T1185 Google Chronicle · YARA-L

Detect Browser Session Hijacking in Google Chronicle

Adversaries may take advantage of security vulnerabilities and inherent functionality in browser software to change content, modify user behaviors, and intercept information as part of various browser session hijacking techniques. A specific example is when an adversary injects software into a browser process that allows them to inherit cookies, HTTP sessions, and SSL client certificates of a user, then uses the browser as a pivot into an authenticated intranet. Executing browser-based behaviors such as pivoting may require specific process permissions, such as SeDebugPrivilege and/or high-integrity/administrator rights. Another technique involves redirecting browser traffic through an adversary-controlled proxy injected into the browser process, allowing session impersonation without modifying user-visible traffic. Malware families such as TrickBot, Dridex, IcedID, QakBot, and Cobalt Strike implement browser pivoting and web inject techniques to steal banking credentials, session tokens, and SSL certificates.

MITRE ATT&CK

Tactic
Collection
Technique
T1185 Browser Session Hijacking
Canonical reference
https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1185/

YARA-L Detection Query

Google Chronicle (YARA-L)
yaral
rule t1185_browser_session_hijacking {
  meta:
    author = "Argus Detection Engineering"
    description = "Detects browser session hijacking via process injection or DLL load into browser processes"
    mitre_attack_tactic = "Collection"
    mitre_attack_technique = "T1185"
    severity = "HIGH"
    priority = "HIGH"

  events:
    // Detection 1: CreateRemoteThread into browser
    $inject.metadata.event_type = "PROCESS_INJECTION"
    $inject.target.process.file.full_path = /(?i)(chrome|msedge|firefox|iexplore|brave|opera|microsoftedge)\.exe$/
    not $inject.principal.process.file.full_path = /(?i)(chrome|msedge|firefox|MsMpEng|WerFault|csrss|dwm|taskmgr)\.exe$/
    $inject.principal.hostname = $host

  OR

    // Detection 2: Suspicious library load inside browser process
    $load.metadata.event_type = "PROCESS_MODULE_LOAD"
    $load.principal.process.file.full_path = /(?i)(chrome|msedge|firefox|iexplore|brave|opera)\.exe$/
    not $load.target.file.full_path = /(?i)(Program Files\\(Google\\Chrome|Mozilla Firefox|Microsoft\\Edge)|Windows\\(System32|SysWOW64|WinSxS))/
    not $load.target.file.full_path = /(?i)(d3d|opengl|vulkan|nvidia|amd|intel)/
    $load.principal.hostname = $host

  condition:
    $inject or $load
}
high severity medium confidence

Chronicle YARA-L 2.0 rule detecting browser session hijacking through two complementary patterns: process injection events targeting browser executables from non-whitelisted injectors, and suspicious DLL/module loads inside browser processes from outside standard browser installation paths. Uses UDM event types PROCESS_INJECTION and PROCESS_MODULE_LOAD.

Data Sources

Google Chronicle SIEMEndpoint telemetry forwarded to Chronicle (via forwarder or ingestion API)Windows Defender for Endpoint via Chronicle integrationCrowdStrike Falcon data ingested into Chronicle

Required Tables

UDM events with metadata.event_type PROCESS_INJECTIONUDM events with metadata.event_type PROCESS_MODULE_LOAD

False Positives & Tuning

  • Legitimate security software accessing browser processes for scanning or monitoring
  • Browser developer extensions that load DLLs from custom installation paths
  • Third-party password managers or accessibility tools with browser integration
  • Automated testing frameworks using browser instrumentation APIs
  • Update managers or software distribution agents that access browser processes
Download portable Sigma rule (.yml)

Other platforms for T1185


Testing Methodology

Validate this detection against 4 adversary techniques from Atomic Red Team. Each test below lists the behaviour to exercise and the telemetry you should expect to see. Executable commands and cleanup steps are available with Pro.

  1. Test 1Browser Process Enumeration and Handle Open (ReadVM Access)

    Expected signal: Sysmon EventCode=10 (ProcessAccess): SourceImage=powershell.exe, TargetImage=<browser>.exe, GrantedAccess=0x10 (PROCESS_VM_READ), CallTrace will show the kernel32.dll and ntdll.dll call stack. MDE DeviceEvents ActionType=OpenProcessApiCall with FileName=<browser>.exe, InitiatingProcessFileName=powershell.exe.

  2. Test 2Chrome Cookie Database Exfiltration via File Copy

    Expected signal: Sysmon EventCode=11 (FileCreate): TargetFilename=%TEMP%\argus_test_cookies_*.db, Image=powershell.exe. Sysmon EventCode=1 (ProcessCreate): powershell.exe with command line referencing LOCALAPPDATA\Google\Chrome\User Data. MDE DeviceFileEvents with ActionType=FileCreated, FileName=argus_test_cookies_*.db, InitiatingProcessFileName=powershell.exe.

  3. Test 3Browser Proxy Configuration via Registry (Browser Pivot Simulation)

    Expected signal: Sysmon EventCode=13 (RegistryValueSet): TargetObject=HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Internet Settings\ProxyServer, Details=127.0.0.1:4444, Image=powershell.exe. Second EventCode=13 for ProxyEnable=1. MDE DeviceRegistryEvents with ActionType=RegistryValueSet, RegistryValueName=ProxyServer, RegistryValueData=127.0.0.1:4444.

  4. Test 4CreateRemoteThread Simulation into Browser Process (Benign Payload)

    Expected signal: Sysmon EventCode=8 (CreateRemoteThread): SourceImage=powershell.exe, TargetImage=<browser>.exe, StartAddress=<kernel32!Sleep address>, StartModule=C:\Windows\System32\kernel32.dll, StartFunction=Sleep. MDE DeviceEvents ActionType=CreateRemoteThreadApiCall, FileName=<browser>.exe, InitiatingProcessFileName=powershell.exe. Security Event ID 4688 for the PowerShell process if command line auditing is enabled.

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