Detect System Binary Proxy Execution in IBM QRadar
Adversaries may bypass process and/or signature-based defenses by proxying execution of malicious content with signed, or otherwise trusted, binaries. Binaries used in this technique are often Microsoft-signed files, indicating that they have been either downloaded from Microsoft or are already native in the operating system. Several Microsoft-signed binaries that are default on Windows installations can be used to proxy execution of other files or commands. Sub-techniques include abuse of mshta.exe, rundll32.exe, regsvr32.exe, msiexec.exe, cmstp.exe, installutil.exe, regsvcs.exe, regasm.exe, odbcconf.exe, verclsid.exe, mavinject.exe, control.exe (Control Panel), compiled HTML files (hh.exe), MMC snap-ins, Electron applications, and wuauclt.exe. On Linux, trusted binaries such as split may be abused similarly. Real-world usage includes Lazarus Group abusing wuauclt.exe to execute malicious DLLs and Volt Typhoon broadly leveraging LOLBins to maintain and expand network access.
MITRE ATT&CK
- Tactic
- Defense Evasion
- Technique
- T1218 System Binary Proxy Execution
- Canonical reference
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/
QRadar Detection Query
SELECT
DATEFORMAT(starttime, 'yyyy-MM-dd HH:mm:ss') AS event_time,
logsourcename(logsourceid) AS log_source,
username,
"Process Name",
"Command",
"Parent Process Name",
sourceip,
hostname,
CASE
WHEN LOWER("Parent Process Name") MATCHES '.*\\\\(winword|excel|powerpnt|outlook|onenote|msaccess|mspub|visio|wscript|cscript)\.exe' THEN 1 ELSE 0
END +
CASE WHEN LOWER("Command") MATCHES '.*(http://|https://|ftp://).*' THEN 1 ELSE 0 END +
CASE WHEN LOWER("Command") MATCHES '.*(\.sct|\.hta|\.vbs|\.wsf|\.js|scrobj).*' THEN 1 ELSE 0 END +
CASE WHEN LOWER("Process Name") MATCHES '.*\\\\regsvr32\.exe' AND LOWER("Command") MATCHES '.*/s|/u|/i:|scrobj|sct.*' THEN 1 ELSE 0 END +
CASE WHEN LOWER("Process Name") MATCHES '.*\\\\mshta\.exe' AND LOWER("Command") MATCHES '.*(\.hta|javascript:|vbscript:).*' THEN 1 ELSE 0 END +
CASE WHEN LOWER("Process Name") MATCHES '.*\\\\rundll32\.exe' AND LOWER("Command") MATCHES '.*(javascript:|shell32|advpack|ieadvpack|syssetup).*' THEN 1 ELSE 0 END +
CASE WHEN LOWER("Process Name") MATCHES '.*\\\\cmstp\.exe' AND LOWER("Command") MATCHES '.*(/s|/ns|\.inf).*' THEN 1 ELSE 0 END +
CASE WHEN LOWER("Process Name") MATCHES '.*\\\\installutil\.exe' AND LOWER("Command") MATCHES '.*/logfile=|/logtoconsole=|/u.*' THEN 1 ELSE 0 END +
CASE WHEN LOWER("Process Name") MATCHES '.*\\\\wuauclt\.exe' AND LOWER("Command") MATCHES '.*updatedeploymentprovider.*' THEN 1 ELSE 0 END +
CASE WHEN LOWER("Process Name") MATCHES '.*\\\\odbcconf\.exe' AND LOWER("Command") MATCHES '.*/a|-a|regsvr|\.rsp.*' THEN 1 ELSE 0 END
AS suspicion_score
FROM events
WHERE
LOGSOURCETYPEID = 119
AND qid = 5001000
AND (
LOWER("Process Name") MATCHES '.*\\\\(mshta|rundll32|regsvr32|msiexec|cmstp|installutil|regsvcs|regasm|odbcconf|verclsid|mavinject|hh|wuauclt|mmc|xwizard)\.exe'
)
AND (
LOWER("Parent Process Name") MATCHES '.*\\\\(winword|excel|powerpnt|outlook|onenote|msaccess|wscript|cscript|cmd|powershell)\.exe'
OR LOWER("Command") MATCHES '.*(http://|https://|ftp://|\.sct|\.hta|\.vbs|scrobj|updatedeploymentprovider|\.rsp).*'
)
HAVING suspicion_score > 0
ORDER BY suspicion_score DESC, event_time DESC
LAST 24 HOURSQRadar AQL detection for T1218 LOLBin proxy execution. Queries Sysmon process creation events (Event ID 1) from Windows endpoints, scoring each event across multiple suspicious indicators: office/script parent process, remote URL in args, script extension references, and binary-specific bypass patterns.
