Detect Rogue Domain Controller in Sumo Logic CSE
Adversaries may register a rogue Domain Controller to enable manipulation of Active Directory data. DCShadow is a method of manipulating Active Directory (AD) data, including objects and schemas, by registering (or reusing an inactive registration) and simulating the behavior of a DC. Once registered, a rogue DC may inject and replicate changes into AD infrastructure for any domain object, including credentials, group memberships, and SID history. Registering a rogue DC involves creating new server and nTDSDSA objects in the Configuration partition of the AD schema, which requires Administrator privileges (Domain or local DC) or the KRBTGT hash. This technique bypasses most SIEM sensors since changes are pushed directly via AD replication without touching standard audit paths. Mimikatz implements DCShadow via the lsadump::dcshadow module, requiring two concurrent sessions: one running as SYSTEM to register the rogue DC and stage changes, and one running as a domain admin to trigger the replication push.
MITRE ATT&CK
- Tactic
- Defense Evasion
- Technique
- T1207 Rogue Domain Controller
- Canonical reference
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1207/
Sumo Detection Query
(_sourceCategory=*windows* OR _sourceCategory=*sysmon* OR _sourceCategory=*wineventlog*)
(EventCode=1 OR EventCode=5137 OR EventCode=4928 OR EventCode=4929 OR EventCode=4742)
| where
(EventCode = "1" and
(CommandLine contains "lsadump::dcshadow"
or CommandLine contains "dcshadow /push"
or CommandLine contains "dcshadow /start"
or CommandLine contains "dcshadow /domain"
or CommandLine contains "dcshadow /object"
or CommandLine contains "dcshadow /attribute"))
or (EventCode = "5137" and
(Message contains "nTDSDSA" or Message contains "NTDS Settings"))
or (EventCode = "4928")
or (EventCode = "4929")
or (EventCode = "4742" and
(Message contains "GC/" or Message contains "E3514235-4B06-11D1-AB04-00C04FC2DCD2"))
| eval DetectionBranch = if(EventCode = "1", "MimikatzDCShadow",
if(EventCode = "5137", "RogueDCObjectCreated",
if(EventCode = "4928" or EventCode = "4929", "ReplicationSourceChange",
"DCLikeSPNAdded")))
| eval AlertReason = if(EventCode = "1",
"Mimikatz DCShadow command-line arguments detected on endpoint",
if(EventCode = "5137",
"nTDSDSA object created in AD Configuration partition - possible rogue DC registration",
if(EventCode = "4928",
"AD replica source naming context established - verify this is a legitimate DC",
if(EventCode = "4929",
"AD replica source naming context removed - verify expected decommission",
"Computer account modified with DC-like SPN (GC/ or DRSUapi UUID)"))))
| fields _messageTime, _sourceHost, ComputerName, UserName, SubjectUserName, CommandLine, EventCode, DetectionBranch, AlertReason
| sort by _messageTime descSumo Logic query detecting DCShadow / Rogue Domain Controller (T1207) across four parallel branches: Mimikatz DCShadow command-line arguments via Sysmon Event 1, nTDSDSA AD object creation via Security Event 5137, AD replication source context establishment or removal via Security Events 4928/4929, and computer account modification with DC-like Global Catalog or DRSUapi SPNs via Security Event 4742.
Data Sources
Required Tables
False Positives & Tuning
- Domain Controller promotion generates Events 5137, 4928, and 4929 during ADDS role installation — suppress alerts for known DC promotion maintenance windows by implementing scheduled view exclusions or field extraction filters on known DC hostnames during approved change windows
- AD replication topology reconfiguration by domain admins during disaster recovery drills or site restructuring generates Events 4928 and 4929 on all DCs in affected AD sites
- Authorized red team exercises running Mimikatz DCShadow module against isolated lab environments — implement suppression by source host exclusion for approved red team asset names in the detection rule
Other platforms for T1207
Testing Methodology
Validate this detection against 4 adversary techniques from Atomic Red Team. Each test below lists the behaviour to exercise and the telemetry you should expect to see. Executable commands and cleanup steps are available with Pro.
- Test 1Enumerate Existing DC Registrations (Baseline / Forensic Recon)
Expected signal: Sysmon Event ID 1: powershell.exe process creation with LDAP query arguments. No directory service modification events (read-only). PowerShell ScriptBlock Log Event ID 4104 capturing the LDAP filter targeting nTDSDSA objectClass. No network connections beyond standard LDAP to port 389.
- Test 2DCShadow Stage Phase — Register Rogue DC (Mimikatz SYSTEM Session)
Expected signal: Sysmon Event ID 1: mimikatz.exe process creation under NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM context, CommandLine containing lsadump::dcshadow. Windows Security Event ID 5137 on Domain Controllers: new nTDSDSA object created under CN=Sites in the Configuration partition. Windows Security Event ID 4742: computer account of the attacking machine modified with GC/ and DRSUapi SPNs added. Sysmon Event ID 3: RPC connections from mimikatz.exe to DC on port 135 and dynamic RPC ports.
- Test 3DCShadow Push Phase — Trigger Replication (Mimikatz Domain Admin Session)
Expected signal: Sysmon Event ID 1: mimikatz.exe process creation with lsadump::dcshadow /push argument. Windows Security Event ID 4928 on receiving Domain Controllers: replica source naming context established, showing the rogue DC as the source. Windows Security Event ID 5136 on DCs: attribute modification on the target AD object (description attribute). Sysmon Event ID 3: outbound RPC connections to legitimate DC IP addresses on dynamic ports.
- Test 4Validate Replication Topology for Rogue DC Partners
Expected signal: Sysmon Event ID 1: repadmin.exe process creation (multiple instances for each flag). No AD modification events (read-only diagnostic). The /showconn output lists all inbound and outbound replication connections — any connection referencing an unexpected computer name or GUID identifies a rogue DC that has successfully registered in the replication topology.
References (10)
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1207/
- https://www.dcshadow.com/
- https://adsecurity.org/?page_id=1821
- https://github.com/shellster/DCSYNCMonitor
- https://adds-security.blogspot.fr/2018/02/detecter-dcshadow-impossible.html
- https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/ms677626.aspx
- https://github.com/gentilkiwi/mimikatz/wiki/module-~-lsadump
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/identity/ad-ds/manage/component-updates/directory-services-component-updates
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/defender-endpoint/advanced-hunting-deviceprocessevents-table
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-5137
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