Detect Odbcconf in CrowdStrike LogScale
Adversaries may abuse odbcconf.exe to proxy execution of malicious payloads. Odbcconf.exe is a Windows utility that allows configuration of Open Database Connectivity (ODBC) drivers and data source names. Like regsvr32, odbcconf.exe has a REGSVR flag that can be abused to execute DLLs (e.g., odbcconf.exe /S /A {REGSVR "C:\Users\Public\file.dll"}). Since odbcconf.exe is digitally signed by Microsoft, it can bypass application control solutions that allowlist Microsoft-signed binaries. Groups including Cobalt Group, Bumblebee malware, and Raspberry Robin have leveraged this technique for DLL execution.
MITRE ATT&CK
- Tactic
- Defense Evasion
- Technique
- T1218 System Binary Proxy Execution
- Sub-technique
- T1218.008 Odbcconf
- Canonical reference
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/008/
LogScale Detection Query
#event_simpleName=ProcessRollup2
| ImageFileName = /\\odbcconf\.exe$/i
| eval REGSVRFlag = if(CommandLine = /REGSVR/i, 1, 0)
| eval SuspiciousPath = if(CommandLine = /(Temp|AppData|Downloads|Public|Desktop|ProgramData)/i, 1, 0)
| eval RemoteLoad = if(CommandLine = /https?:\/\/|\\\\\\\\/i, 1, 0)
| eval SilentFlag = if(CommandLine = /(\/S|\/silent)/i, 1, 0)
| eval SuspiciousParent = if(ParentBaseFileName = /(cmd|powershell|wscript|cscript|mshta)\.exe/i, 1, 0)
| eval RiskScore = REGSVRFlag + SuspiciousPath + RemoteLoad + SuspiciousParent
| where RiskScore > 0
| table([@timestamp, ComputerName, UserName, CommandLine, ParentBaseFileName, ParentCommandLine, REGSVRFlag, SuspiciousPath, RemoteLoad, SilentFlag, SuspiciousParent, RiskScore])
| sort(RiskScore, order=desc)Detects odbcconf.exe proxy execution abuse using Falcon process telemetry. Identifies REGSVR flag usage for DLL loading, remote HTTP/UNC path DLL execution, and script interpreter parent processes loading DLLs from user-writable directories. Risk score aggregates across behavioral indicators.
Data Sources
Required Tables
False Positives & Tuning
- Legitimate enterprise ODBC driver rollouts where IT scripts invoke odbcconf.exe REGSVR against vendor-signed DLLs staged in ProgramData
- Configuration management platforms such as Chef or Puppet running odbcconf.exe through cmd.exe for database source name management
- Software update mechanisms for database tools that use PowerShell to invoke odbcconf.exe with /S flag for silent driver updates from AppData staging areas
Other platforms for T1218.008
Testing Methodology
Validate this detection against 3 adversary techniques from Atomic Red Team. Each test below lists the behaviour to exercise and the telemetry you should expect to see. Executable commands and cleanup steps are available with Pro.
- Test 1Odbcconf REGSVR DLL Execution from Temp
Expected signal: Sysmon Event ID 1: odbcconf.exe with REGSVR, /S, and Temp path. Sysmon Event ID 7 (Image Load) for the DLL being loaded by odbcconf. Security Event ID 4688.
- Test 2Odbcconf Launched from PowerShell
Expected signal: Sysmon Event ID 1: powershell.exe then odbcconf.exe with ParentImage=powershell.exe, REGSVR in command line. Both SuspiciousParent and REGSVRFlag fire.
- Test 3Odbcconf Response File Execution
Expected signal: Sysmon Event ID 11: RSP file written to Temp. Sysmon Event ID 1: odbcconf.exe with /S /F and Temp path for the response file. The REGSVR instruction is inside the file, not on the command line.
References (6)
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/008/
- https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Odbcconf/
- https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/sql/odbc/odbcconf-exe
- https://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/cobalt-spam-runs-use-macros-cve-2017-8759-exploit/
- https://www.cybereason.com/blog/threat-alert-bumblebee-malware
- https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1218.008/T1218.008.md
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