Detect Data from Information Repositories in IBM QRadar
Adversaries may leverage information repositories to mine valuable information. Information repositories are tools that allow for storage of information, typically to facilitate collaboration or information sharing between users, and can store a wide variety of data that may aid adversaries in further objectives, such as Credential Access, Lateral Movement, or Defense Evasion. Targets include SharePoint, Confluence, code repositories, CRM systems, databases, and messaging platforms such as Slack and Microsoft Teams. Adversaries may harvest credentials, network diagrams, system architecture documentation, PII, or source code from these repositories. Cloud-native services (AWS RDS, ElasticSearch, Redis) may also be improperly secured, enabling unauthenticated access to sensitive data stores.
MITRE ATT&CK
- Tactic
- Collection
- Technique
- T1213 Data from Information Repositories
- Canonical reference
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1213/
QRadar Detection Query
-- Branch 1: Bulk file access from SharePoint/OneDrive
SELECT
USERNAME AS UserId,
DATEFORMAT(starttime, 'YYYY-MM-dd HH:mm') AS EventWindow,
COUNT(*) AS OperationCount,
COUNT(DISTINCT "URL") AS UniqueFiles,
QIDNAME(qid) AS EventName,
CATEGORYNAME(category) AS CategoryName,
LOGSOURCENAME(logsourceid) AS LogSource,
ARRAY_AGG(DISTINCT sourceip) AS SourceIPs,
CASE
WHEN COUNT(*) >= 500 THEN 'Critical'
WHEN COUNT(*) >= 200 THEN 'High'
WHEN COUNT(*) >= 50 THEN 'Medium'
ELSE 'Low'
END AS RiskLevel
FROM events
WHERE
LOGSOURCETYPEID = 397
AND LOWER("Application") IN ('sharepoint', 'onedrive')
AND LOWER("Operation") IN ('filedownloaded', 'filesyncdownloadedfull', 'fileaccessed', 'filepreviewed', 'filesyncuploadedfull')
AND starttime > (CURRENT_TIMESTAMP - 86400000)
GROUP BY
USERNAME,
TRUNCATE(starttime, 3600000)
HAVING COUNT(*) >= 50
ORDER BY OperationCount DESC
-- Branch 2: Sensitive keyword searches (run as separate query)
-- SELECT USERNAME, COUNT(*) AS SearchCount, ARRAY_AGG(DISTINCT "SearchQuery") AS Queries, ARRAY_AGG(DISTINCT sourceip) AS SourceIPs
-- FROM events
-- WHERE LOGSOURCETYPEID = 397 AND LOWER("Application") = 'sharepoint' AND LOWER("Operation") = 'searchqueryperformed'
-- AND (LOWER("SearchQuery") LIKE '%password%' OR LOWER("SearchQuery") LIKE '%credential%' OR LOWER("SearchQuery") LIKE '%vpn%'
-- OR LOWER("SearchQuery") LIKE '%api key%' OR LOWER("SearchQuery") LIKE '%secret%' OR LOWER("SearchQuery") LIKE '%private key%'
-- OR LOWER("SearchQuery") LIKE '%connection string%' OR LOWER("SearchQuery") LIKE '%network diagram%'
-- OR LOWER("SearchQuery") LIKE '%architecture%' OR LOWER("SearchQuery") LIKE '%payroll%' OR LOWER("SearchQuery") LIKE '%salary%')
-- AND starttime > (CURRENT_TIMESTAMP - 86400000)
-- GROUP BY USERNAME HAVING COUNT(*) >= 3 Detects data mining activity from Microsoft 365 SharePoint and OneDrive via Office 365 Management Activity logs ingested into QRadar (LOGSOURCETYPEID 397). Identifies bulk file access/download patterns exceeding 50 operations per hour and sensitive keyword search terms indicative of credential or architecture harvesting. Branch 2 covers SearchQueryPerformed events with sensitive keyword patterns.
Data Sources
Required Tables
False Positives & Tuning
- Bulk content migration projects where administrators or migration tools download large volumes of files from SharePoint during tenant consolidations or M&A activities
- End-user sync clients on new devices performing initial full library synchronization, generating hundreds of FileAccessed or FileSyncDownloadedFull events in a short window
- Compliance or legal discovery tools performing keyword-based searches across SharePoint for eDiscovery requests, generating sensitive keyword search events
Other platforms for T1213
Testing Methodology
Validate this detection against 4 adversary techniques from Atomic Red Team. Each test below lists the behaviour to exercise and the telemetry you should expect to see. Executable commands and cleanup steps are available with Pro.
- Test 1Bulk SharePoint Document Download via PnP PowerShell
Expected signal: OfficeActivity events: Operation=FileDownloaded for each downloaded file, Workload=SharePoint, UserId=authenticated user UPN, ClientIP=executing machine IP. Azure AD SigninLogs: interactive authentication event for the SharePoint OAuth flow. Sysmon Event ID 1: Process Create for powershell.exe with PnP module loading.
- Test 2SharePoint Sensitive Keyword Search via REST API
Expected signal: OfficeActivity events: Operation=SearchQueryPerformed for each API search call, with SearchQuery field containing the sensitive keyword, Workload=SharePoint, UserId=authenticated user. Multiple events in quick succession for each term searched.
- Test 3Confluence REST API Page Enumeration and Export
Expected signal: Confluence access logs (atlassian-confluence.log): GET requests to /wiki/rest/api/space and /wiki/rest/api/search endpoints with user authentication. If Confluence audit logging is enabled: search events appear in Administration > Audit Log. Network proxy logs: HTTP requests to the Confluence FQDN with search query parameters visible in URL.
- Test 4Microsoft Teams Message Export via Graph API
Expected signal: OfficeActivity events: Operation=MessageRead or similar Teams audit events, Workload=MicrosoftTeams. Azure AD SigninLogs: token acquisition for Graph API with Teams scopes. AuditLogs: Microsoft Graph API calls for Team and ChannelMessage read operations. Microsoft Defender for Cloud Apps: Graph API activity anomaly if CASB is configured.
References (10)
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1213/
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/microsoft-365/compliance/search-the-audit-log-in-security-and-compliance
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/microsoft-365/compliance/use-sharing-auditing?view=o365-worldwide
- https://support.office.com/en-us/article/configure-audit-settings-for-a-site-collection-a9920c97-38c0-44f2-8bcb-4cf1e2ae22d2
- https://confluence.atlassian.com/confkb/how-to-enable-user-access-logging-182943.html
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/graph/teams-list-all-teams
- https://www.mitiga.io/blog/how-mitiga-found-pii-in-exposed-amazon-rds-snapshots
- https://www.trendmicro.com/en_us/research/20/d/exposed-redis-instances-abused-for-remote-code-execution-cryptocurrency-mining.html
- https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1213/T1213.md
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/defender-cloud-apps/what-is-defender-for-cloud-apps
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