Detect Browser Information Discovery in Elastic Security
Adversaries may enumerate information about browsers to learn more about compromised environments. Data saved by browsers (such as bookmarks, accounts, and browsing history) may reveal personal information about users (banking sites, social media, relationships) as well as details about internal network resources such as servers, tools/dashboards, and other infrastructure. Browser information may also highlight additional targets after an adversary has access to valid credentials, especially credentials cached by browsers in Login Data or logins.json files. Specific storage locations vary by platform and application, but browser information is typically stored in local SQLite databases and JSON files under user profile directories.
MITRE ATT&CK
- Tactic
- Discovery
- Technique
- T1217 Browser Information Discovery
- Canonical reference
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1217/
Elastic Detection Query
file where event.category == "file" and
event.action in ("creation", "modification", "access") and
(
file.path like~ "*\\Google\\Chrome\\User Data\\*" or
file.path like~ "*\\Microsoft\\Edge\\User Data\\*" or
file.path like~ "*\\Mozilla\\Firefox\\Profiles\\*" or
file.path like~ "*\\BraveSoftware\\Brave-Browser\\User Data\\*" or
file.path like~ "*\\Opera Software\\Opera Stable\\*" or
file.path like~ "*\\Vivaldi\\User Data\\*"
) and
file.name in~ (
"History", "Bookmarks", "Login Data", "Cookies", "Web Data",
"places.sqlite", "logins.json", "key4.db", "LocalState",
"Favicons", "Network Action Predictor", "Visited Links",
"Extension Cookies", "TransportSecurity"
) and
not process.name in~ (
"chrome.exe", "msedge.exe", "firefox.exe", "brave.exe",
"opera.exe", "iexplore.exe", "MicrosoftEdge.exe", "msedgewebview2.exe",
"chromium.exe", "vivaldi.exe", "MsMpEng.exe", "SearchIndexer.exe",
"SgrmBroker.exe", "CompatTelRunner.exe", "TiWorker.exe"
)Detects T1217 Browser Information Discovery by identifying non-browser processes performing file creation, modification, or access events against browser credential, history, and session files within known browser profile directories on Windows endpoints. Excludes legitimate browser and Windows noise processes.
Data Sources
Required Tables
False Positives & Tuning
- Enterprise backup software (Veeam, Acronis, Commvault) performing file-level backups of user profile directories during scheduled backup windows — these agents legitimately read browser data files at the OS level
- IT asset management and software inventory tools (SCCM inventory, Tanium, Nexthink) scanning user profile directories to enumerate installed browser versions, cached credentials indicators, or extension lists
- Antivirus or EDR products other than Windows Defender performing full-system scan routines may open browser data files for malware signature scanning — particularly third-party AV engines running as non-browser process names
- Password manager desktop applications (KeePass, 1Password, Bitwarden) that provide browser credential import functionality by reading browser Login Data SQLite files at user request
- Browser profile migration or synchronization utilities used during OS refresh or workstation provisioning workflows that copy entire profile directories
Other platforms for T1217
Testing Methodology
Validate this detection against 5 adversary techniques from Atomic Red Team. Each test below lists the behaviour to exercise and the telemetry you should expect to see. Executable commands and cleanup steps are available with Pro.
- Test 1PowerShell Copy Chrome History and Bookmarks
Expected signal: Sysmon Event ID 1: Process Create — powershell.exe with CommandLine referencing 'Chrome\User Data\Default\History' and 'Chrome\User Data\Default\Bookmarks'. Sysmon Event ID 11: File Create — TargetFilename matching $TEMP\browser_data_test\History and $TEMP\browser_data_test\Bookmarks, with Image=powershell.exe. DeviceFileEvents ActionType=FileCopied for both files.
- Test 2CMD Directory Enumeration of Firefox Profiles
Expected signal: Sysmon Event ID 1: Process Create — cmd.exe with CommandLine containing '%APPDATA%\Mozilla\Firefox\Profiles\'. Security Event ID 4688 (if process command line auditing enabled). No file creation events from dir enumeration, but process command line is the primary indicator.
- Test 3Python SQLite Query Against Chrome History
Expected signal: Sysmon Event ID 1: Process Create — python.exe with CommandLine referencing '%LOCALAPPDATA%\Google\Chrome\User Data\Default\History' and 'sqlite3'. Sysmon Event ID 11: File Create — TargetFilename=$TEMP\hist_tmp.db with Image=python.exe. DeviceFileEvents ActionType=FileCopied for History file.
- Test 4PowerShell Read Chrome Bookmarks for Internal Resource Discovery
Expected signal: Sysmon Event ID 1: Process Create — powershell.exe with CommandLine containing 'Chrome\User Data\Default\Bookmarks'. Sysmon Event ID 11: File Create may not fire for read-only access; rely on DeviceFileEvents ActionType=FileRead in MDE. PowerShell Script Block Log Event ID 4104 captures the full script including ConvertFrom-Json parsing logic.
- Test 5Linux Shell Script Collecting Firefox and Chrome Browser Data
Expected signal: Linux auditd: syscall execve for bash/sh with browser path arguments, and open/read syscalls on ~/.mozilla/firefox/*/places.sqlite and ~/.config/google-chrome/Default/History. Syslog entries if auditd rules are configured for home directory access. Linux file access events in Sysmon for Linux (if deployed): EventCode=11 for file creation in /tmp/browser_staging.
References (9)
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1217/
- https://support.google.com/chrome/a/answer/7349337
- https://www.kaspersky.com/blog/browser-data-theft/27871/
- https://securelist.com/calisto-trojan-for-macos/86543/
- https://www.sentinelone.com/labs/metador-investigating-an-elusive-apt/
- https://www.cybereason.com/blog/powerless-trojan-iranian-apt-phosphorus-adds-new-powershell-backdoor
- https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1217/T1217.md
- https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/cybersecurity-advisories/aa24-038a
- https://www.splunk.com/en_us/blog/security/detecting-redline-stealer.html
Unlock Pro Content
Get the full detection package for T1217 including response playbook, investigation guide, and atomic red team tests.