Detect Video Capture in Sumo Logic CSE
Adversaries may leverage a computer's peripheral devices (e.g., integrated cameras or webcams) or applications (e.g., video call services) to capture video recordings for the purpose of gathering information. Images may also be captured from devices or applications, potentially in specified intervals, in lieu of video files. Malware or scripts may interact with webcam devices through OS or application APIs such as the Windows Video Capture API (avicap32.dll), DirectShow, Windows Media Foundation, or platform-specific libraries on macOS and Linux. Captured video or image files may be written to disk and exfiltrated later. Threat actors including Transparent Tribe (Crimson RAT), Silence Group, and tools such as Empire, NanoCore, Agent Tesla, and PoetRAT have demonstrated active use of this technique.
MITRE ATT&CK
- Tactic
- Collection
- Technique
- T1125 Video Capture
- Canonical reference
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1125/
Sumo Detection Query
// T1125 - Video Capture Detection
// Branch 1: Camera capture DLL loaded by suspicious process (Sysmon EID 7)
(_sourceCategory="windows/sysmon" OR _sourceCategory="WinEventLog/Sysmon")
| parse xml auto
| where EventID = "7"
| where (
ImageLoaded matches "*avicap32.dll" OR
ImageLoaded matches "*vfw32.dll" OR
ImageLoaded matches "*mfreadwrite.dll"
)
| where !(Image matches "*Teams.exe" OR
Image matches "*zoom.exe" OR
Image matches "*Skype.exe" OR
Image matches "*slack.exe" OR
Image matches "*webex.exe" OR
Image matches "*chrome.exe" OR
Image matches "*msedge.exe" OR
Image matches "*firefox.exe" OR
Image matches "*obs64.exe" OR
Image matches "*obs32.exe" OR
Image matches "*vlc.exe" OR
Image matches "*ffmpeg.exe" OR
Image matches "*WindowsCamera.exe")
| eval DetectionType = "CameraAPILoad"
| eval SuspiciousIndicator = if(ImageLoaded matches "*avicap32*", "LegacyCaptureAPI",
if(ImageLoaded matches "*vfw32*", "VideoForWindowsAPI",
if(ImageLoaded matches "*mfreadwrite*", "MediaFoundationWrite", "UnknownDLL")))
| fields _messageTime, Computer, User, Image, CommandLine, ParentImage, ImageLoaded, DetectionType, SuspiciousIndicator
// ---- UNION Branch 2 ----
// Run separately or use subquery union:
// (_sourceCategory="windows/sysmon")
// | parse xml auto
// | where EventID = "11"
// | where (
// TargetFilename matches "*.avi" OR TargetFilename matches "*.mp4" OR
// TargetFilename matches "*.wmv" OR TargetFilename matches "*.mkv" OR
// TargetFilename matches "*.mov" OR TargetFilename matches "*.m4v" OR
// TargetFilename matches "*.flv"
// )
// | where (
// TargetFilename matches "*\AppData\Local\Temp\*" OR
// TargetFilename matches "*\AppData\Roaming\*" OR
// TargetFilename matches "*\ProgramData\*" OR
// TargetFilename matches "*\Users\Public\*" OR
// TargetFilename matches "*\Windows\Temp\*"
// )
// | where !(Image matches "*Teams.exe" OR Image matches "*zoom.exe" OR
// Image matches "*Skype.exe" OR Image matches "*vlc.exe" OR
// Image matches "*ffmpeg.exe" OR Image matches "*WindowsCamera.exe")
// | eval DetectionType = "VideoFileCreation"
// | eval SuspiciousIndicator = "VideoFileInSuspiciousPath"
// | fields _messageTime, Computer, User, Image, CommandLine, ParentImage, TargetFilename as SuspiciousFile, DetectionType, SuspiciousIndicator
| sort by _messageTime desc
| count by Computer, User, Image, CommandLine, DetectionType, SuspiciousIndicatorDetects MITRE ATT&CK T1125 (Video Capture) in Sumo Logic using Sysmon XML event logs. Primary query targets Sysmon Event ID 7 (Image Load) for camera capture DLL loads (avicap32.dll, vfw32.dll, mfreadwrite.dll) by processes not in the known-legitimate media application list. A commented secondary query block covers Sysmon EID 11 (File Create) for video file creation in suspicious temp/staging directories. Combine via subquery union for unified alerting. Detects tools like Crimson RAT, NanoCore, Agent Tesla, and Empire's video capture modules.
