Detect Browser Extensions in IBM QRadar
Adversaries may abuse internet browser extensions to establish persistent access to victim systems. Malicious extensions can be silently installed by modifying Chromium-based browser Preferences or Secure Preferences files while the browser is closed, via Windows Registry extension force-install policies, or through social engineering. Once installed, malicious extensions can steal credentials, cookies, and form data; capture screenshots; exfiltrate data to attacker-controlled servers; or establish command-and-control channels. Threat actors including Kimsuky (TRANSLATEXT), Lumma Stealer, Mispadu, and Grandoreiro have used malicious browser extensions in targeted campaigns.
MITRE ATT&CK
- Tactic
- Persistence
- Technique
- T1176 Software Extensions
- Sub-technique
- T1176.001 Browser Extensions
- Canonical reference
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1176/001/
QRadar Detection Query
SELECT
DATEFORMAT(devicetime, 'yyyy-MM-dd HH:mm:ss') AS event_time,
devicehostname AS hostname,
username,
QIDNAME(qid) AS event_name,
"Image" AS process_image,
"CommandLine" AS command_line,
"TargetFilename" AS target_filename,
"TargetObject" AS registry_key,
"Details" AS registry_value,
LOGSOURCENAME(logsourceid) AS log_source
FROM events
WHERE
devicetime >= NOW() - 86400000
AND (
(
"EventCode" = '11'
AND (
"TargetFilename" ILIKE '%\Google\Chrome\User Data\%'
OR "TargetFilename" ILIKE '%\Microsoft\Edge\User Data\%'
OR "TargetFilename" ILIKE '%\BraveSoftware\Brave-Browser\User Data\%'
OR "TargetFilename" ILIKE '%\Opera Software\Opera Stable\%'
OR "TargetFilename" ILIKE '%\Chromium\User Data\%'
)
AND (
"TargetFilename" ILIKE '%\Extensions\%'
OR "TargetFilename" ILIKE '%Preferences'
OR "TargetFilename" ILIKE '%Secure Preferences'
OR "TargetFilename" ILIKE '%manifest.json'
OR "TargetFilename" ILIKE '%background.js'
OR "TargetFilename" ILIKE '%content_script.js'
OR "TargetFilename" ILIKE '%inject.js'
)
)
OR (
"EventCode" = '13'
AND (
"TargetObject" ILIKE '%Policies\Google\Chrome\ExtensionInstallForcelist%'
OR "TargetObject" ILIKE '%Policies\Microsoft\Edge\ExtensionInstallForcelist%'
OR "TargetObject" ILIKE '%Policies\BraveSoftware\Brave\ExtensionInstallForcelist%'
OR "TargetObject" ILIKE '%Policies\Google\Chrome\ExtensionInstallAllowlist%'
)
)
)
ORDER BY devicetime DESCDetects browser extension abuse via Sysmon events forwarded to IBM QRadar. Monitors Sysmon EventCode 11 (FileCreate) for writes to Chromium browser extension directories and critical preference files across Chrome, Edge, Brave, Opera, and Chromium profiles. Also monitors Sysmon EventCode 13 (RegistrySetValue) for creation of ExtensionInstallForcelist and ExtensionInstallAllowlist registry policies used to force-push extensions. Maps to MITRE ATT&CK T1176.001.
Data Sources
Required Tables
False Positives & Tuning
- IT-managed Active Directory Group Policy deploying approved extensions to ExtensionInstallForcelist — validate against authorized GPO change records; filter by Image field showing legitimate GPO processing tools such as gpo_update.exe or svchost.exe running under SYSTEM from expected parent processes
- Browser installer or version update manager (GoogleUpdate.exe, MicrosoftEdgeUpdate.exe, brave_browser_update.exe) writing to User Data paths during extension updates — correlate Image field against known vendor update binary paths and verify digital signature validity
- Enterprise configuration management agents (Ansible WinRM, Chef, Salt Minion) applying sanctioned browser configuration policies — cross-reference with CMDB change records and confirm CommandLine includes expected configuration parameters
Other platforms for T1176.001
Testing Methodology
Validate this detection against 5 adversary techniques from Atomic Red Team. Each test below lists the behaviour to exercise and the telemetry you should expect to see. Executable commands and cleanup steps are available with Pro.
