Detect Automated Collection in CrowdStrike LogScale
Once established within a system or network, an adversary may use automated techniques for collecting internal data. Methods for performing this technique could include use of a Command and Scripting Interpreter to search for and copy information fitting set criteria such as file type, location, or name at specific time intervals. In cloud-based environments, adversaries may also use cloud APIs, data pipelines, command line interfaces, or ETL services to automatically collect data. This functionality could also be built into remote access tools. This technique may incorporate use of other techniques such as File and Directory Discovery and Lateral Tool Transfer to identify and move files, as well as Cloud Service Dashboard and Cloud Storage Object Discovery to identify resources in cloud environments.
MITRE ATT&CK
- Tactic
- Collection
- Technique
- T1119 Automated Collection
- Canonical reference
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1119/
LogScale Detection Query
// T1119 - Automated Collection: Recursive enumeration, mass copy, and document archiving
#event_simpleName = ProcessRollup2
| eval cmdline_lower = lowercase(CommandLine)
| eval proc_lower = lowercase(FileName)
// Detect recursive search patterns
| eval RecursiveSearch = if(
match(cmdline_lower, "get-childitem|gci |-recurse|dir /s|forfiles|os\.walk|glob\.glob|scandir"),
1, 0
)
// Detect sensitive file extension targeting
| eval SensitiveExt = if(
match(cmdline_lower, "\\.docx?|\\.xlsx?|\\.pdf|\\.pptx?|\\.pst|\\.ost|\\.mdb|\\.accdb|\\.kdbx|\\.pfx|\\.pem|\\.p12|\\.key|\\.csv"),
1, 0
)
// Detect archive tools
| eval ArchiveTool = if(
match(proc_lower, "rar\\.exe|winrar\\.exe|7z\\.exe"),
1, 0
)
// Detect mass copy operations with recursive flags
| eval MassCopy = if(
match(proc_lower, "robocopy\\.exe|xcopy\\.exe")
and match(cmdline_lower, "/s|/e|/mir"),
1, 0
)
// Detect script interpreters used for traversal
| eval ScriptInterpreter = if(
match(proc_lower, "powershell\\.exe|pwsh\\.exe|python[23]?\\.exe|wscript\\.exe|cscript\\.exe"),
1, 0
)
// Detect credential-adjacent files
| eval CredentialFiles = if(
match(cmdline_lower, "\\.pfx|\\.pem|\\.p12|\\.key|\\.kdbx"),
1, 0
)
// Composite risk scoring
| eval SuspicionScore = RecursiveSearch + SensitiveExt + ArchiveTool + MassCopy + CredentialFiles
// Apply detection filter
| where (ScriptInterpreter = 1 and RecursiveSearch = 1 and SensitiveExt = 1)
or MassCopy = 1
or (ArchiveTool = 1 and SensitiveExt = 1)
or SuspicionScore >= 2
| table timestamp, ComputerName, UserName, FileName, CommandLine, ParentBaseFileName, ParentCommandLine,
RecursiveSearch, SensitiveExt, ArchiveTool, MassCopy, CredentialFiles, SuspicionScore
| sort(field=SuspicionScore, order=desc)
| sort(field=timestamp, order=desc)CrowdStrike LogScale (CQL) detection for automated data collection (T1119) using Falcon ProcessRollup2 events. Applies a suspicion scoring model across recursive file enumeration (PowerShell, CMD, Python), mass copy operations (robocopy, xcopy), document archiving (RAR, 7-Zip), and WScript/CScript FileSystemObject file collection patterns targeting sensitive document and credential file types.
Data Sources
Required Tables
False Positives & Tuning
- Falcon sensor-enrolled backup agents (e.g., CrashPlan, Cohesity) that launch robocopy or PowerShell Get-ChildItem to enumerate and stage document backups on a recurring schedule
- Security operations tooling such as endpoint forensic collectors or incident response scripts that use Python os.walk or glob to gather evidence files by extension
- Application packaging teams using 7z.exe or WinRAR to bundle document collections for software releases or internal distribution
Other platforms for T1119
Testing Methodology
Validate this detection against 4 adversary techniques from Atomic Red Team. Each test below lists the behaviour to exercise and the telemetry you should expect to see. Executable commands and cleanup steps are available with Pro.
- Test 1PowerShell Recursive Document Collection to Staging Directory
Expected signal: Sysmon Event ID 1: Process Create with Image=powershell.exe, CommandLine containing 'Get-ChildItem', '-Recurse', '.docx', '.xlsx', '.pdf'. Sysmon Event ID 11: Multiple file creation events in %TEMP%\df00tech-stage for each copied file. PowerShell ScriptBlock Log Event ID 4104 with the full collection script. Security Event ID 4663 (if SACL auditing enabled) for each source document read.
- Test 2CMD Recursive File Enumeration with dir /s
Expected signal: Sysmon Event ID 1: Process Create with Image=cmd.exe, CommandLine containing 'dir /s /b' and '.docx', '.xlsx', '.pdf'. Sysmon Event ID 11: File creation event for %TEMP%\df00tech-filelist.txt. Security Event ID 4688 (if process creation auditing and command line logging are enabled) with full command line including extension targets.
- Test 3forfiles Automated Document Enumeration
Expected signal: Sysmon Event ID 1: Process Create for the shell executing forfiles with CommandLine containing 'forfiles', '/S', and '.docx'. Child cmd.exe process creation events as forfiles spawns a cmd.exe instance per matching file. Sysmon Event ID 11: File creation for %TEMP%\df00tech-forfiles.txt. The child cmd.exe processes with 'echo @PATH' are also logged individually.
- Test 47-Zip Archive Collection — Document Staging Pre-Exfiltration
Expected signal: Sysmon Event ID 1: Process Create with Image=7z.exe, CommandLine containing 'a' (add to archive), target paths with '.docx', '.xlsx', '.pdf', '-r' (recursive), and '-p' (password). Sysmon Event ID 11: File creation event for %TEMP%\df00tech-archive.7z. Security Event ID 4663 (if auditing enabled) for each source document file opened by 7z.exe during archiving.
References (12)
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1119/
- https://www.mandiant.com/resources/blog/unc3944-sms-phishing-sim-swapping-ransomware
- https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/unit42-t9000-advanced-modular-backdoor-uses-complex-anti-analysis-techniques/
- https://www.radware.com/security/ddos-threats-center/threat-advisories-and-attack-reports/micropsia-apt-malware/
- https://www.welivesecurity.com/2020/06/11/gamaredon-group-grows-its-game/
- https://dirkjanm.io/introducing-roadtools/
- https://github.com/dirkjanm/ROADtools
- https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1119/T1119.md
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/defender-endpoint/advanced-hunting-devicefileevents-table
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/administration/windows-commands/forfiles
- https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/administration/windows-commands/robocopy
- https://www.group-ib.com/resources/research/redcurl/
Unlock Pro Content
Get the full detection package for T1119 including response playbook, investigation guide, and atomic red team tests.