Detect JamPlus in Google Chronicle
Adversaries may abuse the JamPlus build utility to proxy the execution of malicious scripts or binaries. JamPlus is a cross-platform build system that uses Jamfiles to describe build processes and dependencies. By embedding arbitrary shell commands within a specially crafted .jam file's Actions blocks, adversaries can execute payloads through a trusted developer tool. Because jam.exe carries a legitimate code-signing reputation, this technique is specifically used to bypass Smart App Control (SAC) and similar reputation-based application control mechanisms that would otherwise block unsigned or unknown executables.
MITRE ATT&CK
- Tactic
- Defense Evasion
- Sub-technique
- T1127.003 JamPlus
- Canonical reference
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1127/003/
YARA-L Detection Query
rule jamplus_proxy_execution_t1127_003 {
meta:
author = "Argus Detection Engineering"
description = "Detects JamPlus (jam.exe/jamplus.exe) abuse for signed binary proxy execution (T1127.003). Covers suspicious child processes, suspicious parent processes, execution from user-writable paths, and loading Jamfiles from suspicious locations via -f flag."
severity = "HIGH"
priority = "HIGH"
mitre_attack_tactic = "Defense Evasion"
mitre_attack_technique = "T1127.003"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1127/003/"
version = "1.0"
created = "2026-04-18"
events:
(
/* Branch 1: JamPlus spawning suspicious child processes */
(
$e1.metadata.event_type = "PROCESS_LAUNCH"
and re.regex($e1.principal.process.file.full_path, `(?i)(\\jam\.exe|\\jamplus\.exe)$`)
and re.regex($e1.target.process.file.full_path, `(?i)(\\cmd\.exe|\\powershell\.exe|\\pwsh\.exe|\\wscript\.exe|\\cscript\.exe|\\mshta\.exe|\\rundll32\.exe|\\regsvr32\.exe|\\certutil\.exe|\\bitsadmin\.exe|\\msiexec\.exe|\\wmic\.exe|\\schtasks\.exe|\\net\.exe|\\netsh\.exe|\\whoami\.exe|\\curl\.exe|\\nltest\.exe)$`)
)
or
/* Branch 2: JamPlus launched by suspicious parent processes */
(
$e1.metadata.event_type = "PROCESS_LAUNCH"
and re.regex($e1.target.process.file.full_path, `(?i)(\\jam\.exe|\\jamplus\.exe)$`)
and re.regex($e1.principal.process.file.full_path, `(?i)(\\winword\.exe|\\excel\.exe|\\powerpnt\.exe|\\outlook\.exe|\\onenote\.exe|\\wscript\.exe|\\cscript\.exe|\\mshta\.exe|\\explorer\.exe|\\powershell\.exe|\\pwsh\.exe|\\cmd\.exe)$`)
)
or
/* Branch 3: JamPlus executing from user-writable/temp paths */
(
$e1.metadata.event_type = "PROCESS_LAUNCH"
and re.regex($e1.target.process.file.full_path, `(?i)(\\jam\.exe|\\jamplus\.exe)$`)
and re.regex($e1.target.process.file.full_path, `(?i)(\\temp\\|\\tmp\\|\\downloads\\|\\desktop\\|\\public\\|appdata\\local\\temp\\)`)
)
or
/* Branch 4: JamPlus loading Jamfile from suspicious path via -f flag */
(
$e1.metadata.event_type = "PROCESS_LAUNCH"
and re.regex($e1.target.process.file.full_path, `(?i)(\\jam\.exe|\\jamplus\.exe)$`)
and re.regex($e1.target.process.command_line, `(?i)-f\s`)
and re.regex($e1.target.process.command_line, `(?i)(\\temp\\|\\tmp\\|\\downloads\\|\\desktop\\|\\appdata\\|\\public\\)`)
)
)
condition:
$e1 Chronicle YARA-L 2.0 rule detecting JamPlus binary proxy execution (T1127.003) across four behavioral branches: suspicious LOLBin child processes spawned by JamPlus, JamPlus launched by Office or script interpreter parents, JamPlus running from user-writable or temporary directories, and JamPlus loading Jamfiles from suspicious paths via the -f flag. Designed to catch Smart App Control bypass via signed binary abuse.
Data Sources
Required Tables
False Positives & Tuning
- Legitimate cross-platform build systems using JamPlus in portable developer environments stored in user Downloads folders
- Automated asset pipeline tooling in game development studios launching JamPlus from Office macro-driven scripts
- Build scripts invoking JamPlus from PowerShell as part of developer onboarding automation installed to APPDATA
Other platforms for T1127.003
Testing Methodology
Validate this detection against 4 adversary techniques from Atomic Red Team. Each test below lists the behaviour to exercise and the telemetry you should expect to see. Executable commands and cleanup steps are available with Pro.
- Test 1JamPlus Executes cmd.exe via Malicious Jamfile in TEMP
Expected signal: Sysmon Event ID 1: Process Create for jam.exe with CommandLine containing '-f' and a path under %TEMP%. Sysmon Event ID 1: Child Process Create for cmd.exe with ParentImage matching jam.exe path. Sysmon Event ID 11: File Create for %TEMP%\jamtest-output.txt written by cmd.exe. Security Event ID 4688 if command line auditing is enabled.
- Test 2JamPlus Executes PowerShell Download Cradle via Jamfile
Expected signal: Sysmon Event ID 1: Process Create for jam.exe from %TEMP%. Sysmon Event ID 1: Child Process Create for powershell.exe with ParentImage=jam.exe and CommandLine containing 'Net.WebClient' and 'DownloadString'. Sysmon Event ID 3: Network connection attempt from powershell.exe to 127.0.0.1:8080 (fails — no listener but event fires). PowerShell ScriptBlock Log Event ID 4104 with the download cradle content.
- Test 3JamPlus Binary Staged in TEMP Directory (Suspicious Execution Path)
Expected signal: Sysmon Event ID 11: File Create for %TEMP%\jam.exe (binary staging). Sysmon Event ID 1: Process Create for jam.exe with Image and FolderPath under %TEMP%. Sysmon Event ID 1: Child Process Create for cmd.exe with ParentImage=%TEMP%\jam.exe and CommandLine containing 'net user'.
- Test 4JamPlus Spawned by Scripting Engine (Simulated VBScript Dropper Delivery)
Expected signal: Sysmon Event ID 1: Process Create for wscript.exe with CommandLine referencing dropper.vbs. Sysmon Event ID 1: Process Create for jam.exe with ParentImage=wscript.exe — this is the primary detection event. Sysmon Event ID 1: Child Process Create for cmd.exe with ParentImage=jam.exe, completing the three-level process chain wscript.exe → jam.exe → cmd.exe.
References (8)
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1127/003/
- https://cyble.com/blog/reputation-hijacking-with-jamplus-a-maneuver-to-bypass-smart-app-control-sac/
- https://www.elastic.co/security-labs/dismantling-smart-app-control
- https://jamplus.github.io/jamplus/quick_start.html
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/defender-endpoint/advanced-hunting-deviceprocessevents-table
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/application-security/application-control/smart-app-control/
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/downloads/sysmon
- https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation
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