Detect Bandwidth Hijacking in Google Chronicle
Adversaries may leverage the network bandwidth resources of co-opted systems to complete resource-intensive tasks, which may impact system and/or hosted service availability. This includes proxyjacking (selling victim bandwidth and IP address to proxyware services such as Honeygain, IPRoyal Pawns, Peer2Profit, PacketStream, and Traffmonetizer), participating in botnets for network denial of service campaigns, seeding malicious torrents, and conducting internet-wide scanning using victim systems. Proxyware agents installed on victim machines route third-party traffic through the victim's IP address, generating revenue for the adversary while consuming the victim's bandwidth and potentially implicating the victim's IP in illegal activity.
MITRE ATT&CK
- Tactic
- Impact
- Technique
- T1496 Resource Hijacking
- Sub-technique
- T1496.002 Bandwidth Hijacking
- Canonical reference
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1496/002/
YARA-L Detection Query
rule t1496_002_bandwidth_hijacking_proxyware {
meta:
author = "Detection Engineering"
description = "Detects bandwidth hijacking via proxyware agent execution, DNS queries, or network connections to known proxyware service infrastructure (T1496.002)"
mitre_attack_tactic = "Impact"
mitre_attack_technique = "T1496.002"
severity = "HIGH"
confidence = "HIGH"
created = "2026-04-13"
version = "1.0"
events:
(
$proc.metadata.event_type = "PROCESS_LAUNCH"
re.regex($proc.target.process.file.full_path,
`(?i)(honeygain(client)?\.exe|iproyal[_-]desktop\.exe|pawns\.exe|peer2profit\.exe|p2p-node\.exe|packetstream\.exe|psnode\.exe|traffmonetizer\.exe|traffmain\.exe|earnapp\.exe|repocket\.exe|bitping\.exe|mysterium\.exe|myst\.exe)$`
)
)
or
(
$dns.metadata.event_type = "NETWORK_DNS"
re.regex($dns.network.dns.questions.name,
`(?i)(honeygain\.com|cdn\.honeygain|api\.honeygain|iproyal\.com|pawns\.app|peer2profit\.com|packetstream\.io|traffmonetizer\.com|earnapp\.com|repocket\.co|bitping\.com|mysterium\.network)`
)
)
or
(
$net.metadata.event_type = "NETWORK_CONNECTION"
re.regex($net.target.hostname,
`(?i)(honeygain\.com|iproyal\.com|pawns\.app|peer2profit\.com|packetstream\.io|traffmonetizer\.com|earnapp\.com|repocket\.co|bitping\.com|mysterium\.network)`
)
)
condition:
$proc or $dns or $net
}YARA-L 2.0 rule for Google Chronicle SIEM detecting proxyware agent binary execution, DNS queries to proxyware control infrastructure, and direct network connections to known bandwidth-hijacking service domains using the Unified Data Model (UDM).
Data Sources
Required Tables
False Positives & Tuning
- Authorized bandwidth-sharing or distributed CDN programs explicitly approved by IT and deployed through managed software channels on designated assets
- Threat intelligence teams using Chronicle-monitored systems to dynamically analyze proxyware samples with documented change control approval
- Penetration testers simulating proxyware installation as part of a scoped red team engagement with prior written authorization
Other platforms for T1496.002
Testing Methodology
Validate this detection against 4 adversary techniques from Atomic Red Team. Each test below lists the behaviour to exercise and the telemetry you should expect to see. Executable commands and cleanup steps are available with Pro.
- Test 1Honeygain Proxyware Agent Binary Simulation (Windows)
Expected signal: Sysmon Event ID 11: File Create — honeygain.exe written to %APPDATA%. Sysmon Event ID 1: Process Create — Image path ends with 'honeygain.exe' in AppData directory, ParentImage=cmd.exe. Security Event ID 4688 (if command line auditing enabled): ProcessName contains honeygain.exe.
- Test 2Proxyware Registry Run Key Persistence (Windows)
Expected signal: Sysmon Event ID 13: Registry Value Set — TargetObject=HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\Honeygain, Details containing '%APPDATA%\honeygain.exe --token=SIM_TOKEN_12345'. Security Event ID 4657 if registry object access auditing is enabled.
- Test 3High-Volume External Connection Simulation (Windows)
Expected signal: Sysmon Event ID 3: Approximately 80 Network Connection events from powershell.exe to diverse external IPs (8.8.*.1 range) on port 80, appearing within a short time window. DeviceNetworkEvents in MDE will show InitiatingProcessFileName=powershell.exe with high UniqueRemoteIPs count.
- Test 4Proxyware Domain DNS Resolution (Linux)
Expected signal: Sysmon for Linux Event ID 22: DNS Query events for honeygain.com, peer2profit.com, packetstream.io, traffmonetizer.com, earnapp.com. Process audit records for 'host' command execution. Network captures (if packet capture enabled) show DNS queries to these domains from the host's public IP.
References (7)
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1496/002/
- https://sysdig.com/blog/proxyjacking-attackers-log4j-exploited/
- https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/large-scale-cloud-extortion-operation/
- https://www.welivesecurity.com/2019/07/08/south-korean-users-backdoor-torrents/
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/defender-endpoint/advanced-hunting-devicenetworkevents-table
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/defender-endpoint/advanced-hunting-deviceprocessevents-table
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/defender-endpoint/advanced-hunting-deviceregistryevents-table
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