Detect Inhibit System Recovery in IBM QRadar
Adversaries may delete or remove built-in data and turn off services designed to aid in the recovery of a corrupted system to prevent recovery. This includes deleting Volume Shadow Copies (VSS), disabling Windows Recovery Environment (WinRE), clearing backup catalogs, and modifying Boot Configuration Data (BCD). This technique is almost universally observed as a pre-encryption step in ransomware attacks, executed within seconds to minutes before the encryption payload is launched. Real-world ransomware families including Ryuk, Black Basta, Medusa, RobbinHood, WastedLocker, EKANS, and Ragnar Locker all employ this technique to maximize the irreversibility of damage.
MITRE ATT&CK
- Tactic
- Impact
- Technique
- T1490 Inhibit System Recovery
- Canonical reference
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1490/
QRadar Detection Query
SELECT
DATEFORMAT(starttime, 'yyyy-MM-dd HH:mm:ss') AS EventTime,
sourceip AS HostIP,
username AS UserName,
"ProcessPath" AS ProcessImage,
"CommandLine" AS CommandLine,
"ParentImage" AS ParentProcess,
LOGSOURCENAME(logsourceid) AS LogSource,
CATEGORYNAME(category) AS EventCategory
FROM events
WHERE (
LOGSOURCETYPEID(logsourceid) = 12
OR LOGSOURCETYPEID(logsourceid) = 392
)
AND (
LOWER("ProcessPath") LIKE '%vssadmin.exe'
OR LOWER("ProcessPath") LIKE '%wmic.exe'
OR LOWER("ProcessPath") LIKE '%diskshadow.exe'
OR LOWER("ProcessPath") LIKE '%wbadmin.exe'
OR LOWER("ProcessPath") LIKE '%bcdedit.exe'
OR LOWER("ProcessPath") LIKE '%reagentc.exe'
)
AND (
LOWER("CommandLine") LIKE '%delete shadows%'
OR LOWER("CommandLine") LIKE '%delete shadow %'
OR LOWER("CommandLine") LIKE '%shadowcopy delete%'
OR LOWER("CommandLine") LIKE '%delete catalog%'
OR LOWER("CommandLine") LIKE '%resize shadowstorage%'
OR LOWER("CommandLine") LIKE '%recoveryenabled%'
OR LOWER("CommandLine") LIKE '%bootstatuspolicy%'
OR LOWER("CommandLine") LIKE '%safeboot%'
OR (
LOWER("ProcessPath") LIKE '%reagentc.exe'
AND (
LOWER("CommandLine") LIKE '%/disable%'
OR LOWER("CommandLine") LIKE '%-disable%'
)
)
)
ORDER BY starttime DESC
LAST 24 HOURSQRadar AQL query detecting T1490 Inhibit System Recovery by querying process execution events from Windows Security (LOGSOURCETYPEID 12) and Sysmon (LOGSOURCETYPEID 392) log sources. Matches the known set of recovery inhibition binaries executing with command-line arguments indicative of VSS deletion, backup catalog removal, shadow storage resizing, BCD modification, or WinRE disabling.
Data Sources
Required Tables
False Positives & Tuning
- Enterprise backup agents (NetBackup, Commvault, Windows Server Backup) that run vssadmin or wbadmin under service accounts to manage shadow copy quotas during scheduled backup windows
- Infrastructure automation scripts used by storage or cloud teams to resize shadowstorage allocations during planned disk capacity expansion operations
- Security operations teams running authorized breach-and-attack simulation (BAS) or red team exercises that include T1490 atomic test execution in isolated environments
Other platforms for T1490
Testing Methodology
Validate this detection against 5 adversary techniques from Atomic Red Team. Each test below lists the behaviour to exercise and the telemetry you should expect to see. Executable commands and cleanup steps are available with Pro.
- Test 1VSS Shadow Copy Deletion via vssadmin
Expected signal: Sysmon Event ID 1: Process Create with Image=vssadmin.exe, CommandLine='vssadmin.exe delete shadows /all /quiet'. Security Event ID 4688 (if command line auditing enabled) with same details. Microsoft-Windows-Volume-Shadow-Copy/Operational Event ID 8194 on deletion attempt.
- Test 2VSS Shadow Copy Deletion via WMI
Expected signal: Sysmon Event ID 1: Process Create with Image=wmic.exe, CommandLine='wmic shadowcopy delete'. Security Event ID 4688 with same details. WMI activity logs in Microsoft-Windows-WMI-Activity/Operational.
- Test 3Boot Recovery Disable via bcdedit
Expected signal: Two Sysmon Event ID 1 events: first with CommandLine='bcdedit.exe /set {default} bootstatuspolicy ignoreallfailures', second with CommandLine='bcdedit.exe /set {default} recoveryenabled no'. Security Event ID 4688 for each. Both events fire within milliseconds of each other from the same parent.
- Test 4Windows Backup Catalog Deletion via wbadmin
Expected signal: Sysmon Event ID 1: Process Create with Image=wbadmin.exe, CommandLine='wbadmin.exe delete catalog -quiet'. Security Event ID 4688 with same details. Microsoft-Windows-Backup event log will record the catalog deletion operation.
- Test 5Ryuk-style VSS Storage Resize to Force Deletion
Expected signal: Sysmon Event ID 1: Process Create with Image=vssadmin.exe, CommandLine containing 'resize shadowstorage' and '/maxsize=401MB'. Microsoft-Windows-Volume-Shadow-Copy/Operational events as Windows responds to the reduced quota by discarding existing shadow copies.
References (10)
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1490/
- https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2018/02/olympic-destroyer.html
- https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/05/wannacry-malware-profile.html
- https://www.cybereason.com/blog/cybereason-vs.-blackcat-ransomware
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/administration/windows-commands/diskshadow
- https://www.zscaler.com/blogs/security-research/technical-analysis-crytox-ransomware
- https://rhinosecuritylabs.com/aws/s3-ransomware-part-2-prevention-and-defense/
- https://www.zdnet.com/article/ransomware-victims-thought-their-backups-were-safe-they-were-wrong/
- https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1490/T1490.md
- https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation
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