Data Sources
Required Tables
False Positives & Tuning
- Legitimate screen capture or remote desktop software (e.g., AnyDesk, TeamViewer) that loads avicap32.dll for desktop sharing functionality when not in the exclusion list will generate alerts
- Video conversion or transcoding utilities (e.g., HandBrake, ffprobe) writing output to temporary directories during automated media processing pipelines
- Browser plugins or Electron-based applications (Slack, Discord) loading media DLLs from non-standard installation directories not matching the exclusion path patterns
Other platforms for T1125
Testing Methodology
Validate this detection against 4 adversary techniques from Atomic Red Team. Each test below lists the behaviour to exercise and the telemetry you should expect to see. Executable commands and cleanup steps are available with Pro.
- Test 1Webcam Access via avicap32.dll (Windows Legacy API)
Expected signal: Sysmon Event ID 7 (Image Load): Image=powershell.exe, ImageLoaded=C:\Windows\System32\avicap32.dll. Sysmon Event ID 1 (Process Create): CommandLine will contain 'avicap32.dll' and 'capCreateCaptureWindowA'. PowerShell Script Block Log Event ID 4104 with the full P/Invoke code.
- Test 2Video File Creation in Temp Directory Simulation
Expected signal: Sysmon Event ID 11 (File Create): Image=powershell.exe, TargetFilename=C:\Users\<user>\AppData\Local\Temp\capture_<timestamp>.avi. File will contain RIFF header bytes matching AVI format. Sysmon Event ID 1 (Process Create) for the PowerShell process.
- Test 3Webcam Capture via Python OpenCV (Cross-Platform)
Expected signal: Sysmon Event ID 1 (Process Create): Image=python3.exe (or python.exe), CommandLine contains 'cv2.VideoCapture' and 'imwrite'. Sysmon Event ID 7 (Image Load): opencv_videoio*.dll or _cv2.pyd loaded by python3.exe. Sysmon Event ID 11 (File Create): TargetFilename matching frame_<timestamp>.jpg in %TEMP%.
- Test 4Webcam Capture Using ffmpeg (Common RAT Dependency)
Expected signal: Sysmon Event ID 1 (Process Create): Image=ffmpeg.exe, CommandLine contains '-f dshow' and '-i video=' and the output .mp4 path in %TEMP%. Sysmon Event ID 11 (File Create): TargetFilename matching *.mp4 in %TEMP% with Image=ffmpeg.exe. DeviceNetworkEvents (KQL) should be clean for this test — ffmpeg does not make network connections in offline capture mode.
References (11)
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1125/
- https://objective-see.com/blog/blog_0x25.html
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/multimedia/video-capture
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/medfound/microsoft-media-foundation-sdk
- https://www.proofpoint.com/us/threat-insight/post/new-poison-ivy-rat-variant-targets-us-government-employees
- https://securelist.com/the-machete-apt/98121/
- https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2020/04/poetrat-targets-azerbaijan.html
- https://www.group-ib.com/resources/threat-research/silence_moving_into_the_darkside.pdf
- https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1125/T1125.md
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/defender-endpoint/advanced-hunting-deviceimageloadevents-table
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/defender-endpoint/advanced-hunting-devicefileevents-table
Unlock Pro Content
Get the full detection package for T1125 including response playbook, investigation guide, and atomic red team tests.