Detect Local Email Collection in Google Chronicle
Adversaries may target user email on local systems to collect sensitive information. Outlook stores email data in offline data files (.ost) and personal storage table files (.pst), typically located in C:\Users\<username>\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Outlook or C:\Users\<username>\Documents\Outlook Files. Threat actors access, copy, or exfiltrate these files to harvest credentials, reconnaissance data, business intelligence, or email threads for thread-hijacking phishing campaigns. Groups such as APT1, QakBot, Carbanak, and RedCurl have all employed this technique at scale.
MITRE ATT&CK
- Tactic
- Collection
- Technique
- T1114 Email Collection
- Sub-technique
- T1114.001 Local Email Collection
- Canonical reference
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1114/001/
YARA-L Detection Query
rule t1114_001_local_email_collection {
meta:
author = "Argus Detection Engineering"
description = "Detects local Outlook PST/OST email collection via file access by non-Outlook processes, staging in suspicious directories, or command-line copy operations targeting email stores"
mitre_attack_technique = "T1114.001"
mitre_attack_tactic = "Collection"
severity = "HIGH"
priority = "HIGH"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1114/001/"
created = "2026-04-18"
version = "1.0"
events:
(
// Branch 1: Non-Outlook process accessing PST/OST in Outlook directories
(
$e1.metadata.event_type = "FILE_OPEN" OR
$e1.metadata.event_type = "FILE_CREATION" OR
$e1.metadata.event_type = "FILE_COPY"
) AND
(
$e1.target.file.full_path = /(?i)\.(pst|ost)$/
) AND
(
$e1.target.file.full_path = /(?i)(AppData\\Local\\Microsoft\\Outlook|Documents\\Outlook Files)/
) AND
NOT $e1.principal.process.file.full_path = /(?i)(outlook\.exe|msoia\.exe|ocpubmgr\.exe|olk\.exe|searchindexer\.exe|searchprotocolhost\.exe|msosync\.exe)$/
)
OR
(
// Branch 2: PST/OST staged outside Outlook directories in suspicious paths
(
$e1.metadata.event_type = "FILE_CREATION" OR
$e1.metadata.event_type = "FILE_COPY"
) AND
$e1.target.file.full_path = /(?i)\.(pst|ost)$/ AND
NOT $e1.target.file.full_path = /(?i)(AppData\\Local\\Microsoft\\Outlook|Documents\\Outlook Files)/ AND
(
$e1.target.file.full_path = /(?i)(\\Windows\\Temp|\\Temp\\|\\Downloads\\|\\Public\\|\\ProgramData\\|\\AppData\\Roaming\\|\\Users\\Public\\)/
)
)
OR
(
// Branch 3: Command-line process referencing PST/OST with copy/exfil verbs
$e1.metadata.event_type = "PROCESS_LAUNCH" AND
$e1.principal.process.file.full_path = /(?i)(cmd\.exe|powershell\.exe|pwsh\.exe|xcopy\.exe|robocopy\.exe|wmic\.exe|forfiles\.exe)$/ AND
$e1.target.process.command_line = /(?i)\.(pst|ost)/ AND
(
$e1.target.process.command_line = /(?i)(\bcopy\b|xcopy|robocopy|Compress-Archive|Invoke-WebRequest|\bcurl\b|wmic.*process.*call|\bmove\b)/
)
)
condition:
$e1
} Chronicle YARA-L 2.0 rule detecting T1114.001 Local Email Collection across three behavioral branches: non-Outlook processes opening/reading PST/OST files from Outlook directories, email files being created or copied to staging paths outside normal Outlook locations, and command-line utilities launching with PST/OST references combined with copy/exfiltration command patterns.
Data Sources
Required Tables
False Positives & Tuning
- Windows Search indexer (searchindexer.exe) and Search Protocol Host (searchprotocolhost.exe) are explicitly excluded but other indexing or DLP agents may access PST/OST files — verify principal.process.file.full_path against approved endpoint tool inventory
- Outlook add-ins or COM add-in host processes that interact with PST/OST files on behalf of the user may trigger Branch 1 — inspect principal.process.file.full_path for known addin executables and add to exclusion
- PowerShell scripts used in IT automation for PST import/export workflows (e.g., Exchange Online import) will trigger Branch 3 — validate target.process.command_line for authorized import scripts via hash or script path allow-list
Other platforms for T1114.001
Testing Methodology
Validate this detection against 4 adversary techniques from Atomic Red Team. Each test below lists the behaviour to exercise and the telemetry you should expect to see. Executable commands and cleanup steps are available with Pro.
- Test 1Copy Outlook OST File to Windows Temp (cmd.exe)
Expected signal: Sysmon Event ID 1: Process Create with Image=cmd.exe, CommandLine containing '.ost' and 'copy'. Sysmon Event ID 11: File Create with TargetFilename=%TEMP%\staged_email.ost, Image=cmd.exe. Security Event ID 4688 (if process command line auditing enabled) with same details. Security Event ID 4663 (if object access auditing enabled on Outlook directory) showing read access by cmd.exe.
- Test 2Enumerate and Copy PST Files with PowerShell
Expected signal: Sysmon Event ID 1: Process Create with Image=powershell.exe, CommandLine containing 'Get-ChildItem', '.pst', and 'Copy-Item'. Sysmon Event ID 11: File Create with TargetFilename=C:\ProgramData\dftest_email_staged.pst, Image=powershell.exe. PowerShell ScriptBlock Log Event ID 4104 capturing full script. Security Event ID 4688 for the PowerShell process.
- Test 3WMIC Remote Process PST Copy (Chimera APT Pattern)
Expected signal: Sysmon Event ID 1: Process Create with Image=wmic.exe, CommandLine containing 'process call create' and '.ost'. Secondary Sysmon Event ID 1 for the spawned cmd.exe with the copy command. Sysmon Event ID 11 for the created file in Temp. Security Event ID 4688 for both wmic.exe and cmd.exe child process. Sysmon Event ID 3 (Network Connection) for wmic WMI connection to localhost.
- Test 4Archive Outlook Data Files for Exfiltration Preparation
Expected signal: Sysmon Event ID 1: Process Create with Image=powershell.exe, CommandLine containing 'Compress-Archive' and '.pst'. Sysmon Event ID 11: File Create events for both the dummy .pst and the resulting .zip archive in Temp. PowerShell ScriptBlock Log Event ID 4104 with full script. File Create event for the archive file may also trigger DLP rules if archive-in-staging detection is enabled.
References (9)
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1114/001/
- https://support.office.com/en-us/article/introduction-to-outlook-data-files-pst-and-ost-222eaf92-a995-45d9-bde2-f331f60e2790
- https://practical365.com/clients/office-365-proplus/outlook-cached-mode-ost-file-sizes/
- https://www.mandiant.com/resources/blog/apt1-exposing-one-of-chinas-cyber-espionage-units
- https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2018/07/smoking-guns-smoke-loader-learned-new.html
- https://www.kroll.com/en/insights/publications/cyber/qakbot-malware-growing-threat
- https://www.group-ib.com/resources/threat-research/red-curl.html
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/defender-endpoint/advanced-hunting-devicefileevents-table
- https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1114.001/T1114.001.md
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