Detect Create Account in Sumo Logic CSE
Adversaries may create an account to maintain access to victim systems. With sufficient privilege, creating accounts establishes secondary credentialed access that does not require persistent remote access tools. Accounts may be created on local systems, within a domain, or in cloud tenants. Threat actors including Indrik Spider (WastedLocker), LockBit 2.0, Scattered Spider, and Salt Typhoon have all used account creation as a persistence mechanism. In cloud environments, attackers may create accounts with access limited to specific services to reduce detection likelihood.
MITRE ATT&CK
- Tactic
- Persistence
- Technique
- T1136 Create Account
- Canonical reference
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1136/
Sumo Detection Query
// Branch 1: Windows Security Event 4720
(_sourceCategory=*windows* OR _sourceCategory=*WinEventLog*)
| where EventID = "4720"
| parse field=Message "Account Name:*\n" as new_account_block multi
| parse field=new_account_block "*\t" as new_account_name
| parse field=Message "Subject:*Account Name:*\n" as subject_block
| eval new_account_name = trim(new_account_name)
| eval hour = num(formatDate(_messageTime, "H"))
| eval off_hours = if(hour < 7 OR hour > 19, 1, 0)
| eval short_name = if(length(trim(new_account_name)) <= 3, 1, 0)
| eval risk_score = off_hours + short_name
| eval source = "Security-4720"
| fields _messageTime, _sourceHost, EventID, new_account_name, off_hours, short_name, risk_score, source
// Branch 2: Sysmon Process Create (Event 1) — account creation via process
// Run as separate query and union manually or use union operator
// (_sourceCategory=*sysmon* OR _sourceCategory=*windows*)
// | where EventID = "1"
// | where (CommandLine matches /(?i)net[1]?\.exe.*user.*\/add/)
// OR (CommandLine matches /(?i)wmic.*useraccount.*create/)
// OR (CommandLine matches /(?i)(powershell|pwsh).*New-LocalUser/)
// OR (Image matches /useradd|adduser/)
// | eval hour = num(formatDate(_messageTime, "H"))
// | eval off_hours = if(hour < 7 OR hour > 19, 1, 0)
// | eval suspicious_parent = if(ParentImage matches /(?i)(cmd|powershell|wscript|cscript|mshta|rundll32)\.exe/, 1, 0)
// | eval risk_score = off_hours + suspicious_parent
// | eval source = "ProcessCreate"
// | fields _messageTime, _sourceHost, EventID, Image, CommandLine, ParentImage, User, off_hours, suspicious_parent, risk_score, source
| sort by _messageTime descSumo Logic query detecting Windows account creation via Security Event 4720 and process-based creation patterns (net.exe, wmic, PowerShell, Linux useradd). Includes risk scoring for off-hours activity, short suspicious account names, and suspicious parent processes.
Data Sources
Required Tables
False Positives & Tuning
- IT provisioning systems creating accounts for new employees during business hours
- CI/CD pipelines or deployment scripts creating service accounts as part of application setup
- Security products or EDR agents creating local accounts for their own operation
Other platforms for T1136
Testing Methodology
Validate this detection against 4 adversary techniques from Atomic Red Team. Each test below lists the behaviour to exercise and the telemetry you should expect to see. Executable commands and cleanup steps are available with Pro.
- Test 1Create Local User Account via net.exe
Expected signal: Security Event 4720: 'A user account was created' with TargetUserName=df00tech-testacct, SubjectUserName=<running user>. Sysmon Event ID 1: Process Create with Image=net.exe (or net1.exe), CommandLine='net user df00tech-testacct P@ssw0rd123! /add'. Security Event 4722 (account enabled) may follow immediately.
- Test 2Create Local User via WMIC (Indrik Spider TTP)
Expected signal: Sysmon Event ID 1: Process Create with Image=wmic.exe, CommandLine containing 'useraccount'. Followed by net.exe process create. Security Event 4720 generated by the net user /add call. Parent process chain visible in Sysmon logs.
- Test 3Create Local User via PowerShell New-LocalUser
Expected signal: Sysmon Event ID 1: Process Create with Image=powershell.exe, CommandLine containing 'New-LocalUser'. Security Event 4720: new account df00tech-pstest created, SubjectUserName shows running user. PowerShell ScriptBlock Log Event ID 4104 will show the full New-LocalUser command with parameters.
- Test 4Linux Account Creation via useradd
Expected signal: Syslog / /var/log/auth.log: 'useradd: new user: name=df00tech-linuxtest, UID=<uid>, GID=<gid>'. If auditd is configured with -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S execve rules: audit log entry for useradd execution with full command line. If Sysmon for Linux is deployed: process creation event for useradd.
References (9)
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1136/
- https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4720
- https://symantec-enterprise-blogs.security.com/blogs/threat-intelligence/wastedlocker-ransomware-us
- https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/lockbit-2-ransomware/
- https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/cybersecurity-advisories/aa23-320a
- https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/td/docs/security/salt-typhoon-advisory.html
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/identity/ad-ds/plan/security-best-practices/audit-account-management
- https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1136.001/T1136.001.md
- https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/builtin/security
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