Detect Domain Account in Google Chronicle
Adversaries may create a domain account to maintain access to victim systems. Domain accounts are managed by Active Directory Domain Services where access and permissions are configured across systems and services that are part of that domain. With sufficient privileges, the net user /add /domain command or PowerShell's New-ADUser cmdlet can be used to create domain accounts. Threat actors including GALLIUM, BlackByte, Wizard Spider, HAFNIUM, and Medusa Group have used this technique to establish persistent, credentialed access that does not require remote access tools to remain deployed.
MITRE ATT&CK
- Tactic
- Persistence
- Technique
- T1136 Create Account
- Sub-technique
- T1136.002 Domain Account
- Canonical reference
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1136/002/
YARA-L Detection Query
rule T1136_002_domain_account_creation {
meta:
author = "Argus Detection Engineering"
description = "Detects domain account creation and privileged AD group membership additions consistent with T1136.002. Covers Windows Security Events 4720/4728 and process-based creation via net.exe, dsadd.exe, and PowerShell AD cmdlets."
severity = "HIGH"
priority = "HIGH"
mitre_attack_tactic = "Persistence"
mitre_attack_technique = "T1136.002"
mitre_attack_technique_name = "Create Account: Domain Account"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1136/002/"
false_positives = "Authorized IT provisioning, IAM platform automation, AD migration tooling"
version = "1.0"
events:
(
// Branch 1: Domain account created — Security Event 4720
(
$e.metadata.event_type = "USER_CREATION" and
$e.metadata.product_event_type = "4720" and
not re.regex($e.target.administrative_domain, `(?i)^WORKGROUP$`) and
$e.target.administrative_domain != ""
)
or
// Branch 2: Member added to privileged global security group — Security Event 4728
(
$e.metadata.event_type = "GROUP_MODIFICATION" and
$e.metadata.product_event_type = "4728" and
re.regex($e.target.group.group_display_name,
`(?i)(domain\s+admins|enterprise\s+admins|schema\s+admins|group\s+policy\s+creator\s+owners|^administrators$)`)
)
or
// Branch 3: net.exe / net1.exe / dsadd.exe with /add /domain flags
(
$e.metadata.event_type = "PROCESS_LAUNCH" and
re.regex($e.target.process.file.full_path,
`(?i)(\\net\.exe$|\\net1\.exe$|\\dsadd\.exe$)`) and
(
re.regex($e.target.process.command_line, `(?i)/add`) and
re.regex($e.target.process.command_line, `(?i)/domain`)
) or
re.regex($e.target.process.command_line, `(?i)dsadd\s+user`)
)
or
// Branch 4: PowerShell New-ADUser or Add-ADGroupMember targeting privileged groups
(
$e.metadata.event_type = "PROCESS_LAUNCH" and
re.regex($e.target.process.file.full_path,
`(?i)(\\powershell\.exe$|\\pwsh\.exe$)`) and
re.regex($e.target.process.command_line,
`(?i)(New-ADUser|Add-ADGroupMember|New-ADAccount)`) and
re.regex($e.target.process.command_line,
`(?i)(Domain\s+Admins|Enterprise\s+Admins|Schema\s+Admins|Administrators|-AccountPassword|-Enabled\s+\$true)`)
)
)
condition:
$e
} Detects domain account creation and privileged Active Directory group membership additions across four behavioral branches: Security Event 4720 (domain account created), Security Event 4728 (privileged group member added), process execution of net.exe/dsadd.exe with domain creation flags, and PowerShell New-ADUser or Add-ADGroupMember cmdlets targeting Domain Admins, Enterprise Admins, or Schema Admins groups.
Data Sources
Required Tables
False Positives & Tuning
- Authorized identity lifecycle management platforms (SailPoint IdentityIQ, Saviynt, Omada) performing automated AD account provisioning through approved integration workflows
- System administrators executing net.exe or PowerShell AD scripts in documented change management windows for routine account provisioning
- Active Directory migration or consolidation projects using dsadd.exe or bulk PowerShell cmdlets to recreate accounts during forest restructuring
Other platforms for T1136.002
Testing Methodology
Validate this detection against 4 adversary techniques from Atomic Red Team. Each test below lists the behaviour to exercise and the telemetry you should expect to see. Executable commands and cleanup steps are available with Pro.
- Test 1Create Domain Account via Net User
Expected signal: Domain Controller Security Event ID 4720: TargetUserName=df00tech_test_acct, SubjectUserName=<executing account>, TargetDomainName=<domain>. Sysmon Event ID 1 on executing host: Image=C:\Windows\System32\net.exe, CommandLine containing 'user df00tech_test_acct' and '/add /domain'. Security Event 4688 (if command line auditing enabled) on executing host.
- Test 2Create Domain Account and Add to Domain Admins via PowerShell
Expected signal: Domain Controller Security Event 4720: account creation for df00tech_priv_test. Domain Controller Security Event 4728: MemberName=df00tech_priv_test added to TargetUserName=Domain Admins. Sysmon Event 1: powershell.exe with CommandLine containing 'New-ADUser' and 'Add-ADGroupMember'. PowerShell ScriptBlock Log Event 4104 with full command text.
- Test 3Create Domain Account via dsadd
Expected signal: Domain Controller Security Event 4720: TargetUserName=df00tech_dsadd_test. Sysmon Event 1: Image=C:\Windows\System32\dsadd.exe, CommandLine containing 'user CN=df00tech_dsadd_test'. Security Event 4688 on executing host with dsadd.exe process creation.
- Test 4Simulate Adversary Account Naming with Empire-style Pattern
Expected signal: Domain Controller Security Event 4720 with TargetUserName=svc_argus_health$ (note the $ suffix mimicking a machine or service account). Sysmon Event 1: net.exe with /add /domain. Security Event 4688. The account name pattern (svc_ prefix, $ suffix) may not match naming convention baselines and should be noted in triage.
References (10)
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1136/002/
- https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4720
- https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4728
- https://web.archive.org/web/20150511162820/http://windowsitpro.com/windows/netexe-reference
- https://www.cybereason.com/blog/operation-soft-cell-a-worldwide-campaign-against-telecommunications-providers
- https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2019/12/12/gallium-targeting-global-telecom/
- https://www.mandiant.com/resources/fin12-ransomware-intrusion-actor-redefining-speed
- https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/cybersecurity-advisories/aa23-058a
- https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1136.002/T1136.002.md
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/activedirectory/new-aduser
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