Detect Exploitation for Client Execution in IBM QRadar
Adversaries may exploit software vulnerabilities in client applications to execute code. This includes browser-based exploitation via drive-by compromise or spearphishing links, Office application exploitation through malicious attachments (CVE-2017-11882, CVE-2017-0262, CVE-2021-40444), and third-party application exploitation (Adobe Reader, Flash). These exploits cause vulnerable client software to execute attacker-controlled code, often spawning unexpected child processes or injecting shellcode into memory.
MITRE ATT&CK
- Tactic
- Execution
- Technique
- T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution
- Canonical reference
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1203/
QRadar Detection Query
SELECT
DATEFORMAT(starttime, 'yyyy-MM-dd HH:mm:ss') AS EventTime,
devicehostname AS Hostname,
username AS User,
CASE
WHEN LOWER("ParentProcessPath") MATCHES '(?i).*(winword|excel|powerpnt|outlook|mspub|visio|onenote|msaccess)\.exe.*' THEN 'Office Application'
WHEN LOWER("ParentProcessPath") MATCHES '(?i).*(chrome|firefox|msedge|iexplore|opera|brave)\.exe.*' THEN 'Browser'
WHEN LOWER("ParentProcessPath") MATCHES '(?i).*(acrord32|acrobat|foxit|sumatrapdf)\.exe.*' THEN 'PDF Reader'
ELSE 'Other'
END AS ExploitVector,
"ParentProcessPath",
"ParentCommandLine",
"ProcessPath",
"CommandLine",
CASE
WHEN LOWER("ProcessPath") MATCHES '(?i).*(powershell|pwsh|mshta|regsvr32|rundll32|wscript|cscript)\.exe.*' THEN 'true'
ELSE 'false'
END AS HighRisk
FROM events
WHERE LOGSOURCETYPEID IN (12, 433)
AND QIDNAME(qid) = 'Process Create'
AND (
LOWER("ParentProcessPath") MATCHES '(?i).*(winword|excel|powerpnt|outlook|mspub|visio|onenote|msaccess)\.exe.*'
OR LOWER("ParentProcessPath") MATCHES '(?i).*(chrome|firefox|msedge|iexplore|opera|brave)\.exe.*'
OR LOWER("ParentProcessPath") MATCHES '(?i).*(acrord32|acrobat|foxit|sumatrapdf)\.exe.*'
)
AND LOWER("ProcessPath") MATCHES '(?i).*(cmd|powershell|pwsh|wscript|cscript|mshta|rundll32|regsvr32|certutil|bitsadmin|msbuild|installutil|regasm|regsvcs|schtasks|wmic|msiexec)\.exe.*'
AND starttime > NOW() - 86400000
ORDER BY starttime DESCIBM QRadar AQL query detecting T1203 client exploitation using Sysmon Process Create (Event ID 1) custom properties mapped via the Sysmon DSM. Correlates the ParentProcessPath custom property against known client application families (Office, browser, PDF reader) and ProcessPath against a curated LOLBin and script interpreter list. LOGSOURCETYPEID 12 covers WinCollect Windows Security and 433 covers Sysmon via Universal DSM. Requires ParentProcessPath and ProcessPath custom properties to be defined and extracted in QRadar's DSM Editor for the Sysmon log source.
Data Sources
Required Tables
False Positives & Tuning
- Business intelligence or finance team Office macros that legitimately call PowerShell or cmd.exe for scheduled report generation, SharePoint data sync, or ERP export automation
- Enterprise GPO-deployed browser extensions that spawn msiexec.exe for silent component updates or DLP agent installation triggered by browser policy enforcement
- PDF-based digital signing workflows in legal or compliance environments where Acrobat or Foxit calls certutil.exe for certificate chain validation during document signing
Other platforms for T1203
Testing Methodology
Validate this detection against 4 adversary techniques from Atomic Red Team. Each test below lists the behaviour to exercise and the telemetry you should expect to see. Executable commands and cleanup steps are available with Pro.
- Test 1Simulate Office Exploitation — Equation Editor Child Process
Expected signal: Sysmon Event ID 1: Process Create with ParentImage containing eqnedt32.exe and Image=cmd.exe. Security Event ID 4688 with similar parent/child relationship if command line auditing enabled.
- Test 2Office Application Spawning PowerShell via Macro Simulation
Expected signal: Sysmon Event ID 1: Process Create chain showing cmd.exe spawning powershell.exe. The detection focuses on the child process spawning pattern. PowerShell ScriptBlock Log Event ID 4104 will record the Write-Output command.
- Test 3Browser Renderer Process Spawning Cmd
Expected signal: Sysmon Event ID 1: Process Create for cmd.exe with subsequent net.exe and whoami.exe child processes. This represents the reconnaissance commands commonly executed immediately following successful browser exploitation.
- Test 4Mshta Spawned from Office Context (CVE-2021-40444 Pattern)
Expected signal: Sysmon Event ID 1: Process Create for mshta.exe. In real exploitation this process would have a parent of winword.exe or excel.exe. Security Event ID 4688 will also record the mshta.exe launch with command line arguments.
References (8)
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1203/
- https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2017-11882
- https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2021-40444
- https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1203/T1203.md
- https://www.mandiant.com/resources/blog/evasive-attacker-leverages-solarwinds-supply-chain-compromises-with-sunburst-backdoor
- https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/defender-endpoint/advanced-hunting-deviceprocessevents-table
- https://www.sentinelone.com/blog/agent-tesla-old-rat-uses-new-tricks-to-stay-on-top/
Unlock Pro Content
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