sensors for health dashboards
Other platforms for T1497
Testing Methodology
Validate this detection against 3 adversary techniques from Atomic Red Team. Each test below lists the behaviour to exercise and the telemetry you should expect to see. Executable commands and cleanup steps are available with Pro.
- Test 1WMI thermal zone temperature check for VM detection
Expected signal: Sysmon Event ID 1: Process Create with Image=wmic.exe, CommandLine containing 'MSAcpi_ThermalZoneTemperature'. WMI trace log entry in Microsoft-Windows-WMI-Activity/Operational.
- Test 2Registry check for VMware artifacts
Expected signal: Sysmon Event ID 1: Process Create with Image=reg.exe, CommandLine containing 'VMware' and 'VBoxGuest'. Sysmon Event ID 13: RegistryEvent for key access.
- Test 3Process enumeration for analysis tools
Expected signal: Sysmon Event ID 1: Multiple Process Create events for tasklist.exe with filter arguments. Each tasklist invocation generates a separate process event.
References (6)
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1497/
- https://drive.google.com/file/d/1t0jn3xr4ff2fR30oQAUn_RsWSnMpOAQc/edit
- https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/ups-observations-on-cve-2015-3113-prior-zero-days-and-the-pirpi-payload/
- https://securingtomorrow.mcafee.com/other-blogs/mcafee-labs/stopping-malware-fake-virtual-machine/
- https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1497/T1497.md
- https://github.com/a0rtega/pafish
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