Detect Control Panel in CrowdStrike LogScale
Adversaries may abuse control.exe to proxy execution of malicious payloads. The Windows Control Panel process binary (control.exe) handles execution of Control Panel items, which are utilities that allow users to view and adjust computer settings. Control Panel items are registered executable (.exe) or Control Panel (.cpl) files — the latter are renamed DLL files that export a CPlApplet function. Malicious CPL files can be delivered via phishing or executed as part of multi-stage malware. Adversaries may rename malicious DLLs with .cpl extensions and register them under HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Control Panel\Cpls. Malware families including InvisiMole and Reaver have leveraged this technique.
MITRE ATT&CK
- Tactic
- Defense Evasion
- Technique
- T1218 System Binary Proxy Execution
- Sub-technique
- T1218.002 Control Panel
- Canonical reference
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/002/
LogScale Detection Query
// T1218.002 - control.exe CPL abuse detection
#event_simpleName = ProcessRollup2
| FileName = /(?i)^control\.exe$/
OR ParentBaseFileName = /(?i)^control\.exe$/
| eval HasCPL = if(CommandLine = /(?i)\.cpl/, "true", "false")
| eval SuspiciousPath = if(
CommandLine = /(?i)(temp|appdata|downloads|public|programdata)/,
"true", "false")
| eval OfficeParent = if(
ParentBaseFileName = /(?i)^(winword|excel|outlook|powerpnt)\.exe$/,
"true", "false")
| eval ScriptParent = if(
ParentBaseFileName = /(?i)^(wscript|cscript|mshta|cmd|powershell)\.exe$/,
"true", "false")
| eval SuspiciousChild = if(
ParentBaseFileName = /(?i)^control\.exe$/ AND
FileName = /(?i)^(cmd|powershell|wscript|cscript|rundll32|regsvr32)\.exe$/,
"true", "false")
| where HasCPL = "true" OR SuspiciousPath = "true" OR OfficeParent = "true" OR ScriptParent = "true" OR SuspiciousChild = "true"
| groupBy([ComputerName, UserName, FileName, CommandLine, ParentBaseFileName, ParentCommandLine,
HasCPL, SuspiciousPath, OfficeParent, ScriptParent, SuspiciousChild],
function=count(aid, as=EventCount))
| sort(EventCount, order=desc)CrowdStrike LogScale (CQL) detection for T1218.002. Queries ProcessRollup2 events for control.exe with CPL arguments from suspicious directories, abnormal parent processes, or spawning suspicious child processes.
Data Sources
Required Tables
False Positives & Tuning
- System administrators using control.exe with custom CPL files distributed via SCCM or Intune to AppData or ProgramData paths
- Legitimate third-party applications that register CPL applets via scripts using wscript.exe or cmd.exe as part of their installation routine
- Desktop customization tools or accessibility utilities that spawn control.exe with CPL arguments from non-standard locations during configuration
Other platforms for T1218.002
Testing Methodology
Validate this detection against 3 adversary techniques from Atomic Red Team. Each test below lists the behaviour to exercise and the telemetry you should expect to see. Executable commands and cleanup steps are available with Pro.
- Test 1Control Panel CPL Execution from Command Line
Expected signal: Sysmon Event ID 1: Process Create with Image=control.exe, CommandLine containing '.cpl'. Security Event ID 4688 with the same information. No child process should be spawned by a legitimate CPL.
- Test 2CPL File Executed from Temp Directory
Expected signal: Sysmon Event ID 11: File Create for update.cpl in Temp. Sysmon Event ID 1: control.exe with Temp path in command line. Security Event ID 4688 for the control.exe process.
- Test 3Malicious CPL Registry Registration
Expected signal: Sysmon Event ID 13 (Registry Value Set): TargetObject containing 'Control Panel\Cpls' with the CPL path as data. Security Event ID 4657 (Registry value modified) if object access auditing is enabled.
References (7)
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/002/
- https://www.trendmicro.com/cloud-content/us/pdfs/security-intelligence/white-papers/wp-cpl-malware.pdf
- https://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/control-panel-files-used-as-malicious-attachments/
- https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2017/11/unit42-new-malware-with-ties-to-sunorcal-discovered/
- https://www.welivesecurity.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/06/ESET_InvisiMole.pdf
- https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1218.002/T1218.002.md
- https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/cc144185.aspx
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