Detect Screen Capture in IBM QRadar
Adversaries may attempt to take screen captures of the desktop to gather information over the course of an operation. Screen capturing functionality may be included as a feature of a remote access tool used in post-compromise operations. Taking a screenshot is also typically possible through native utilities or API calls, such as CopyFromScreen (.NET), xwd (Linux), or screencapture (macOS). Threat actors including Dragonfly, Gamaredon (Pteranodon), APT33 (TURNEDUP), Agent Tesla, and BlackEnergy have all used screen capture as part of post-compromise collection operations.
MITRE ATT&CK
- Tactic
- Collection
- Technique
- T1113 Screen Capture
- Canonical reference
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1113/
QRadar Detection Query
SELECT
DATEFORMAT(devicetime, 'yyyy-MM-dd HH:mm:ss') AS event_time,
LOGSOURCENAME(logsourceid) AS log_source,
sourceip AS host_ip,
username,
"Process Name" AS process_name,
"Command" AS command_line,
"Parent Process Name" AS parent_process_name,
CASE
WHEN LOWER("Process Name") MATCHES
'(scrot|xwd|screencapture|psr\.exe|snippingtool\.exe|snipingtool\.exe|screenshot\.exe|xrandr)'
AND LOWER("Parent Process Name") MATCHES
'(cmd\.exe|powershell\.exe|pwsh\.exe|wscript\.exe|cscript\.exe|mshta\.exe|regsvr32\.exe|rundll32\.exe)'
THEN 'ScreenshotUtilFromSuspiciousParent'
WHEN LOWER("Process Name") MATCHES
'(powershell\.exe|pwsh\.exe|cscript\.exe|wscript\.exe|mshta\.exe)'
AND LOWER("Command") MATCHES
'(copyfromscreen|system\.drawing\.graphics|system\.windows\.forms\.screen|printwindow|vk_snapshot|keybd_event|0x2c)'
THEN 'ScriptingEngineScreenshotAPI'
ELSE 'Unknown'
END AS detection_branch
FROM events
WHERE devicetime > NOW() - 86400000
AND LOGSOURCETYPEID IN (12, 119, 341, 352)
AND (
(
LOWER("Process Name") MATCHES
'(scrot|xwd|screencapture|psr\.exe|snippingtool\.exe|snipingtool\.exe|screenshot\.exe|xrandr)'
AND LOWER("Parent Process Name") MATCHES
'(cmd\.exe|powershell\.exe|pwsh\.exe|wscript\.exe|cscript\.exe|mshta\.exe|regsvr32\.exe|rundll32\.exe)'
) OR (
LOWER("Process Name") MATCHES
'(powershell\.exe|pwsh\.exe|cscript\.exe|wscript\.exe|mshta\.exe)'
AND LOWER("Command") MATCHES
'(copyfromscreen|system\.drawing\.graphics|system\.windows\.forms\.screen|printwindow|vk_snapshot|keybd_event|0x2c)'
)
)
ORDER BY devicetime DESCDetects T1113 screen capture activity using QRadar AQL against Windows Sysmon process creation events. Two branches are implemented: screenshot utility execution (scrot, xwd, psr.exe, screencapture, snippingtool.exe) from known suspicious scripting parent processes, and scripting engines (PowerShell, cscript, wscript, mshta) whose command lines reference screenshot APIs (CopyFromScreen, PrintWindow, VK_SNAPSHOT, keybd_event with 0x2C). LOGSOURCETYPEID values cover Microsoft Windows Sysmon, WinEventLog, and common Windows endpoint log sources.
Data Sources
Required Tables
False Positives & Tuning
- Automated CI/CD pipelines that run GUI integration tests (e.g., Selenium Grid, WinAppDriver) using PowerShell wrappers that call CopyFromScreen for visual regression testing
- RMM platforms (NinjaRMM, Kaseya, SolarWinds N-central) that launch built-in screenshot utilities from their agent service processes during remote support sessions
- Security awareness or DLP solutions (ObserveIT, Teramind) that periodically capture employee screens for compliance monitoring, running as background services under non-explorer parents
Other platforms for T1113
Testing Methodology
Validate this detection against 5 adversary techniques from Atomic Red Team. Each test below lists the behaviour to exercise and the telemetry you should expect to see. Executable commands and cleanup steps are available with Pro.
- Test 1Windows Screen Capture via PowerShell CopyFromScreen
Expected signal: Sysmon Event ID 1: Process Create — Image=powershell.exe, CommandLine containing 'CopyFromScreen', 'System.Drawing.Graphics', 'System.Windows.Forms.Screen'. Sysmon Event ID 11: File Create — TargetFilename=C:\Users\<user>\AppData\Local\Temp\df00tech-capture.png, Image=powershell.exe. PowerShell ScriptBlock Log Event ID 4104 with full script content. Sysmon Event ID 7: Image Load — gdi32.dll loaded by powershell.exe.
- Test 2Windows Screen Capture via PSR.exe (Problem Steps Recorder)
Expected signal: Sysmon Event ID 1: Process Create — Image=C:\Windows\System32\psr.exe, CommandLine containing '/start /output ... /sc 1 /maxsc 5'. Second Event ID 1 for the /stop invocation. Sysmon Event ID 11: File Create — TargetFilename ending in .zip in TEMP path, created by psr.exe. Security Event ID 4688 (if command line auditing enabled) for psr.exe execution.
- Test 3Linux Screen Capture via xwd (X Window Dump)
Expected signal: Linux auditd syscall log: execve syscall for xwd with arguments '-root -silent -out /tmp/df00tech-capture.xwd'. File creation event in /tmp/. Syslog entry if auditd is configured with -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S execve rule. Process accounting record for xwd execution. /var/log/auth.log may show the user context.
- Test 4macOS Screen Capture via screencapture Utility
Expected signal: macOS Unified Log: log show --predicate 'process == "screencapture"' will show the invocation. Endpoint security framework (ESF) event for ES_EVENT_TYPE_NOTIFY_EXEC for screencapture. File creation event in /tmp/ for the PNG file. If Defender for Endpoint macOS agent is deployed: DeviceProcessEvents with FileName=screencapture and DeviceFileEvents for the output file.
- Test 5Windows VK_SNAPSHOT Keyboard Simulation Screenshot
Expected signal: Sysmon Event ID 1: Process Create — Image=powershell.exe, CommandLine containing 'keybd_event', '0x2C', 'VK_SNAPSHOT'. PowerShell ScriptBlock Log Event ID 4104 with full P/Invoke code. Sysmon Event ID 7: Image Load — user32.dll loaded by powershell.exe. Sysmon Event ID 11: File Create for .png in TEMP if clipboard contained image data.
References (13)
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1113/
- https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/dotnet/api/system.drawing.graphics.copyfromscreen?view=netframework-4.8
- https://blog.malwarebytes.com/threat-analysis/2017/01/new-mac-backdoor-using-antiquated-code/
- https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2017/02/unit-42-title-gamaredon-group-toolset-evolution/
- https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/gamaredon-february-2022/
- https://securelist.com/griffon-the-javascript-backdoor-used-by-fin7/90515/
- https://www.talos-sec.com/blogs/agent-tesla
- https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA18-074A
- https://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/dragonfly-western-energy-sector-targeted-sophisticated-attack-group
- https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1113/T1113.md
- https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/defender-endpoint/advanced-hunting-devicefileevents-table
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/defender-endpoint/advanced-hunting-deviceimageloadevents-table
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