Detect Rundll32 in Elastic Security
Adversaries may abuse rundll32.exe to proxy execution of malicious code. Using rundll32.exe avoids triggering security tools that allowlist it or ignore it due to high noise. Rundll32 can execute DLL payloads, Control Panel items (.cpl via Control_RunDLL), JavaScript (via mshtml,RunHTMLApplication), remote COM scriptlets, and system DLLs (zipfldr.dll, ieframe.dll). Adversaries may also export DLL functions by ordinal number or obscure function names by appending W/A character set suffixes. Widely used by InvisiMole, Latrodectus, FIN8, APT28, BoomBox, MegaCortex, QakBot, Emotet, Cobalt Strike, and many ransomware families.
MITRE ATT&CK
- Tactic
- Defense Evasion
- Technique
- T1218 System Binary Proxy Execution
- Sub-technique
- T1218.011 Rundll32
- Canonical reference
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/011/
Elastic Detection Query
sequence by host.id with maxspan=30s
[process where event.type == "start"
and process.name : "rundll32.exe"
and (
process.command_line : ("*javascript:*", "*mshtml*", "*RunHTMLApplication*") or
process.command_line : ("*http://*", "*https://*", "*GetObject(*") or
process.command_line : ("*MiniDump*") or
process.command_line : ("*Control_RunDLL*", "*.cpl*") or
(
process.command_line : ("*Temp*", "*AppData*", "*Downloads*", "*Public*", "*Desktop*") and
process.parent.name : ("winword.exe", "excel.exe", "outlook.exe", "powerpnt.exe",
"cmd.exe", "powershell.exe", "wscript.exe", "cscript.exe", "mshta.exe")
) or
process.parent.name : ("winword.exe", "excel.exe", "outlook.exe", "powerpnt.exe",
"cmd.exe", "powershell.exe", "wscript.exe", "cscript.exe", "mshta.exe") or
process.command_line : ("*,#[0-9]*")
)
] by process.pid
[any where true] by process.parent.pid
OR
process where event.type == "start"
and process.parent.name : "rundll32.exe"
and process.name : ("cmd.exe", "powershell.exe", "wscript.exe", "cscript.exe", "net.exe", "certutil.exe")Detects suspicious rundll32.exe execution patterns including JavaScript proxy execution via mshtml, remote SCT/COM scriptlet loading via HTTP(S) or GetObject, LSASS MiniDump via comsvcs.dll, Control Panel item abuse, ordinal-based DLL loading, and suspicious parent-child relationships indicative of T1218.011 abuse by families such as Emotet, QakBot, and Cobalt Strike.
Data Sources
Required Tables
False Positives & Tuning
- Legitimate software installers and updaters that invoke rundll32.exe with Control_RunDLL to launch .cpl control panel applets (e.g., scheduled maintenance tools)
- Enterprise IT management tools (SCCM, PDQ Deploy) that call rundll32.exe from cmd.exe or PowerShell scripts during software deployment workflows
- Developers or security researchers invoking comsvcs.dll MiniDump for legitimate process dump analysis or debugging purposes on developer workstations
Other platforms for T1218.011
Testing Methodology
Validate this detection against 3 adversary techniques from Atomic Red Team. Each test below lists the behaviour to exercise and the telemetry you should expect to see. Executable commands and cleanup steps are available with Pro.
- Test 1Rundll32 LSASS Dump via comsvcs.dll MiniDump
Expected signal: Sysmon Event ID 1: powershell.exe then rundll32.exe with comsvcs.dll and MiniDump in command line. Sysmon Event ID 10 (Process Access): rundll32.exe accessing lsass.exe. Sysmon Event ID 11: lsass.dmp file created in Temp. Windows Defender will likely block this on patched systems.
- Test 2Rundll32 JavaScript Execution via mshtml
Expected signal: Sysmon Event ID 1: rundll32.exe with javascript: and mshtml in command line. If WScript.Shell successfully runs calc.exe, a child process creation event for calc.exe with ParentImage=rundll32.exe will appear.
- Test 3Rundll32 DLL Execution from Temp Directory
Expected signal: Sysmon Event ID 11: DLL written to Temp. Sysmon Event ID 1: rundll32.exe with ordinal (#1) and Temp path. Sysmon Event ID 7: DLL loaded by rundll32.exe. Security Event ID 4688.
References (6)
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/011/
- https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Rundll32/
- https://www.carbonblack.com/2016/04/28/threat-advisory-squiblydoo-continues-trend-of-attackers-using-native-os-tools-to-live-off-the-land/
- https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1218.011/T1218.011.md
- https://blog.f-secure.com/hunting-for-the-undefined-behavior-the-case-of-comsvcs-dll/
- https://www.elastic.co/blog/hunting-for-persistence-using-elastic-security
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