Detect Parent PID Spoofing in IBM QRadar
Adversaries may spoof the parent process identifier (PPID) of a new process to evade process-monitoring defenses or to elevate privileges. By calling CreateProcess with a PROC_THREAD_ATTRIBUTE_PARENT_PROCESS entry in the process attribute list, an attacker can assign any running process as the apparent parent of the newly spawned child. Security tools that rely on parent-child process lineage for detection see only the spoofed parent, masking the true origin. This technique is also exploited for privilege escalation: by opening a handle to a SYSTEM-level process such as lsass.exe and using it as the spoofed parent, the child process inherits the SYSTEM access token. Used in the wild by Cobalt Strike, KONNI, PipeMon, and DarkGate.
MITRE ATT&CK
- Technique
- T1134 Access Token Manipulation
- Sub-technique
- T1134.004 Parent PID Spoofing
- Canonical reference
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1134/004/
QRadar Detection Query
SELECT
DATEFORMAT(starttime, 'YYYY-MM-dd HH:mm:ss') AS event_time,
logsourcename(logsourceid) AS log_source,
"username",
"ParentImage",
"Image",
"CommandLine",
"ParentCommandLine",
"IntegrityLevel",
"ProcessId",
"ProcessGuid",
CASE
WHEN LOWER("ParentImageShort") IN ('lsass.exe','wininit.exe','smss.exe','csrss.exe','winlogon.exe','services.exe')
AND LOWER("ImageShort") IN ('cmd.exe','powershell.exe','pwsh.exe','rundll32.exe','regsvr32.exe','mshta.exe','wscript.exe','cscript.exe','msbuild.exe','certutil.exe','bitsadmin.exe','cmstp.exe','installutil.exe')
THEN 'HighPrivilegeParentSpawn'
WHEN "IntegrityLevel" = 'System'
AND LOWER("ParentImageShort") NOT IN ('lsass.exe','wininit.exe','smss.exe','csrss.exe','winlogon.exe','services.exe','system','ntoskrnl.exe')
AND LOWER("ImageShort") IN ('cmd.exe','powershell.exe','pwsh.exe','rundll32.exe','regsvr32.exe','mshta.exe','wscript.exe','cscript.exe','msbuild.exe','certutil.exe','bitsadmin.exe','cmstp.exe','installutil.exe')
THEN 'IntegrityMismatchElevation'
WHEN LOWER("ParentImageShort") = 'explorer.exe' AND "IntegrityLevel" = 'System'
THEN 'ExplorerSystemChild'
ELSE 'MultipleIndicators'
END AS spoof_branch
FROM events
WHERE
LOGSOURCETYPENAME(devicetype) ILIKE '%sysmon%'
AND QIDNAME(qid) ILIKE '%process create%'
AND starttime > NOW() - 1 DAYS
AND (
-- Branch 1: High-value system process as apparent parent of LOLBin/shell
(
LOWER("ParentImage") MATCHES '.*\\(lsass|wininit|smss|csrss|winlogon|services)\.exe'
AND LOWER("Image") MATCHES '.*\\(cmd|powershell|pwsh|rundll32|regsvr32|mshta|wscript|cscript|msbuild|certutil|bitsadmin|cmstp|installutil)\.exe'
)
OR
-- Branch 2: SYSTEM integrity child from non-SYSTEM, non-privileged parent
(
"IntegrityLevel" = 'System'
AND NOT LOWER("ParentImage") MATCHES '.*\\(lsass|wininit|smss|csrss|winlogon|services|system|ntoskrnl)\.exe'
AND LOWER("Image") MATCHES '.*\\(cmd|powershell|pwsh|rundll32|regsvr32|mshta|wscript|cscript|msbuild|certutil|bitsadmin|cmstp|installutil)\.exe'
)
OR
-- Branch 3: explorer.exe parent of SYSTEM-integrity process
(
LOWER("ParentImage") MATCHES '.*\\explorer\.exe'
AND "IntegrityLevel" = 'System'
)
)
ORDER BY starttime DESCAQL rule for QRadar detecting Parent PID Spoofing via Sysmon Process Create events. Evaluates three detection branches: spoofed high-privilege parent spawning LOLBins, integrity level mismatch indicating PROC_THREAD_ATTRIBUTE_PARENT_PROCESS abuse for SYSTEM token inheritance, and the impossible scenario of explorer.exe parenting a SYSTEM-integrity process. Requires Sysmon logs forwarded to QRadar with ParentImage, IntegrityLevel, and CommandLine fields parsed.
