Which SIEM platforms have a T1195.003 detection rule?

df00tech provides T1195.003 (Compromise Hardware Supply Chain) detection queries for 7 SIEM platforms: Microsoft Sentinel / Defender, Splunk, Elastic Security (EQL), IBM QRadar (AQL), Sumo Logic CSE, Google Chronicle / SecOps, CrowdStrike LogScale (CQL).

What data sources are required to detect Compromise Hardware Supply Chain (T1195.003)?

Detecting Compromise Hardware Supply Chain requires the following data sources: Driver: Driver Load, Process: Process Creation, Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Creation, Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification, Firmware: Firmware Modification, Microsoft Defender for Endpoint.

What severity and confidence is the T1195.003 detection?

The T1195.003 detection is rated critical severity with low confidence.

What are common false positives for T1195.003?

Common false positives for T1195.003 include: Hardware vendor management software (Dell SupportAssist, HP Support Assistant, Lenovo Vantage) legitimately executes firmware flash utilities and installs drivers during scheduled updates — filter by known vendor parent processes and scheduled maintenance windows; Windows Update and Windows Driver Framework (drvinst.exe, setuphost.exe, TrustedInstaller.exe) legitimately create PCI registry keys and install drivers during OS updates — these processes are explicitly excluded but verify parent process chains; IT administrators running firmware audit tools (chipsec, flashrom in read-only mode, MEInfo) for inventory or security assessments — coordinate with asset management teams to identify authorized audit activity.

T1195.003 CrowdStrike LogScale · LogScale

Detect Compromise Hardware Supply Chain in CrowdStrike LogScale

Adversaries may manipulate hardware components in products prior to receipt by a final consumer for the purpose of data or system compromise. By modifying hardware or firmware in the supply chain, adversaries can insert a backdoor into consumer networks that may be difficult to detect and give the adversary a high degree of control over the system. Hardware backdoors may be inserted into various devices such as servers, workstations, network infrastructure, or peripherals. Real-world examples include UEFI firmware implants (LoJax, CosmicStrand, BlackLotus), compromised network interface card firmware (Equation Group capabilities), and server baseboard management controller (BMC) implants. Detection is inherently constrained because the compromise predates the device's arrival, often manifesting as unexpected kernel-mode drivers, firmware modification activity, anomalous out-of-band management traffic, or covert network channels established through compromised NIC or BMC firmware. Defenders should focus on firmware integrity monitoring, hardware inventory baselining, driver signing verification, and anomalous network activity from system-level processes.

MITRE ATT&CK

Tactic: Initial Access
Technique: T1195 Supply Chain Compromise
Sub-technique: T1195.003 Compromise Hardware Supply Chain
Canonical reference: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1195/003/

LogScale Detection Query

CrowdStrike LogScale (LogScale)

cql

#event_simpleName = /^(ProcessRollup2|DriverLoad|ModuleLoad)$/
| eval lower_filename = lower(FileName ?? "")
| eval lower_cmdline = lower(CommandLine ?? "")
| eval lower_imagepath = lower(ImageFileName ?? FileName ?? "")
| eval lower_parent = lower(ParentBaseFileName ?? "")
| eval is_firmware_tool = (
    #event_simpleName = "ProcessRollup2" and
    (
      lower_filename = /^(afuwin(64)?|afudos|fptw?(64)?|h2offt(-wx(64|86))?|flashrom|winphlash|phlash16|meinfo(win)?(64)?|fwupdmgr|chipsec_main)\.exe$/ or
      lower_cmdline = /(afuwin|afudos|fpt\.exe|fptw64|h2offt|winphlash|phlash16|amifldrv64|meinfo|flashrom|fwupdmgr|chipsec_main)/
    ) and
    not lower_parent = /(msiexec\.exe|setup\.exe|install\.exe|update\.exe|dellupdate\.exe|hpfirmwareupdrecov\.exe)/
  )
| eval is_suspicious_driver = (
    #event_simpleName in ("DriverLoad", "ModuleLoad") and
    lower_imagepath = /(\\temp\\|\\appdata\\|\\programdata\\|\\users\\public\\|\\windows\\temp\\)/
  )
| where is_firmware_tool or is_suspicious_driver
| eval detection_category = case(
    is_firmware_tool, "Firmware Flash Utility Execution",
    is_suspicious_driver, "Driver or Module Loaded From Suspicious Path",
    "Unknown Hardware Anomaly"
  )
| eval risk_indicators = if(is_firmware_tool, "firmware_tool ", "") + if(is_suspicious_driver, "suspicious_driver_path", "")
| table([timestamp, ComputerName, UserName, detection_category, risk_indicators, FileName, CommandLine, ImageFileName, ParentBaseFileName, MD5HashData, SHA256HashData])
| sort(timestamp, order=desc)

high severity medium confidence

CrowdStrike LogScale (Falcon) query detecting T1195.003 hardware supply chain compromise using ProcessRollup2 (process execution) and DriverLoad/ModuleLoad (kernel driver and module load) Falcon telemetry events. Identifies firmware flash utility execution by file name and command line pattern with parent process exclusions, and driver or module loads from user-writable or temporary paths. Hash fields are included to enable IOC pivoting on detected artifacts.

