Detect Hardware Additions in Google Chronicle
Adversaries may physically introduce computer accessories, networking hardware, or other computing devices into a system or network to gain access or expand capabilities. Hardware additions range from passive network taps (Throwing Star LAN Tap) to active keystroke injection devices (USB Rubber Ducky, Bash Bunny, O.MG Cable), rogue wireless access points, DMA attack devices (PCILeech), and fully autonomous compute devices (Raspberry Pi, netbooks) providing persistent network footholds. Unlike purely software-based attacks, hardware additions require physical proximity to target systems and can bypass many software security controls by presenting as trusted peripherals. The DarkVishnya threat group is documented connecting Bash Bunny, Raspberry Pi, and inexpensive netbooks directly to victim organization networks to establish persistent access and conduct internal reconnaissance. Detection relies primarily on monitoring for unexpected device class connections via Windows Plug and Play audit events, correlating new HID device connections with subsequent automated keystroke injection patterns, and identifying new network interfaces with unknown MAC addresses appearing on internal segments.
MITRE ATT&CK
- Tactic
- Initial Access
- Technique
- T1200 Hardware Additions
- Canonical reference
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1200/
YARA-L Detection Query
rule t1200_hardware_additions_suspicious_usb_device {
meta:
author = "Argus Detection Engineering"
description = "Detects T1200 Hardware Additions — suspicious USB HID or network device connections via Windows PnP Event 6416. Flags known pentest hardware VIDs (Hak5, Digispark, Raspberry Pi Pico, Arduino), unknown HID devices, and unknown USB network adapters."
mitre_attack_tactic = "Initial Access"
mitre_attack_technique = "T1200"
severity = "HIGH"
priority = "HIGH"
events:
$e.metadata.event_type = "STATUS_UPDATE"
$e.metadata.product_name = "Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing"
$e.metadata.product_event_type = "6416"
$e.principal.hostname = $hostname
(
/* Known pentest hardware VIDs */
re.regex($e.target.resource.name, `(?i)(VID_2B04|VID_16D0|VID_2E8A|VID_2341|VID_1B4F|VID_221A|VID_04D8)`) or
/* Unknown HID device — not from known legitimate vendor */
(
re.regex($e.target.resource.type, `(?i)hidclass`) and
not re.regex($e.target.resource.name, `(?i)(VID_045E|VID_046D|VID_05AC|VID_413C|VID_03F0|VID_17EF|VID_047D|VID_046A|VID_1B1C|VID_1532|VID_1038|VID_04B3|VID_04CA|VID_0461)`)
) or
/* Unknown USB network device — possible LAN tap or rogue adapter */
(
re.regex($e.target.resource.type, `(?i)(^net$|wlan|bluetooth|net service)`) and
re.regex($e.target.resource.attribute.labels["DeviceId"], `(?i)USB`) and
not re.regex($e.target.resource.name, `(?i)(VID_045E|VID_046D|VID_05AC|VID_413C|VID_03F0|VID_17EF)`)
)
)
condition:
$e
}Chronicle YARA-L 2.0 rule detecting T1200 Hardware Additions via Windows Security Event 6416. Matches known pentest/attack hardware vendor IDs (Hak5 Bash Bunny/Rubber Ducky, Digispark ATTiny85, Raspberry Pi Pico, Arduino-based injectors, ZTEX DMA hardware), unrecognized HID-class devices not from major peripheral vendors, and USB network adapters from unknown vendors that may be LAN taps or rogue interfaces. Ingests via Google Chronicle Windows Event log parser.
Data Sources
Required Tables
False Positives & Tuning
- Specialty input devices (barcode scanners, POS terminals, medical peripherals) using HID class with obscure VIDs not in the allowlist
- USB Ethernet adapters bundled with laptops or docking stations from vendors not on the known-good VID list
- Embedded systems developers connecting microcontroller dev boards (ESP32, Teensy) for legitimate firmware development work
Other platforms for T1200
Testing Methodology
Validate this detection against 4 adversary techniques from Atomic Red Team. Each test below lists the behaviour to exercise and the telemetry you should expect to see. Executable commands and cleanup steps are available with Pro.
- Test 1Install Microsoft Loopback Network Adapter via devcon
Expected signal: Windows Security Event ID 6416: ClassName=Net, ClassId={4d36e972-e325-11ce-bfc1-08002be10318}, DeviceId=ROOT\NET\0001 or similar, HardwareIds=*MSLOOP. Windows System Event IDs 20001 and 20003 in System log for driver installation. Entry in C:\Windows\INF\setupapi.dev.log with timestamp and INF path.
- Test 2Enumerate Connected HID Devices via PowerShell
Expected signal: Sysmon Event ID 1: Process Create with Image=powershell.exe and CommandLine containing 'Get-PnpDevice' and 'HIDClass'. Security Event ID 4688 (if command line auditing enabled). PowerShell ScriptBlock Log Event ID 4104 with the full device enumeration script.
- Test 3Query USB Device Connection History via Registry
Expected signal: Sysmon Event ID 1: Process Create for reg.exe with CommandLine containing 'HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Enum\USB'. Sysmon Event ID 1 also for findstr.exe. Security Event ID 4688 (if enabled) for both processes. Registry access events may be logged depending on SACL configuration.
- Test 4Simulate Keystroke Injection via PowerShell SendKeys
Expected signal: Sysmon Event ID 1: Process Create for powershell.exe initiated by the calling process, plus any processes spawned by the injected keystrokes. If Sysmon monitors for the parent process chain, keystrokes injected into an Explorer window will show explorer.exe as parent. PowerShell ScriptBlock Log Event ID 4104 for both the outer and any inner PowerShell sessions.
References (9)
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1200/
- https://securelist.com/darkvishnya/89169/
- https://ossmann.blogspot.com/2011/02/throwing-star-lan-tap.html
- https://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2012/03/the-pwn-plug-is-a-little-white-box-that-can-hack-your-network/
- https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-6416
- https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/advanced-security-audit-policy-settings
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-hardware/drivers/install/devcon-command-syntax
- https://github.com/hak5/bashbunny-payloads
- https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/devio/device-management-events
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