Data Sources
Required Tables
False Positives & Tuning
- Enterprise software deployment tools (SCCM, Intune, PDQ Deploy) that invoke processes via Windows APIs with explicit parent handles may appear as integrity mismatches when deploying SYSTEM-level configurations
- Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents that instrument CreateProcess calls for behavioral monitoring may occasionally generate synthetic parent-child relationships that trigger Branch 2
- Windows Subsystem for Linux (WSL2) process creation can produce unusual parent-child relationships in Sysmon telemetry that superficially resemble PPID spoofing patterns
Other platforms for T1134.004
Testing Methodology
Validate this detection against 4 adversary techniques from Atomic Red Team. Each test below lists the behaviour to exercise and the telemetry you should expect to see. Executable commands and cleanup steps are available with Pro.
- Test 1PPID Spoofing via PowerShell P/Invoke — Explorer Parent
Expected signal: Sysmon Event ID 1: cmd.exe process creation with ParentImage=<path>\explorer.exe and ParentProcessId matching the selected explorer.exe PID. The actual spawning process (PowerShell) does NOT appear as ParentImage. Sysmon Event ID 10: may capture OpenProcess against explorer.exe from PowerShell with GrantedAccess=0x0080. Security Event ID 4688 (if audit enabled): CreatorProcessId=PowerShell's PID, ParentProcessId=explorer.exe's PID — the mismatch confirms spoofing.
- Test 2PPID Spoofing for Privilege Escalation — LSASS as Spoofed Parent
Expected signal: Sysmon Event ID 1: cmd.exe with ParentImage=lsass.exe, ParentProcessId=LSASS PID, IntegrityLevel=System. Sysmon Event ID 10: SourceImage=PowerShell accessing TargetImage=lsass.exe with GrantedAccess=0x0080. Security Event ID 4672: Special privilege logon for the SYSTEM session inherited by cmd.exe. Security Event ID 4688 (if audit enabled): CreatorProcessId=PowerShell PID vs ParentProcessId=LSASS PID — mismatch is the definitive forensic artifact.
- Test 3Cobalt Strike Spawn-To Simulation — Rundll32 Under Explorer
Expected signal: Sysmon Event ID 1: rundll32.exe creation with ParentImage=explorer.exe and ParentProcessId matching the selected explorer.exe PID. Sysmon Event ID 10: OpenProcess from PowerShell against explorer.exe with GrantedAccess=0x0080. The rundll32.exe -> explorer.exe parent relationship is the canonical Cobalt Strike PPID spoofing telemetry signature seen in real incident response engagements.
- Test 4PPID Spoofing Detection Validation — Sysmon ParentProcessId vs Security 4688 CreatorProcessId
Expected signal: Sysmon Event ID 1: cmd.exe with ParentImage=svchost.exe, ParentProcessId=<svchost PID>. Security Event ID 4688 (requires audit process creation + command line enabled): CreatorProcessId=<PowerShell PID>, ParentProcessId=<svchost PID> — the mismatch between Creator and Parent is the definitive PPID spoof indicator. The test outputs exact PID values needed for manual SIEM correlation to confirm the discrepancy is visible in your environment.
References (8)
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1134/004/
- https://blog.didierstevens.com/2009/11/22/quickpost-selectmyparent-or-playing-with-the-windows-process-tree/
- https://www.countercept.com/blog/detecting-parent-pid-spoofing/
- https://blog.xpnsec.com/becoming-system/
- https://blog.christophetd.fr/building-an-office-macro-to-spoof-process-parent-and-command-line/
- https://docs.microsoft.com/windows/desktop/ProcThread/process-creation-flags
- https://www.securityinbits.com/malware-analysis/parent-pid-spoofing-stage-2-ataware-ransomware-part-3
- https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1134.004/T1134.004.md
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