Detect Messaging Applications in IBM QRadar
Adversaries may leverage chat and messaging applications, such as Microsoft Teams, Slack, and Google Chat, to mine valuable information including credentials, API keys, source code snippets, internal resource links, and proprietary data. Threat actors including Scattered Spider, LAPSUS$, and Fox Kitten have deliberately searched victim messaging platforms for credentials shared informally in chat, internal tooling documentation, and active incident response communications. This technique is particularly dangerous because employees routinely share sensitive information in messaging apps with an expectation of privacy, and because bulk message access by a compromised account often appears indistinguishable from normal user activity without behavioral baselining.
MITRE ATT&CK
- Tactic
- Collection
- Technique
- T1213 Data from Information Repositories
- Sub-technique
- T1213.005 Messaging Applications
- Canonical reference
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1213/005/
QRadar Detection Query
// T1213.005 - Messaging Application Data Mining
// Detects bulk/suspicious access to Teams, Slack, and Google Chat via QRadar normalized log sources
SELECT
DATEFORMAT(MIN(starttime), 'YYYY-MM-dd HH:mm:ss') AS first_event,
DATEFORMAT(MAX(starttime), 'YYYY-MM-dd HH:mm:ss') AS last_event,
username,
CATEGORYNAME(category) AS event_category,
LOGSOURCENAME(logsourceid) AS log_source,
COUNT(*) AS event_count,
SUM(CASE WHEN LOWER(QIDNAME(qid)) LIKE '%export%'
OR LOWER(QIDNAME(qid)) LIKE '%search%'
OR LOWER(QIDNAME(qid)) LIKE '%contentsearch%'
OR LOWER(QIDNAME(qid)) LIKE '%bulkdownload%' THEN 1 ELSE 0 END) AS export_events,
SUM(CASE WHEN LOWER(QIDNAME(qid)) LIKE '%download%'
OR LOWER(QIDNAME(qid)) LIKE '%fileaccess%'
OR LOWER(QIDNAME(qid)) LIKE '%messageread%'
OR LOWER(QIDNAME(qid)) LIKE '%channelread%' THEN 1 ELSE 0 END) AS bulk_read_events,
ARRAY_AGG(DISTINCT sourceip) AS source_ips,
ARRAY_AGG(DISTINCT QIDNAME(qid)) AS operations
FROM events
WHERE
starttime >= NOW() - 86400
AND (
LOGSOURCETYPEID(logsourceid) IN (
SELECT id FROM logsourcetypes WHERE name ILIKE '%Office 365%'
OR name ILIKE '%Microsoft Teams%'
OR name ILIKE '%Slack%'
OR name ILIKE '%Google Workspace%'
OR name ILIKE '%Google GSuite%'
)
)
AND (
LOWER(QIDNAME(qid)) LIKE '%teams%'
OR LOWER(QIDNAME(qid)) LIKE '%slack%'
OR LOWER(QIDNAME(qid)) LIKE '%chat%'
OR LOWER(QIDNAME(qid)) LIKE '%message%'
OR LOWER(QIDNAME(qid)) LIKE '%channel%'
OR CATEGORYNAME(category) ILIKE '%messaging%'
OR CATEGORYNAME(category) ILIKE '%collaboration%'
)
GROUP BY
username,
CATEGORYNAME(category),
LOGSOURCENAME(logsourceid),
BUCKET(starttime, 3600)
HAVING
event_count > 50
OR export_events >= 1
ORDER BY event_count DESCDetects bulk messaging application data access or export operations via QRadar normalized events from O365, Slack Enterprise, and Google Workspace log sources. Aggregates per-user activity in hourly buckets and flags accounts with high event volume (>50 events/hour) or any export/eDiscovery operation against Teams, Slack, or Chat data. The export_events counter specifically surfaces compliance export, content search, and bulk download operations that are high-fidelity indicators of credential harvesting or data exfiltration.
Data Sources
Required Tables
False Positives & Tuning
- Authorized HR or legal personnel performing eDiscovery searches tied to employment investigations, which generate high export_events counts
- Automated backup or archival bots with service accounts that continuously read and archive message history for compliance retention
- Security Operations Center analysts using SIEM-integrated connectors that poll Teams/Slack APIs at high frequency for UEBA data collection
Other platforms for T1213.005
Testing Methodology
Validate this detection against 4 adversary techniques from Atomic Red Team. Each test below lists the behaviour to exercise and the telemetry you should expect to see. Executable commands and cleanup steps are available with Pro.
- Test 1Microsoft Teams Bulk Channel and Message Enumeration via PowerShell
Expected signal: OfficeActivity events with RecordType=MicrosoftTeams and Operations including TeamListed and ChannelListed. CloudAppEvents with AppName='Microsoft Teams' and multiple ActionType entries for channel read operations. Azure AD SigninLogs showing Teams PowerShell module authentication against graph.microsoft.com.
- Test 2Microsoft Graph API Teams Channel Message Retrieval
Expected signal: Azure AD AuditLogs with OperationName='Add delegated permission grant' for ChannelMessage.Read.All scope (from initial consent). Azure AD SigninLogs with ResourceDisplayName='Microsoft Graph' showing token issuance. CloudAppEvents (if MDCA connected) showing Teams API access attributed to the application or user. Network connections from the host to graph.microsoft.com.
- Test 3Slack API Bulk Channel Message Harvest
Expected signal: Slack Enterprise Grid audit logs showing actor performing search_performed, file_downloaded, and channel_joined actions. Network traffic logs showing HTTP GET requests to slack.com/api/conversations.list and slack.com/api/conversations.history at high frequency. Sysmon EventCode=1 for the curl or python3 processes. Large HTTP response bodies in proxy logs.
- Test 4Microsoft Purview Compliance Center Teams Content Search and Export
Expected signal: OfficeActivity events with RecordType=SecurityComplianceCenter and Operations: SearchCreated, SearchStarted, SearchCompleted, ExportReport, SearchExported. Azure AD SigninLogs for the compliance PowerShell session authentication. CloudAppEvents may attribute Teams data access to the compliance service principal during the search execution.
References (11)
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1213/005/
- https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/cybersecurity-advisories/aa23-320a
- https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2022/03/22/dev-0537-criminal-actor-targeting-organizations-for-data-exfiltration-and-destruction/
- https://permiso.io/blog/lucr-3-scattered-spider-getting-saas-y-in-the-cloud
- https://www.scmagazine.com/analysis/ragnar-locker-reminds-breach-victims-it-can-read-the-on-network-incident-response-chat-rooms
- https://www.sentinelone.com/labs/nullbulge-threat-actor-masquerades-as-hacktivist-group-rebelling-against-ai/
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/microsoft-365/compliance/search-the-audit-log-in-security-and-compliance
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/graph/api/channel-list-messages
- https://api.slack.com/enterprise/audit-logs
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/defender-cloud-apps/investigate-activities-api
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/defender-xdr/advanced-hunting-cloudappevents-table
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