Data Sources
Required Tables
False Positives & Tuning
- SCCM or software management tools invoking msiexec.exe or rundll32.exe from cmd.exe for legitimate deployments
- Helpdesk or IT scripts that use wscript.exe to launch msiexec for application installs
- Security product installers that register DLLs via regsvr32.exe or regasm.exe during initial setup
Other platforms for T1218
Testing Methodology
Validate this detection against 5 adversary techniques from Atomic Red Team. Each test below lists the behaviour to exercise and the telemetry you should expect to see. Executable commands and cleanup steps are available with Pro.
- Test 1Regsvr32 SCT Scriptlet Remote Execution
Expected signal: Sysmon Event ID 1: Process Create with Image=regsvr32.exe, CommandLine containing '/s /n /u /i:http://127.0.0.1:8080/payload.sct scrobj.dll'. Sysmon Event ID 3: Network connection attempt to 127.0.0.1:8080 (connection will fail). Sysmon Event ID 7: Image Load for scrobj.dll from C:\Windows\System32.
- Test 2MSHTA Inline VBScript Execution
Expected signal: Sysmon Event ID 1: Process Create for mshta.exe with CommandLine containing 'vbscript:Execute'. Sysmon Event ID 1 child: cmd.exe spawned by mshta.exe. Sysmon Event ID 11: File creation of mshta_test.txt in %TEMP%.
- Test 3CMSTP INF File UAC Bypass and Execution
Expected signal: Sysmon Event ID 1: Process Create for cmstp.exe with CommandLine containing '/s' and path to .inf file. Sysmon Event ID 11: File creation for test.inf and cmstp_test.txt. Sysmon Event ID 1 child: cmd.exe spawned by cmstp.exe executing the RunPreSetupCommands action.
- Test 4InstallUtil CLR Bypass via /logfile Flag
Expected signal: Sysmon Event ID 1: Process Create for installutil.exe with CommandLine containing '/logfile=' and '/LogToConsole=false'. Sysmon Event ID 7: Image loads for CLR DLLs (clr.dll, mscorwks.dll). The command will fail against calc.exe (not a valid .NET assembly) but the process creation telemetry fires.
- Test 5Rundll32 JavaScript Execution
Expected signal: Sysmon Event ID 1: Process Create for rundll32.exe with CommandLine containing 'javascript:' and 'mshtml'. Sysmon Event ID 7: Image Load for mshtml.dll into rundll32.exe. Sysmon Event ID 1 child: cmd.exe spawned. Sysmon Event ID 11: File creation for rundll32_test.txt.
References (11)
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/
- https://github.com/LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS
- https://gtfobins.github.io/gtfobins/split/
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/defender-endpoint/attack-surface-reduction-rules-reference
- https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/tree/master/atomics/T1218
- https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation
- https://posts.specterops.io/documenting-and-attacking-a-windows-defender-application-control-feature-the-hard-way-a-case-study-in-applocker-bypass-8e0a5b9c89a1
- https://www.mandiant.com/resources/blog/the-risks-of-bypassing-uac-with-cmstp
- https://pentestlab.blog/2017/05/11/applocker-bypass-regsvr32/
- https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0032/
- https://www.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/2024-02/aa24-038a-prc-state-sponsored-actors-compromise-us-critical-infrastructure_0.pdf
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