T1195 Google Chronicle · YARA-L

Detect Supply Chain Compromise in Google Chronicle

Adversaries may manipulate products or product delivery mechanisms prior to receipt by a final consumer for the purpose of data or system compromise. Supply chain compromise can occur at any stage — from manipulation of development tools, source code repositories, open-source dependencies, software update/distribution mechanisms, system images, or physical hardware. Because the attack abuses trusted software distribution channels, defenders must focus on post-delivery behavioral indicators: trusted installer processes spawning shells, legitimate software making unexpected network connections, newly installed applications loading unsigned modules, and integrity failures in software binaries. High-profile incidents include SolarWinds Orion (Sunburst backdoor in update packages), CCleaner (backdoor distributed via official update), 3CX (second-order compromise via trojanized Electron app), and NotPetya (distributed via M.E.Doc accounting software update).

MITRE ATT&CK

Tactic
Initial Access
Technique
T1195 Supply Chain Compromise
Canonical reference
https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1195/

YARA-L Detection Query

Google Chronicle (YARA-L)
yaral
rule supply_chain_compromise_t1195 {
  meta:
    author = "Argus Detection Engineering"
    description = "Detects post-delivery supply chain compromise indicators: installer/updater processes spawning LOLBins, or trusted signed software in standard install paths launching shell interpreters"
    mitre_attack_tactic = "Initial Access"
    mitre_attack_technique = "T1195"
    mitre_attack_subtechniques = "T1195.001, T1195.002, T1195.003"
    severity = "HIGH"
    confidence = "HIGH"
    created = "2026-04-18"
    platform = "Windows"

  events:
    $e.metadata.event_type = "PROCESS_LAUNCH"
    $e.metadata.vendor_name = "Microsoft"

    // Capture parent and child process names
    $parent = $e.principal.process.file.full_path
    $child = $e.target.process.file.full_path
    $child_name = $e.target.process.file.basename
    $parent_name = $e.principal.process.file.basename

    // Branch 1: Installer/updater spawning LOLBin
    // Branch 2: Trusted software in Program Files spawning shell
    (
      (
        re.regex($e.principal.process.file.basename, `(?i)(msiexec\.exe|setup\.exe|install(er)?\.exe|update(r)?\.exe|autoupdate\.exe|squirrel\.exe|appinstaller\.exe|packageinstaller\.exe|softwareupdate\.exe|uninst\.exe|uninstall\.exe|patchinstaller\.exe)`)
        and
        re.regex($e.target.process.file.basename, `(?i)(cmd\.exe|powershell\.exe|pwsh\.exe|wscript\.exe|cscript\.exe|mshta\.exe|regsvr32\.exe|rundll32\.exe|certutil\.exe|bitsadmin\.exe|wmic\.exe|msbuild\.exe|csc\.exe|odbcconf\.exe|xwizard\.exe|installutil\.exe|regasm\.exe|regsvcs\.exe|schtasks\.exe|at\.exe)`)
      )
      or
      (
        re.regex($e.principal.process.file.full_path, `(?i)(\\Program Files\\|\\Program Files \(x86\)\\|\\ProgramData\\)`)
        and
        re.regex($e.target.process.file.basename, `(?i)(cmd\.exe|powershell\.exe|pwsh\.exe|wscript\.exe|cscript\.exe|mshta\.exe)`)
        and
        not re.regex($e.principal.process.file.basename, `(?i)(explorer\.exe|svchost\.exe|services\.exe|taskhostw\.exe|msiexec\.exe|setup\.exe)`)
        and
        $e.principal.process.file.pe_file.company_name != ""
      )
    )

    $hostname = $e.principal.hostname
    $user = $e.principal.user.userid
    $parent_cmd = $e.principal.process.command_line
    $child_cmd = $e.target.process.command_line

  condition:
    $e
}
high severity high confidence

Chronicle YARA-L 2.0 rule detecting supply chain compromise post-delivery behavioral indicators. Matches on two event patterns within process launch telemetry: trusted installer/updater binaries spawning LOLBins, and vendor-signed software resident in standard installation directories launching shell interpreters. Leverages UDM process launch event type with principal (parent) and target (child) process fields.

Data Sources

Endpoint - Windows Process Events (via Chronicle forwarder or Sysmon-to-UDM ingestion)

Required Tables

PROCESS_LAUNCH UDM events

False Positives & Tuning

  • Software vendors that legitimately use Squirrel.Windows (Electron apps like Slack, Teams, Discord) whose squirrel.exe spawns PowerShell for installation hooks
  • Enterprise software (SAP, Oracle, Adobe) with complex install procedures that execute cmd.exe scripts from their Program Files directories during patching cycles
  • Security tools (CrowdStrike Falcon, SentinelOne, Carbon Black) that self-update from ProgramData paths and execute shell commands as part of sensor update processes
Download portable Sigma rule (.yml)

Other platforms for T1195


Testing Methodology

Validate this detection against 4 adversary techniques from Atomic Red Team. Each test below lists the behaviour to exercise and the telemetry you should expect to see. Executable commands and cleanup steps are available with Pro.

  1. Test 1Simulate Trojanized Installer Spawning PowerShell (Windows)

    Expected signal: Sysmon Event ID 1: Two process creation events — first for %TEMP%\setup.exe (Image matches 'setup.exe'), then for powershell.exe with ParentImage pointing to %TEMP%\setup.exe. Security Event ID 4688 (if command line auditing enabled) with same parent-child details. Sysmon Event ID 11: File creation for t1195_installer_test.txt.

  2. Test 2Malicious npm Package Postinstall Script (Windows)

    Expected signal: Sysmon Event ID 1: Process chain: npm.cmd (or node.exe) spawning cmd.exe with the postinstall command. The CommandLine will contain the postinstall script command. Sysmon Event ID 11: File creation for postinstall_output.txt in %TEMP%\t1195-npm\. Windows Event ID 4688 (process creation) for each spawned process.

  3. Test 3Malicious Python Package setup.py Executing Shell Command (Linux/macOS)

    Expected signal: Linux auditd: syscall execve events for python3 spawning subprocess (id command). Syslog/auditd EXECVE records showing python3 as parent process and id as child. If Falco is deployed, process_spawned_by_pip_or_python rules will fire. File creation event for /tmp/t1195-pip/pip_payload_output.txt.

  4. Test 4Software Binary Hash Integrity Verification Failure Simulation (Windows)

    Expected signal: Process creation events for certutil.exe (Sysmon Event ID 1) with -hashfile arguments. The fc command will show or report mismatches between the two hash files, demonstrating the hash divergence that would indicate a tampered supply chain binary. No network activity expected. This test validates the analyst investigation workflow rather than triggering a real-time detection rule.

Unlock Pro Content

Get the full detection package for T1195 including response playbook, investigation guide, and atomic red team tests.

Response PlaybookInvestigation GuideHunting QueriesAtomic Red Team TestsTuning Guidance

Related Detections