Which SIEM platforms have a T1132.002 detection rule?

df00tech provides T1132.002 (Non-Standard Encoding) detection queries for 7 SIEM platforms: Microsoft Sentinel / Defender, Splunk, Elastic Security (EQL), IBM QRadar (AQL), Sumo Logic CSE, Google Chronicle / SecOps, CrowdStrike LogScale (CQL).

What data sources are required to detect Non-Standard Encoding (T1132.002)?

Detecting Non-Standard Encoding requires the following data sources: Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content, Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation, Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow, Microsoft Defender for Endpoint.

What severity and confidence is the T1132.002 detection?

The T1132.002 detection is rated medium severity with medium confidence.

What are common false positives for T1132.002?

Common false positives for T1132.002 include: CDN and cloud services that use long, base64-encoded tokens in URLs (AWS S3 presigned URLs, Azure SAS tokens, CloudFront signed URLs); Legitimate DNS-over-HTTPS or DNS security products that may generate high-volume DNS query patterns; Monitoring and telemetry agents (Datadog, Dynatrace, New Relic) that POST encoded metrics to collection endpoints using long encoded query strings.

T1132.002 IBM QRadar · QRadar

Detect Non-Standard Encoding in IBM QRadar

Adversaries may encode data with a non-standard data encoding system to make the content of command and control traffic more difficult to detect. Non-standard encoding schemes diverge from existing protocol specifications — for example, modified Base64 using a custom alphabet, XOR encoding with a static or rolling key, character substitution (replacing '/' with '-s', '+' with '-p'), or custom binary serialization. Real-world examples include OceanSalt (NOT operation on bytes), Small Sieve (hex byte swapping), TONESHELL (XOR with 32/256-byte key), NightClub (modified Base64 in DNS subdomains), RDAT (Base64 with character substitutions in DNS), InvisiMole (modified Base32 in DNS subdomains), and Uroburos (custom Base62/Base32). Detection focuses on anomalous DNS subdomain lengths and entropy, unusual encoded patterns in network traffic, and scripting processes generating high-entropy outbound data.

MITRE ATT&CK

Tactic: Command and Control
Technique: T1132 Data Encoding
Sub-technique: T1132.002 Non-Standard Encoding
Canonical reference: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1132/002/

QRadar Detection Query

IBM QRadar (QRadar)

sql

SELECT
  DATEFORMAT(devicetime, 'yyyy-MM-dd HH:mm:ss') AS EventTime,
  sourceip,
  destinationip,
  destinationport,
  username,
  LOGSOURCETYPENAME(logsourceid) AS SourceType,
  QIDNAME(qid) AS EventName,
  "QueryName" AS DNSQuery,
  URL AS RequestURL,
  "ProcessPath" AS ProcessImage,
  magnitude
FROM events
WHERE
(
  /* Branch 1: DNS query with encoded first subdomain label */
  (
    QIDNAME(qid) LIKE '%DNS%'
    AND (
      "QueryName" MATCHES '^[A-Za-z0-9+/=]{50,}\\..+'
      OR "QueryName" MATCHES '^[A-Za-z0-9_\\-]{50,}\\..+'
      OR "QueryName" MATCHES '^[0-9a-fA-F]{50,}\\..+'
    )
  )
  OR
  /* Branch 2: HTTP/S request with encoded path segment or query string parameter */
  (
    destinationport IN (80, 443, 8080, 8443, 8888)
    AND URL IS NOT NULL
    AND (
      URL MATCHES '.*/[A-Za-z0-9_\\-]{60,}(/|\\?|$).*'
      OR URL MATCHES '.*[?&][a-z]{1,4}=[A-Za-z0-9+/_%\\-]{60,}.*'
    )
  )
  OR
  /* Branch 3: Scripting engine process making outbound connections to public IPs */
  (
    "ProcessPath" MATCHES '(?i).*(python|perl|ruby|wscript|cscript|mshta|powershell|pwsh)\\..*'
    AND NOT INCIDR(destinationip, '10.0.0.0/8')
    AND NOT INCIDR(destinationip, '172.16.0.0/12')
    AND NOT INCIDR(destinationip, '192.168.0.0/16')
    AND NOT INCIDR(destinationip, '127.0.0.0/8')
    AND NOT INCIDR(destinationip, '169.254.0.0/16')
  )
)
LAST 24 HOURS
ORDER BY devicetime DESC

high severity medium confidence

QRadar AQL detection for T1132.002 across three branches: DNS events whose QueryName custom property matches Base64, URL-safe Base64, or hex encoding patterns in the first label (> 50 chars); HTTP/S flows to standard web ports containing encoded path segments or long query parameter values; and scripting engine process paths making external connections. Requires QRadar DSMs for Windows Security Event Log and Sysmon, plus custom event properties for QueryName and ProcessPath mapped via QRadar DSM editor.