- Test 1Silently Install Chrome Extension via Preferences File Modification
Expected signal: Sysmon Event ID 11: File Create/Modify with TargetFilename ending in '\Google\Chrome\User Data\Default\Preferences', Image=powershell.exe. Sysmon Event ID 1: Process Create for powershell.exe with CommandLine containing 'Preferences' and 'ConvertFrom-Json'. DeviceFileEvents (MDE): FolderPath containing 'Google\Chrome\User Data\Default', FileName='Preferences', InitiatingProcessFileName='powershell.exe'.
- Test 2Force-Install Browser Extension via Registry Policy
Expected signal: Sysmon Event ID 13: Registry Value Set with TargetObject containing 'SOFTWARE\Policies\Google\Chrome\ExtensionInstallForcelist', Details containing the extension ID and update URL, Image=reg.exe. DeviceRegistryEvents (MDE): RegistryKey containing 'ExtensionInstallForcelist', RegistryValueData='nmmhkkegccagdldgiimedpiccmgmieda;...', InitiatingProcessFileName='reg.exe'.
- Test 3Drop Malicious Extension Files to Browser Extension Directory
Expected signal: Sysmon Event ID 11: Multiple File Create events with TargetFilename in '...Chrome\User Data\Default\Extensions\abcdefghijklmnopabcdefghijklmnop\1.0_0\' for manifest.json, background.js, and content.js, all with Image=powershell.exe. Sysmon Event ID 1: PowerShell process create with CommandLine referencing extension directory and manifest content. DeviceFileEvents (MDE): Multiple records with FolderPath containing 'Extensions\abcdefghijklmnopabcdefghijklmnop', InitiatingProcessFileName='powershell.exe'.
- Test 4Enumerate Installed Browser Extensions for Reconnaissance
Expected signal: Sysmon Event ID 1: PowerShell process create with CommandLine referencing 'Extensions' and 'manifest.json'. DeviceFileEvents (MDE): Multiple FileRead events on manifest.json files in extension directories with InitiatingProcessFileName='powershell.exe'. This test generates lower-confidence telemetry (reads, not writes) suitable for hunting queries rather than high-confidence alerting.
- Test 5Install Extension via .CRX File Drop and Chrome Command Line
Expected signal: Sysmon Event ID 1: PowerShell process create writing manifest.json to TEMP directory. If Chrome launch is executed: Sysmon Event ID 1 for chrome.exe with CommandLine containing '--load-extension' pointing to temp directory. DeviceProcessEvents (MDE): chrome.exe launched with non-standard command line arguments including '--load-extension'. DeviceFileEvents: manifest.json created in %TEMP% by powershell.exe.
References (12)
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1176/001/
- https://blog.pulsedive.com/rilide-an-information-stealing-browser-extension/
- https://developer.chrome.com/extensions
- https://www.icebrg.io/blog/malicious-chrome-extensions-enable-criminals-to-impact-over-half-a-million-users-and-global-businesses
- https://www.xorrior.com/No-Place-Like-Chrome/
- https://isc.sans.edu/forums/diary/CatchAll+Google+Chrome+Malicious+Extension+Steals+All+Posted+Data/22976/
- https://www.proofpoint.com/uk/blog/threat-insight/ta413-leverages-new-friarfox-browser-extension-target-gmail-accounts-global
- https://www.welivesecurity.com/2017/07/20/stantinko-massive-adware-campaign-operating-covertly-since-2012/
- https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2020/12/10/widespread-malware-campaign-seeks-to-silently-inject-ads-into-search-results-affects-multiple-browsers/
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/deployedge/microsoft-edge-manage-extensions-ref-guide
- https://support.google.com/chrome/a/answer/9296680
- https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1176/T1176.md
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