Data Sources

CrowdStrike Falcon EDR sensorFalcon Data Replicator

Required Tables

ProcessRollup2DriverLoadModuleLoad

False Positives & Tuning

Vendor OEM firmware update agents (DellUpdate.exe, HP Support Assistant, Lenovo System Update) that spawn licensed firmware flash utilities during scheduled or user-initiated update windows, resulting in known-good tools appearing under non-standard parent processes
Enterprise endpoint management platforms (Tanium, BigFix, Microsoft Endpoint Configuration Manager) that distribute and execute firmware validation or update binaries using Falcon-visible process execution paths through Temp or ProgramData staging directories
Authorized red team or hardware security engineering workflows invoking firmware inspection tools (chipsec, flashrom) from non-standard paths on designated test endpoints under change-control approval

Download portable Sigma rule (.yml)

Other platforms for T1195.003

Microsoft Sentinel (KQL) Splunk (SPL) Elastic Security (Elastic) IBM QRadar (QRadar) Sumo Logic CSE (Sumo) Google Chronicle (YARA-L) All platforms (combined) →

Testing Methodology

Validate this detection against 5 adversary techniques from Atomic Red Team. Each test below lists the behaviour to exercise and the telemetry you should expect to see. Executable commands and cleanup steps are available with Pro.

Test 1Firmware Inventory Tool Execution (Read-Only Audit)
Expected signal: Sysmon Event ID 1: Process Create with Image=powershell.exe, CommandLine containing 'Win32_BIOS' and 'Win32_BaseBoard'. Security Event ID 4688 (if command line auditing enabled). Note: WMI queries also generate Event ID 4688 for wmiprvse.exe child processes.
Test 2Simulate Firmware Flash Tool Execution From Temp Directory
Expected signal: Sysmon Event ID 1: Process Create with Image=C:\Windows\Temp\AFUWINx64.EXE. Security Event ID 4688 with NewProcessName=C:\Windows\Temp\AFUWINx64.EXE. The OriginalFileName in PE headers will show cmd.exe (indicating the binary was renamed), which is an additional forensic signal.
Test 3Inject Rogue PCI Device Registry Key
Expected signal: Sysmon Event ID 12 (Registry Key Create): TargetObject=HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Enum\PCI\VEN_DEAD&DEV_BEEF&SUBSYS_00000000&REV_00, Image=powershell.exe. Sysmon Event ID 13 (Registry Value Set): TargetObject containing DeviceDesc. DeviceRegistryEvents in MDE will record ActionType=RegistryKeyCreated with InitiatingProcessFileName=powershell.exe.
Test 4Install Kernel Driver Service From Temp Path
Expected signal: Windows System Event ID 7045 (New Service Installed): ServiceName=HWImplantTestDrv, ServiceType=kernel mode driver, StartType=demand start, ImagePath=C:\Windows\Temp\hw_implant_test.sys. Security Event ID 4697 (A service was installed in the system). The ImagePath pointing to \Windows\Temp\ is the primary anomaly indicator.
Test 5Simulate BMC/IPMI Network Reconnaissance From Management Interface
Expected signal: Sysmon Event ID 1: Process Create with Image=curl.exe, User=SYSTEM (or NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM). Sysmon Event ID 3: Network Connection attempted from curl.exe running as SYSTEM to 127.0.0.1:9876. DeviceNetworkEvents in MDE: InitiatingProcessAccountName=SYSTEM, RemotePort=9876.

Last updated: 2026-04-18 Research depth: deep

References (10)

Response Playbook

1. Examine the full command line and decode any Base64 content...
2. Identify the parent process chain and user context...
3. Check for concurrent network connections from the process...

Investigation Guide

Related techniques: T1027, T1105, T1562.001...
Forensic artifacts: PSReadLine history, Prefetch, ScriptBlock logs...

Atomic Red Team Tests

Test 1: Encoded command execution...
Test 2: Download cradle via Net.WebClient...

Unlock Pro Content

Get the full detection package for T1195.003 including response playbook, investigation guide, and atomic red team tests.

Response PlaybookInvestigation GuideHunting QueriesAtomic Red Team TestsTuning Guidance

Detect Compromise Hardware Supply Chain in CrowdStrike LogScale

MITRE ATT&CK

LogScale Detection Query

Data Sources

Required Tables

False Positives & Tuning

Other platforms for T1195.003

Testing Methodology

Response Playbook

Investigation Guide

Atomic Red Team Tests

Unlock Pro Content

Related Detections

Parent Technique

Related Sub-techniques

Related Techniques

Same Tactic: Initial Access

Popular Detections

MITRE ATT&CK

LogScale Detection Query

Data Sources

Required Tables

False Positives & Tuning

Other platforms for T1195.003

Testing Methodology

Unlock Pro Content

Related Detections

Parent Technique

Related Sub-techniques

Related Techniques

Same Tactic: Initial Access

Popular Detections

Get new detections in your inbox