Data Sources

QRadar DSM for Microsoft Windows Security Event LogQRadar DSM for Sysmon (Windows Event Log provider)QRadar Network Activity flowsQRadar DSM for Microsoft DNS Analytical Log

Required Tables

events

False Positives & Tuning

Enterprise endpoint agents (CrowdStrike Falcon, Microsoft Defender, Carbon Black) that use Python or PowerShell runtimes to beacon cloud management APIs with encoded host telemetry in URL parameters
Browser extensions or enterprise SaaS tools using long Base64-encoded JWT tokens or session identifiers as HTTP query parameters for authentication and session resumption
Custom internal REST APIs using UUID-composite path segments or Base64-encoded resource identifiers that exceed 60 characters, commonly seen in microservice architectures

Download portable Sigma rule (.yml)

Other platforms for T1132.002

Microsoft Sentinel (KQL) Splunk (SPL) Elastic Security (Elastic) Sumo Logic CSE (Sumo) Google Chronicle (YARA-L) CrowdStrike LogScale (LogScale) All platforms (combined) →

Testing Methodology

Validate this detection against 4 adversary techniques from Atomic Red Team. Each test below lists the behaviour to exercise and the telemetry you should expect to see. Executable commands and cleanup steps are available with Pro.

Test 1Simulate DNS Tunneling with Modified Base64 Subdomain Encoding
Expected signal: Sysmon Event ID 22 (DNS Query): QueryName will contain a long alphanumeric subdomain label (length > 30 characters) matching the pattern [a-z0-9ps]{30,}\.df00tech-test\.local. Sysmon Event ID 1 (Process Create): powershell.exe with command line containing Base64, Replace, and Resolve-DnsName. PowerShell ScriptBlock Log Event ID 4104 capturing the encoding logic.
Test 2XOR-Encoded C2 Data Transmission Simulation (TONESHELL Pattern)
Expected signal: Sysmon Event ID 1: powershell.exe with CommandLine containing -bxor, New-Object System.Net.WebClient, and UploadString. Sysmon Event ID 3: Network connection attempt to 127.0.0.1:8080 (connection will be refused but event fires). PowerShell ScriptBlock Log Event ID 4104 capturing the full XOR encoding loop and WebClient upload code.
Test 3High-Volume DNS Query Burst Simulating DNS Tunneling Data Transfer
Expected signal: 25x Sysmon Event ID 22 (DNS Query) events within ~5 seconds, each with a unique QueryName containing a long base64-like subdomain label (length 40-70 characters) under df00tech-dnstest.local. All queries initiated by powershell.exe. The burst pattern with unique subdomains matches DNS tunneling telemetry.
Test 4HTTP C2 with Custom Base64 Alphabet Encoding (Neo-reGeorg Pattern)
Expected signal: Sysmon Event ID 1: powershell.exe with CommandLine containing IndexOf, ToCharArray, WebClient, and UploadString — all indicators of custom encoding implementation. Sysmon Event ID 3: Network connection to 127.0.0.1:8080. PowerShell ScriptBlock Log Event ID 4104 capturing the full custom alphabet encoding logic. If stream:http is available, the POST body will contain d=<60+ char custom-alphabet string>.

Last updated: 2026-04-18 Research depth: deep

References (11)

Response Playbook

1. Examine the full command line and decode any Base64 content...
2. Identify the parent process chain and user context...
3. Check for concurrent network connections from the process...

Investigation Guide

Related techniques: T1027, T1105, T1562.001...
Forensic artifacts: PSReadLine history, Prefetch, ScriptBlock logs...

Atomic Red Team Tests

Test 1: Encoded command execution...
Test 2: Download cradle via Net.WebClient...

Unlock Pro Content

Get the full detection package for T1132.002 including response playbook, investigation guide, and atomic red team tests.

Response PlaybookInvestigation GuideHunting QueriesAtomic Red Team TestsTuning Guidance

Detect Non-Standard Encoding in IBM QRadar

MITRE ATT&CK

QRadar Detection Query

Data Sources

Required Tables

False Positives & Tuning

Other platforms for T1132.002

Testing Methodology

Response Playbook

Investigation Guide

Atomic Red Team Tests

Unlock Pro Content

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MITRE ATT&CK

QRadar Detection Query

Data Sources

Required Tables

False Positives & Tuning

Other platforms for T1132.002

Testing Methodology

Unlock Pro Content

Related Detections

Parent Technique

Related Sub-techniques

Related Techniques

Same Tactic: Command and Control

Popular Detections

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