Detect SMS Pumping in Sumo Logic CSE
Adversaries may leverage messaging services for SMS pumping, a telecommunications fraud technique where the attacker first obtains a block of phone numbers from a carrier, then abuses a victim's SMS infrastructure to generate large volumes of messages to those numbers. The adversary earns per-message payments from the carrier proportional to traffic volume. Attack vectors typically target public-facing web forms — OTP verification, account confirmation, password reset — backed by services such as Twilio, AWS SNS, or Amazon Cognito. Indicators include a spike in SMS API calls from a small set of source IPs, sequential or numerically adjacent destination phone numbers, destination numbers concentrated in high-fraud carrier prefixes, and a sharp increase in SMS-related cloud spend. Unlike volumetric DoS, SMS pumping is financially motivated: the attacker profits directly from the victim's messaging bill.
MITRE ATT&CK
- Tactic
- Impact
- Technique
- T1496 Resource Hijacking
- Sub-technique
- T1496.003 SMS Pumping
- Canonical reference
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1496/003/
Sumo Detection Query
_index=sec_record
| where metadata_vendor in ("Amazon Web Services", "Microsoft Azure", "Twilio", "Vonage", "Plivo")
or metadata_product in ("CloudTrail", "AzureDiagnostics", "SNS", "Cognito")
| where (
action in (
"Publish", "GetUserAttributeVerificationCode",
"ResendConfirmationCode", "ForgotPassword",
"InitiateAuth", "SmsSend", "SmsDelivery"
)
or http_url matches /(otp|verify|verification|confirm|sms|phone|mobile|2fa|mfa|passcode|send[-_]code)/i
)
| where isNull(http_response_statusCode)
or http_response_statusCode in ("200", "400", "422", "429")
| timeslice 5m
| count by _timeslice, srcDevice_ip, action, metadata_vendor
| where _count > 50
| sort by _count desc
| fields
_timeslice as TimeWindow,
srcDevice_ip as SourceIP,
action as EventAction,
metadata_vendor as Vendor,
_count as RequestCount Detects T1496.003 SMS Pumping in Sumo Logic Cloud SIEM Enterprise using the normalized sec_record index. Queries CSE records from cloud providers (AWS, Azure) and SMS platform vendors, filtering on normalized action fields matching cloud SMS API operations and HTTP URL patterns matching OTP/phone-verification path components. Groups by source device IP in 5-minute buckets and alerts when any source exceeds 50 matching events. Uses CSE normalized schema fields (srcDevice_ip, action, http_url, http_response_statusCode, metadata_vendor, metadata_product) enabling cross-vendor correlation without vendor-specific parsers.
Data Sources
Required Tables
False Positives & Tuning
- Corporate NAT or cloud egress gateways that aggregate legitimate employee OTP requests from many internal users, causing the shared source IP to exceed per-IP thresholds even though individual user behavior is normal — segment by department or subnet if possible
- CI/CD pipeline runners with static IPs executing end-to-end phone verification integration tests against production or staging environments as part of nightly test suites
- Legitimate bulk SMS service resellers or ISVs whose outbound traffic is ingested into the same SIEM tenant and whose normal operating volume surpasses the detection threshold
- Rapid customer onboarding waves (e.g., post-marketing event) where a genuine burst of new user registrations requiring phone verification occurs within a short window, creating a natural spike that mirrors the attack pattern
Other platforms for T1496.003
Testing Methodology
Validate this detection against 4 adversary techniques from Atomic Red Team. Each test below lists the behaviour to exercise and the telemetry you should expect to see. Executable commands and cleanup steps are available with Pro.
- Test 1AWS SNS Publish Burst to Phone Number via CLI
Expected signal: AWS CloudTrail: 15 eventName=Publish events from eventSource=sns.amazonaws.com within ~5 seconds, each with requestParameters containing phoneNumber=+15550001234 and message content. Events appear in CloudTrail within ~15 minutes. SNS CloudWatch metric NumberOfMessagesSentToPhoneNumbers increments by 15. SMSMonthToDateSpentUSD increases.
- Test 2Amazon Cognito ForgotPassword OTP Flood
Expected signal: AWS CloudTrail: up to 20 eventName=ForgotPassword events from eventSource=cognito-idp.amazonaws.com within ~10 seconds, all sharing the same sourceIPAddress. requestParameters.username will be consistent across all events. Cognito may throttle after ~5 rapid requests, generating ThrottlingException errors also visible in CloudTrail.
- Test 3OTP Form Endpoint Burst via curl Parallel Requests
Expected signal: Application Insights AppRequests table: 60 request entries for /api/auth/send-otp with identical ClientIP (local machine), ResultCode 200 or 429 (rate-limited), arriving within a ~15-second window. Telemetry visible in Application Insights within 1-2 minutes. If Application Insights SDK is not instrumented in the local app, substitute with reviewing the application access log.
- Test 4Twilio REST API SMS Burst
Expected signal: Twilio Console: 5 outbound messages visible under Monitor > Logs > Messaging Logs within seconds. Twilio REST API: GET /2010-04-01/Accounts/{AccountSid}/Messages.json returns 5 records with Direction=outbound-api, Status=delivered or sent. Twilio usage record increments SMSSent by 5. NOTE: Direct Twilio API calls do NOT generate AWS CloudTrail or Azure Diagnostic events — detection requires Twilio Event Streams ingested into SIEM or Twilio's native fraud scoring dashboard.
References (10)
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1496/003/
- https://www.twilio.com/en-us/blog/sms-pumping-fraud-solutions
- https://www.twilio.com/docs/glossary/what-is-sms-pumping-fraud
- https://reinforce.awsevents.com/content/dam/reinforce/2024/slides/TDR432_New-tactics-and-techniques-for-proactive-threat-detection.pdf
- https://docs.aws.amazon.com/sns/latest/dg/sms_stats_cloudwatch.html
- https://docs.aws.amazon.com/cognito/latest/developerguide/user-pool-settings-mfa.html
- https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/communication-services/concepts/analytics/logs/sms-logs
- https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/azure-monitor/app/asp-net
- https://owasp.org/www-community/attacks/SMS_OTP_Bypass
- https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1496/T1496.md
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